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As China continues its comprehensive military modernization program, the 2015 
Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, 
published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has expressed concerns that “China’s 
military modernization has the potential to reduce core U.S. military technological 
advantages.” In order to put this concern into a broader context, this thesis asks: how 
does China’s navy compare to navies of existing powers? With China’s naval expansion 
in mind, this thesis compares the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) (PLAN) to other 
modern naval powers to determine if China’s force structure resembles a regional navy 
that is built primarily for power projection, sea denial, or sea line of communications 
(SLOC) defense.  
Comparative case studies are used to contextualize China’s naval modernization 
by identifying characteristics of archetypal navies built for sea denial, power projection, 
and SLOC defense. The Royal Swedish Navy is analyzed as a navy that specializes in sea 
denial, the French Navy is analyzed as a navy that specializes in power projection, and 
the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force is analyzed as a navy that specializes in SLOC 
defense.  
This thesis finds that China is primarily pursuing a maritime strategy centered on 
SLOC defense, but is also capable of employing a sea denial strategy in its near seas. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: VIEWING CHINA’S NAVAL 
MODERNIZATION THROUGH DIFFERENT STRATEGIC LENSES 
A. INTRODUCTION AND MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As China continues its comprehensive military modernization program, the 
Pentagon has expressed concerns that “China’s military modernization has the potential 
to reduce core U.S. military technological advantages.”1 In order to put this concern into 
broader context, this thesis asks what purpose does the People’s Liberation Army (Navy) 
(PLAN) serve in China’s broader maritime strategy? Is China developing a navy for a 
regional strategy of sea denial, power projection or SLOC defense? How does the 
modernized PLAN compare with archetypal navies built with a strategy sea denial, power 
projection, or SLOC defense in mind?  
China’s rapid naval modernization is impressive when compared to the 
capabilities of the PLAN from the 1940s to the early 1990s, but that does not necessarily 
mean that China will provide a regional challenge to the U.S. Navy. China’s primary 
naval mission has, at least until recently, centered on preparing for conflict in the Taiwan 
Strait, but heightened territorial disputes in the South China Sea (SCS) and expanding 
mission sets from the Central Military Commission—to include Sea Lines of 
Communication (SLOC) protection, counter piracy, and humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HA/DR)—have validated the PLAN’s requests for additional funding and 
asset procurement. Former PRC president Hu Jintao publicly advocated the continued 
modernization of the PLAN to meet the growing maritime mission demands in 2011, and 
he appointed the PLAN commander to the Central Military Commission (CMC) for only 
the second time in PRC history the same year.2  
With China’s naval expansion in mind, this thesis compares the PLAN to other 
modern naval powers to determine if China’s force structure resembles a regional navy 
                                                 
1 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 
of China 2015,” Department of Defense, April 7, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/
2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf. 
2 Bernard Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy in the Twenty-first Century (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 2010), xii. 
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that focuses on power projection, sea denial, or SLOC protection. More broadly, this 
thesis discusses the different mission sets associated with command of the sea, control of 
the sea, and sea denial. Additionally, this thesis evaluates specific weapon, ship, 
submarine, and aircraft procurements with an eye toward the different Chinese mission 
sets in order to assess their possible contribution with a particular grand strategy. Power 
projection is the basis of the U.S. Navy’s command of the sea; but for China, power 
projection goals may be limited to preventing Taiwanese independence and international 
involvement in territorial disputes. Finally, this thesis uses China’s current capabilities 
and procurements to compare and contrast with other regional navies that specialize in 
power projection, sea denial, or SLOC protection.  
B. IMPORTANCE 
Realist and power transition theories give credence to the concerns some have 
about Chinese naval expansion. Realists believe that power is a zero sum game and the 
makeup of the global system predicts its stability; thus, any relative gains the Chinese 
make against the United States has the potential to shape the stability of the international 
system, even if the challenge comes at a regional level.3 Power transition theories asserts 
that a rising challenger frequently goes to war against the established major power if the 
challenger is dissatisfied with the current political system.4 Military power gives the state 
the means to enforce their economic and political will. As China continues to modernize 
and expand its navy, while making relative gains on the U.S. Navy, it could eventually be 
in a position to challenge U.S. naval supremacy in the East Asian region. This thesis 
examines China’s strategic naval options based on the capabilities of its current naval 
force and infer intentions from characteristics of its modernization. 
According to a section in the 2012 Secretary of Defense Strategic Guidance report 
concerning China, “The growth of China’s military power must be accompanied by 
                                                 
3 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 93, 97. 
4 Yves-Heng Lim, “How (Dis)Satisfied Is China? A Power Transition Theory Perspective,” Journal of 
Contemporary China, 24, no. 92 (2015): 282. 
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greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region.”5 
Historically, the consequences of friction between the United States and China have 
varied widely. From proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam to the angry rhetoric of one state 
condemning the actions of another, the history of the past seven decades hit nearly every 
point on the spectrum short of an open and direct war between China and the United 
States. Over time, the relationship between China and the United States has grown to 
become more peaceful and more mutually interdependent on the economic level; 
however, there are political and strategic consequences associated with China’s rise that 
have the potential to escalate tensions within the relationship. By analyzing China’s 
capabilities and the strategic options created by them, this thesis identifies current and 
potential sources of friction between the United States and China—and other regional 
powers like Japan—that arise from the type of modernization and force structure the 
PLAN is pursuing.  
Chinese leadership desires to have more political and economic sway on the 
global level and is willing to build new international institutions if the old institutions do 
not recognize their growing power. Moreover, China’s sustained economic growth and 
involvement in regional economic institutions has increased their regional and global 
legitimacy. China recently created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
which plausibly may act in accord with the spirit of the Bretton Woods System, but gives 
China a veto over bank actions, similar to those the United States has with respect to 
actions by the IMF and World Bank. The AIIB was accepted by President Obama, who 
said, “We are all for it,” after stipulating that the system would have to follow best 
practices that enabled the free market to work.6 Similarly, as China expands and 
modernizes its naval forces, the PLAN may enable China to take a stronger leadership 
role in regional security operations. A November 2015 report to Congress on China’s 
Naval Modernization argued that one primary aim of China’s naval modernization is 
                                                 
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Sustaining Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century 
Defense, Defense Strategic Guidance Document (January 5, 2012), 2. http://archive.defense.gov/
news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf. 
6 Ian Talley, “Obama: We’re All for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Wall Street Journal, 
April 28, 2015. http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2015/04/28/obama-were-all-for-the-asian-infrastructure-
investment-bank/. 
 4
“asserting China’s status as a leading regional power and major world power.”7 The AIIB 
did not seek to overthrow the Brenton Woods system—but allowed China to increase its 
status as a regional leader and major global economic power.  
Similarly, naval expansion may give China the opportunity to build upon its 
growing role as an economic leader and assume a greater leadership role in coordinating 
regional security concerns like SLOC protection or settling territorial disputes, while 
acting in concert with the ongoing efforts of the U.S. Navy to protect global trade—
which benefits everyone. After analyzing China’s force structure and comparing it to 
other regional navies, this thesis makes inferences about whether the PLAN is being 
structured to integrate into local maritime efforts, assume a leadership role in the East 
Asian maritime domain, or encourage an environment similar to the status quo—where 
China benefits from the security that the U.S. Navy and its partners provide, while 
occasionally disputing their methods of how to provide it. 
Economic strength is one major variable in China’s rising power, but its military 
strength gives China a greater ability to impose its views that differ from those of the 
United States within the framework the current system. The AIIB built upon existing 
norms of the IMF and World Bank, but if the Chinese were to propose a global or 
regional institution that was contrary to those norms and values, it might be met with 
stiffer resistance. One such example is China’s interpretation of the United Nations 
Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As a signatory member of UNCLOS, 
China placed five qualifying statements when signing—two of the more controversial 
qualifiers include declaring “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” over its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf (CS) and requiring foreign warships to 
receive permission from the government of the PRC to transit Chinese territorial seas.8 
An expanding and modernizing naval force that includes the expansion of Anti-Access 
Area Denial (A2/AD) weapons along the coast and a growing blue water force could 
                                                 
7 Ronald O’Rourke. China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress. (CRS Report no. RL33153). Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2015, i. https://news.usni.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/RL33153_6.pdf.  
8 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, 22. UNCLOS states that “sovereign rights and jurisdiction” are limited to its 
territorial seas (12nm). 
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eventually enable China to perform a range of missions that bolster its ability to defend 
its territorial claims (whether they are compliant with UNCLOS or not). Moreover, 
capability is only one part of the equation. Opportunity and intent are crucial in 
determining Chinese naval strategy, but are much more difficult to discern. Generally, 
China has greatly benefited from the current global political and economic system and 
would have a lot to lose by challenging it outright, however, it is China’s intention to 
become the dominant actor in East Asia.  
As China continues to gain power relative to the U.S. Navy, regional norms in 
maritime security should evolve. This thesis considers whether the PLAN is currently 
built in a way best suited for sea denial, power projection, or SLOC protection, which 
could also provide some prescriptive evidence about how relevant regional norms could 
evolve. For example, a pure sea denial strategy could indicate that China intends to focus 
more on homeland defense than regional security cooperation; whereas, a SLOC defense 
strategy implies that the PLAN will deploy to key chokepoints and SLOCs that may be 
outside of the region and will experience increased maritime interactions with other states 
and security players that operate near key SLOCs. If a state has a sea denial strategy, it 
should be more likely to accept the regional security status quo as long as the status quo 
is not threatening to homeland defense. In a SLOC defense strategy, there is room to take 
a greater role in interacting within the broader regional security apparatus—where the 
large contributors to security have more influence over how the security apparatus is run. 
Identifying China’s maritime strategy may provide clearer insight to its long term 
regional and global ambitions. 
Why does the type of naval force structure matter? According to 2015 report to 
Congress on China’s naval modernization, “Observers of Chinese and U.S. military 
forces view China’s improving naval capabilities as posing a potential challenge in the 
Western Pacific to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain control of blue-water 
ocean areas in wartime—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of 
the Cold War.”9 The type of naval force structure China is building is a crucial 
                                                 
9 O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization, i. 
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component to U.S. defense planning and can be used to more specifically analyze the 
type of threat that China poses more specifically. Thus, a sea denial force has 
significantly different threat limitations than a force designed for sea control.  
If China is building a navy that is meant for SLOC control, that has significant 
implications for the maritime security apparatus in North East Asia and the SLOCs that 
feed into it. Expanded Chinese cooperation in SLOC defense can be viewed in a positive 
light because of the increased load sharing between the U.S. Navy, Japanese Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), and the PLAN. Furthermore, cooperation between the U.S. 
Navy and the PLAN in areas of mutual interest—like SLOC protection—has the potential 
to bolster the political relationship between the United States and China. Alternatively, 
China could decide to act on its own in SLOC protection of Chinese trade. By 
determining if the PLAN is built primarily as a power projection, SLOC defense, or sea 
denial force, this thesis infers the likelihood of cooperation and integration with other 
regional naval powers in the current maritime security apparatus in East Asia, or 
determine if it appears probable that China will operate independently of the current 
system and challenge it. 
This thesis analyzes the nature of China’s expanding capabilities to draw some 
inference to its intentions for a long term naval strategy. Robert Jervis and George 
Quester argue, “The true state of the military balance can be determined only by war; 
states’ intentions may be impossible to determine, even after the fact and with the 
relevant records open for inspection.”10 Moreover, intentions can quickly change 
depending on the international and domestic environment that state faces. Capabilities are 
much more difficult to change, and it takes time to make substantial changes in a state’s 
war making capabilities. Jervis states, “capabilities of course can be misperceived,” but 
having a deep knowledge of capabilities make the strategic limitations of a state more 
distinguishable.11 Although it is seemingly impossible to perfectly and precisely impute 
China’s long-term intentions for the PLAN, it is possible to evaluate current PLAN 
                                                 
10 Jervis Robert and George H. Quester, “War and Misperception.” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18, no. 4 (April 1988): 681.  
11 Jervis, “War and Misperception,” 676. 
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capabilities and how China’s modernization compares to other naval powers. From that, 
some inference regarding Chinese intentions is reasonable. This thesis evaluates China’s 
naval expansion in the context of abstract and empirical cases of forces optimized for 
power projection, SLOC defense, or sea denial. I compare France as an example of a 
regional power projection navy, Sweden as an example of a sea denial navy, and Japan as 
an example of a navy focused on SLOC protection. Once a strategy is determined, it 
makes deciphering Chinese regional political intent more manageable because it will 
identify the operational restrictions placed on Chinese policy by determining the 
capability of the PLAN in comparison to other regional naval powers. This thesis does 
not predict what China will do with its navy, rather, it aims to show what China is 
capable of doing with its navy, how its capabilities have changed in recent decades, and 
the range of strategic alternatives these changes have made possible. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis assesses PLAN expansion by comparison to other regional navies to 
determine the naval grand strategy the Chinese are attempting to achieve. Scholarship on 
China’s naval modernization tends to analyze the PLAN in comparison to its capabilities 
at the start of modernization or in comparison to the U.S. Navy. Both comparisons do 
provide insight into how far the PLAN has come—as well as how far it has to go if it 
wants to be a dominant global navy—but can miss the mark in drawing an “apples to 
apples” comparison that identifies a long term naval strategy. This thesis contributes to 
existing academic literature on Chinese naval modernization by identifying archetypal 
navies for the sea denial, power projection, and SLOC defense strategies, and it will use 
the archetypes to contextualize China’s naval growth with respect to a specific strategy 
that is already being implanted by a modern navy. Additionally, much of the scholarship 
on China’s naval modernization focuses on sea denial and sea control in regards to the 
first and second island chains or the PLAN’s prospects for developing a global navy.  
This thesis introduces the argument that China already has the sea denial 
capabilities it needs—to prevent external intervention in a Taiwan scenario—and is 
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moving toward a regional SLOC defense strategy that provides a solid foundation should 
China’s future ambitions grow to include a gradually expanding global force.  
Scholarship on modern naval grand strategy is largely grounded on the works of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. Three general types of grand strategy emerge 
within the theories of Mahan and Corbett: command of the sea, sea control, and sea 
denial. After discussing the objectives of command of the sea, sea control, and sea denial, 
competing arguments will be presented in the debate over which grand strategy China is 
trying to achieve with its navy. 
For Mahan, command of the sea was the primary factor to determining success in 
wartime. Naval War College professor and retired U.S. Navy Captain Robert Rubel 
points out that although Mahan never wrote the words “command of the sea” specifically, 
he did emphasize the importance of “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the 
enemy’s flag from it, or allows it only to appear as a fugitive, and which, by controlling 
the great commons, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the 
enemy’s shores.”12 Command of the sea can be used as a means to project power and as a 
means to dictate the use of the “great commons.” For decades, the U.S. Navy has used its 
command of the seas to protect and encourage international trade—indeed, it is arguably 
a foundation of the Bretton Woods agreement (and the rule-based, mostly free, globalized 
trade system that emerged after the breakdown of the agreement in the 1970s). Command 
of the sea serves four main purposes, “At sea it assures that our own goods and services 
are safe and that an enemy’s are not. From the sea, it guarantees safe delivery of goods 
and services ashore, and prevents delivery ashore by an enemy navy.”13 For Mahan, 
command of the sea held a crucial economic importance, as it still does today. Mahan 
argued that achieving command of the sea would fall to the victor of a battle between the 
principle naval forces of the powers trying to obtain it. Fleet concentration was the key to 
                                                 
12 Rubel, Command of the Sea, 22. 
13 Wayne P. Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 
9. 
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success for Mahan, because a state whose naval forces could operate without fear of the 
enemy’s fleet will necessarily have obtained command of the sea.14 
Julian Corbett advocated for fleet dispersal—instead of concentration—to obtain 
sea control.15 While command of the sea focused on concentrated forces of capital ships 
with general superiority over all other navies, sea control is limited to a specific space 
and time, and can be achieved by a large force of smaller naval combatants. Moreover, 
command of the sea has been “traditionally about the relative strength of fleets, whereas 
control was and is about the condition of a water space.”16 Corbett also believed that 
securing command of the sea was purely a war time objective, and just because one navy 
lost command of the sea, did not mean it was automatically passed on to another navy.17 
Thus, in peace time, sea control could be exerted over a certain space for an amount of 
time, but command of the sea was not the primary objective. 
The characteristics of a sea denial strategy resemble those of sea control. Sea 
denial is a step below sea control and focuses on preventing a foreign navy for accessing 
a space for a limited time. In sea control the navy can command a limited area for a 
limited time, but sea denial only calls for preventing an adversary from using a limited 
amount of water space to achieve its objectives.18 Sea denial is an attractive option for 
smaller navies to use in the littorals against larger navies that would have a clear 
advantage in the open ocean. 
This thesis focuses on sea denial, power projection, and SLOC defense strategies. 
Although power projection and SLOC defense are not among the three main types of 
naval strategy discussed by Mahan and Corbett, they are hybrid strategies that have 
elements of sea control and command of the seas. Power projection is a strategic 
capability gained from sea control. Since the U.S. Navy commands the seas benignly, 
states that wish to develop power projection capabilities can do so while free riding on 
                                                 
14 Rubel, Command of the Sea, 22. 
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 23. 
18 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, 170. 
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the freedom of the seas that the U.S. Navy broadly provides. The same is true of SLOC 
defense. SLOC defense is a specific mission strategy that requires capabilities that could 
be used for gaining command of the seas, sea control, or sea denial—but SLOC defense 
does require the platforms, weapons, and equipment in huge quantities as would be 
necessary for a command of the seas or sea control strategy. The current maritime status, 
in which the U.S. Navy enforces freedom of the seas, allows states to pursue more cost 
efficient and specific naval strategies (like sea denial and SLOC defense) or take 
advantage of the uncontested seas to amass a power projection force that can be used 
without having to secure broader sea control first. Thus, this thesis addresses the 
likelihood of the PLAN pursuing a sea control, power projection, or SLOC defense 
strategy. 
One prominent argument regarding PLAN capabilities is that the PLAN is still 
only able to use a sea denial strategy effectively. Retired U.S. Navy Captain Bernard 
Cole has surveyed PLAN development from its conception in 1947 as a backwards 
gunboat navy, to its current status as a modernizing force. Cole argues that China 
combines elements of sea control and sea denial into its naval strategy, but is only 
capable of sea denial. China’s surface force has numerous vessels designed with defense 
and denial of the littorals in mind, including 9 corvettes, 175 missile boats, 27 mine 
warfare vessels, and 75 submarine chasers.19 China’s expanding blue water assets—
including 28 destroyers and 49 frigates—provide more credible threats in a sea denial 
scenario, especially when used with the green water forces and the PLAN’s submarine 
fleet. Additionally, the Chinese Second Artillery Force, which was originally created to 
employ nuclear missions against land targets has expanded its conventional missile 
capabilities since 1994.20 Moreover, currently two-thirds of the Second Artillery Force 
structure is currently allocated for near-seas missions.21 Although the primary 
                                                 
19 Timothy A. Walton and Bryan McGrath, “China’s Surface Fleet Trajectory: Implications for the 
U.S. Navy,” China Maritime Study no. 11, ed. Peter Dutton, Andrew S. Erickson, and Ryan Martinson 
(February 2014): 120. https://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/cmsi/publications. 
20 Ron Christman, “China’s Second Artillery Force: Capabilities and Missions in the Near Seas,” 




conventional mission of the Second Artillery Force centers on conflict with Taiwan, the 
mobility and volume of its conventional weapons provide a strong anti-access area denial 
capability (A2/AD) within the first island chain, and pose a moderate threat into the 
second island chain.22 
China’s shift in focus to near sea A2/AD capabilities and bolstering its littoral fast 
attack craft—like the homegrown development of the Houbei—matches the specific 
mission objectives that the PLAN has identified. The five primary specific missions the 
PLAN has are “preparing for operations against Taiwan, defending Chinese claims in the 
East and South China seas, maintaining a strategic deterrent force against the United 
States (and possible India, Russia, and Japan), protecting vital SLOCs—some lying a 
great distance from China, and serving as a diplomatic force.”23 Potential operations 
against Taiwan and belligerents in territorial disputes require China to—at a minimum—
be able to deny outside interference from intervening in the case of military action. Cole 
argues that the PLAN is not strong enough to control the seas of East Asia because of the 
U.S. maritime presence, together with that of the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force, 
and the formidable Republic of Korea Navy. As a consequence, sea denial is the strategy 
China must pursue first before proceeding to sea control.24 Similarly, the Office of Naval 
Intelligence (ONI) also assesses that the PLAN force structure is based on a sea denial 
strategy and that by 2016–17 China may have a strong enough sea denial apparatus to 
start working toward a sea control force structure; but it is not there yet.25 
Shi Xiaoqin argues that any analysis of seapower that aims to predict future 
behavior should “take material and ideational factors into equal account and to integrate 
domestic and international factors.”26 Shi asserts that domestic material factors—like 
                                                 
22 Christman, “Chinas Second Artillery Force,” 44–45. 
23 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, 183. 
24 Ibid., 183–184 
25 Walton, “Chinese Surface Fleet Trajectory,” 128. 
26 Shi Xiaoqin is a lieutenant colonel from the PLA Academy for Military Science in Beijing, China. 
Shi Xiaoqin, “Boundaries and Directions of China’s Seapower,” Twenty-first Century Seapower: 
Cooperation and Conflict At Sea. ed. Peter Dutton, Robert S. Ross, and Øystein Tunsjø (London: 
Routledge, 2012), 80. 
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production of new ships and weapon systems—only tell part of the story, and he argues 
that China has shown great self-restraint in building up their naval forces.27 Many of 
China’s historical security threats have come from the ocean—most dramatically 
demonstrated in China’s humiliating defeat in the first Opium War—and China has an 
increasing stake in maritime security for economic reasons. Despite the increasing 
importance of maritime issues to China, “it is not going to spend an inappropriate 
percentage of its entire defense budget on its navy or make the army a secondary branch 
of the armed forces, which means the likelihood that the PLAN will become a peer 
competitor of the U.S. Navy is very low.”28 Shi also looks at how remnants of U.S. Cold 
War strategy—which is sensitive to the danger of rising seapowers—have caused the 
United States to overreact in their response to China’s naval modernization.29 
Furthermore, he argues that the United States’ habit of identifying China as a threat 
exacerbates the security dilemma from a Chinese perspective because the United States 
has made its counter-balancing strategy well known.30 Shi takes a balanced approach at 
identifying China’s needs in the maritime realm, assessing how their naval forces match 
their needs, and determining how foreign influences have impacted China’s maritime 
strategy. This thesis builds upon Shi’s approach by considering procurements, assets, 
deployment patterns, and maritime interests in determining if China’s naval apparatus is 
built for sea denial, SLOC protection, or power projection. 
Ren Xiaofeng builds upon Shi’s work by performing a deeper analysis of the 
challenges that are driving Chinese maritime security policy and establishing whether 
there is a coherent maritime security policy at the national level. Ren asserts, “China’s 
maritime security strategy must address multiple challenges, including reunification and 
the risk of secessionist activities, constraints and infringement on its natal operations in 
its maritime area, and, as its economy becomes increasingly globalized, risks to marine 
                                                 
27 Shi, “Direction of China’s Seapower,” 80. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 71. 
30 Ibid., 72. 
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shipping, offshore production and the marine environment.”31 A fundamental 
requirement for success for any military strategy is that it must match the national policy. 
Policy development—and the factors that influence it—are a crucial component to the 
strategic development of forces and will be a component of analysis of the PLAN within 
the thesis. Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes provide additional insights into 
competing Chinese strategic theories and their impacts on policymaking. They further 
discuss the impacts of mobile sea denial forces and the ability to obtain limited sea 
control through the use of sea denial forces. Yoshihara and Holmes also assess how 
China is developing tactics, building an undersea deterrent, and using soft power at sea, 
while determining if China is pursuing the “two tridents” of Mahanian naval power 
through forward naval basing and the construction of a decisive battle fleet.32  
One final argument is that China is already capable of sea denial and sea control 
within a limited area. Retired U.S. Navy Commander John Patch from the China 
Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College argues that the PLAN 
has expanded its near seas missions and capabilities from beyond sea denial to sea 
control.33 One example that Patch gives of China shifting to a sea control mindset, is the 
offensive capabilities that the Houbei has obtained. The Office of Naval Intelligence 
(ONI) assessed the Houbei as a defensive patrol craft in 2009, but Patch argues that the 
development of offensive ASCM and data link capabilities have allowed the Houbei to be 
deployed for brief times with strike groups in sea control scenarios focused on ASCM 
saturation—signaling a shift in strategy.34 Similarly, in 2009, RAND concluded that the 
PLAN was investing in technologies to shift from a sea denial strategy to a sea control 
strategy for the near seas.35 James Holmes of the U.S. Naval War College also argued 
                                                 
31 Ren Xiaofeng, “China’s Maritime Security Policy Making,” Twenty-first Century Seapower: 
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that China is shifting to a sea control strategy where “The South China Sea represents the 
most likely maritime theater for Beijing to deploy a force, including combined-arm 
attacks designed to oversaturate and overpower U.S. task group defenses, to realize its 
geopolitical and strategic aims.”36 Timothy Walton and Bryan McGrath from the CMSI 
assert that China has a naval force that is primarily suited for sea denial, but has sea 
control characteristics that—over time—will grow to surpass the sea denial force 
structure exhibited today.37 Even those who have traditionally emphasized the sea denial 
components believe that the tide is beginning to shift. Although Cole argued that China 
employs a sea denial strategy, he believed that the PLAN would be capable of sea control 
within the first island chain by 2020.  
Both China and the United States have official documents that discuss the nature 
of Chinese military modernization. China’s military strategy—including naval strategy—
is vaguely outlined in a series of China Defense white papers. Although some useful 
information can be gathered from China’s white papers (like trends in what China 
believes is important to national security and gradual shifts in stated policy), the white 
papers are written with foreign audiences in mind and do not reveal any reliable 
information on China’s long term military strategy. Moreover, China’s ambiguous white 
papers can be interpreted in numerous ways—with China viewing its defense policy as 
benign and reasonable, but other states (like the United States) viewing it as potentially 
destabilizing.  
The United States releases various documents that seek to explain Chinese naval 
modernization in the context of the U.S. grand strategy and how the United States intends 
to operate within the East Asian region in response to China’s evolving maritime 
strategy. The National Security Strategy (NSS; published by the president’s National 
Security Council), National Military Strategy (NMS; published by the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff), and the Quadrennial Defense Review (ODR; published by the 
Secretary of Defense, but soon to be replaced by two new strategic documents) all 
provide regular evaluations of China’s military modernization and the U.S. interpretation 
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of what it means for long term strategy in the region (both for China and the United 
States). The NSS, NMS, and QDR provide insight to how another regional power 
perceive the nature of China’s modernization and the implications modernization has for 
regional security. Annual reports to Congress on the status of China’s military 
modernization compile a wide array of information—including Office of Naval 
Intelligence reports on naval modernization—to aid in deciphering the long term 
intentions of China’s military strategy. Moreover, if China is using its white papers to 
send a message to foreign audiences about its intentions—however ambiguous that 
message may be—high level U.S. strategic documents can aid China in determining 
whether or not its message is being interpreted as it intended. The Chinese white papers 
and high level strategic documents that the United States releases are politically driven 
documents that provide insight on how each state views the evolution of key interests that 
effect both states, but neither provide any verifiable information on China’s long term 
strategy. 
D. HYPOTHESES 
This thesis discusses whether China is modernizing its navy with a sea denial, 
power projection, or SLOC defense in mind. The main goal of a sea denial strategy is to 
deny entry into a specific water space by making incursions too costly for the adversary, 
but to do so with a relatively cheap force. If China were to build a sea denial force it 
would have several key characteristics. First, a sea denial strategy is one of the cheaper 
strategies to pursue. Navies that employ sea denial strategies aim to build an apparatus 
that can inflict high costs to the enemy at a low financial cost to the state. If China’s 
naval budget has remained relatively static or has increased at a rate significantly slower 
than the rest of China’s armed forces, it could be one indicator that China is modernizing 
toward a sea denial strategy. Additionally, sea denial forces focus on large numbers of 
small naval platforms that stay close to shore and have advanced weapon systems—even 
if that platforms are old, the weapons systems continue to upgrade. Large numbers of 
smaller craft can overwhelm larger naval vessels using swarm tactics. Diesel submarines 
add another layer of security in a sea denial strategy because it provides another platform 
that can cause substantial damage to an enemy fleet and operate silently and effectively in 
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the littorals. Mine warfare is another relatively inexpensive way to inflict heavy costs to 
the enemy without a substantial naval fleet, thus, mines and minesweepers are critical 
platforms in a sea denial force. In addition to naval forces, a state with a sea denial 
strategy will use land based artillery as an added layer of defense against intrusion from 
the sea. Therefore, sea denial forces tend to comprise of patrol craft, corvettes, 
minesweepers, land based artillery, and submarines. 
If China were to pursue a power projection strategy, it would have several key 
characteristics. First, power projection forces are centered on an aircraft carrier or large 
amphibious assault ship capable of maintaining its own area air defense and carrying out 
strike attacks or troop insertion into territory away from the state’s home shores. In 
addition to strike-capable aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, there must be a 
blue water naval force capable of providing fleet ASW, ASuW, and AAW defense for the 
aircraft carrier or amphibious assault ship. Amphibious assault ships with the capability 
to deliver ground troops and their equipment ashore is another requirement in a power 
projection strategy. Power projection forces are expensive to maintain and require 
extensive funding to build up the blue water force, carrier force, amphibious lift 
capability, and strike fighter force. If China is pursuing a power projection strategy, I 
would expect it to have an expanding blue water force (including auxiliaries to support 
sustained operations at sea), amphibious ships built for troop insertion and strategic lift, 
and large aircraft carriers capable of strike missions. Moreover, a power projection 
strategy is inherently used in situations away from a state’s home territory. Power 
projection is pursued by states that have a willingness to intervene in the foreign affairs 
of other states. 
If China is modernizing toward a SLOC defense strategy it is slightly more 
difficult to determine, but has several key characteristics. First, there must be a maritime 
dependence on SLOCs for economic success to make a SLOC defense force worth 
pursuing. Since the key SLOCs that China depends on for its economic viability are far 
from its home waters, it would require a blue water force and auxiliaries to support 
sustained naval operations away from China’s near seas. Additionally, an expanding 
submarine force can be expected, as they are utilized near choke points in key SLOCs to 
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prevent SLOC closure or interference by foreign naval blockade. A SLOC defense force 
does not require as large of a budget as a power projection force, but is much more 
expensive than a sea denial force since a variety of large platforms and support ships are 
required for operating far from home. Routine deployments to key SLOCs should be 
common as well.  
Briefly, this thesis finds that China is primarily pursuing a maritime strategy 
centered on SLOC defense, but is also capable of using its navy for sea denial in its near 
seas. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, China’s short term maritime goal was 
to develop a sea denial force that could prevent U.S. Navy intervention in a future 
Taiwan Strait scenario. The PLAN is capable of sea denial after substantial development 
of its Anti-Access Area Denial technology, and has shifted to a maritime strategy outside 
of its littorals.  
China’s meteoric economic assent has made securing SLOCs a critical component 
of maintaining economic growth, and economic growth is a crucial source of legitimacy 
for the CCP. The Chinese depend on SLOCs both for energy imports to support its 
growing industries and to deliver goods for its export driven economy. Although China’s 
naval modernization currently points to a SLOC defense purpose, many of the naval 
platforms it has invested in—like its amphibious ships, oilers, blue water ships, 
submarines, and aircraft carriers—have the potential to be used in limited power 
projection scenarios. Moreover, SLOC defense assets can provide a foundation for a 
larger power projection force should China’s ambitions grow in the future. To date, 
China does not appear to have global naval ambitions that would support development of 
the PLAN in a way that is analogous to the modern U.S. Navy. Rather, Chinese maritime 
strategy aims at becoming the dominant regional maritime power and leader of the 
regional security infrastructure—much of which is based on maritime security. To 
achieve their strategy, China is modernizing its naval forces to protect the economic 
chokepoints the region depends on without having to depend on the U.S. Navy. 
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E. ROADMAP 
Comparative case studies will be used for conducting research for the thesis. The 
thesis aims to evaluate China’s naval capabilities and available strategic options based 
their force structure and procurements. There are three major strategic missions for naval 
forces, which are command of the sea, sea control—or power projection—and sea denial. 
Command of the sea is only plausible for a global navy, and since there is no near peer 
competitor to the only global navy—the United States—the force structure for achieving 
command of the sea will not be assessed. Three strategic missions will be analyzed: 
power projection, SLOC defense, and sea denial. Although it is not one of the three broad 
categories of naval strategy, SLOC defense is a hybrid of power projection and sea denial 
because there are elements of each that can be used to protect trade. In some instances, 
important trade choke points are located thousands of miles from a states coastline. 
Moreover, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, and Strait of Malacca all hold tremendous 
economic significance for China and its neighbors.  
This thesis is broken up into two main chapters. Chapter II will provide a 
comparative analysis of three different regional navies which are archetypes for specific 
strategic missions. The Royal Swedish Navy will be analyzed as a navy that specializes 
in sea denial, the French Navy will be analyzed as a navy that specializes in power 
projection, and Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force will be analyzed as a navy that 
specializes in SLOC defense. Each regional navy will be analyzed based several factors 
including its policy goals, strategy, threats, force structure, C2 and ISR capabilities, and 
the nature of its recent naval deployments and exercises. Each of the factors assessed will 
aid in providing a common set of characteristics for an archetypal navy aimed at 
enforcing a sea denial, power projection, or SLOC defense mission set, and the factors 
will be used to contextualize Chinese naval modernization toward a specific goal—or 
goals. 
Chapter III will discuss China’s naval modernization through the same factors 
that were used to determine the characteristics of the archetypal navies in Chapter II. 
Careful attention will be paid to nuances pertaining China’s regional security situation 
and the unique security concerns it faces that the archetypal navies might not have to 
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contend with. Additionally, the difficulties in determining China’s long term strategy will 
be addressed and recent shifts in maritime policy will be highlighted.  
Chapter IV, the conclusion chapter, will make direct comparisons between 
China’s naval modernization and the archetypal navies assessed in Chapter II. Moreover, 
Chapter IV will identify unique characteristics to China’s naval modernization that make 
it difficult to fit into one archetypal category. Lastly, inferences to China’s long term 
maritime strategy were be made based on their current trajectory and the evolving 
regional security structure. 
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II. ARCHETYPAL NAVIES: SEA DENIAL, POWER 
PROJECTION, AND SLOC DEFENSE 
Mankind did not take to the sea for any one single cause but for a variety 
of reasons that are linked to the four attributes of the sea itself, namely, as 
a resource, and as a means of transportation, information and dominion. 
 —Geoffrey Till38 
A. BUILDING A NAVY WITH A NARROW PURPOSE 
Before determining the strategic purpose behind the navy that China is actively 
modernizing and building, it is crucial to identify a standard to which the PLAN will be 
compared. Thus, archetypal navies for three main strategic mission sets will be analyzed 
based on their goals, threats, and force structure of three international comparative cases. 
There are three major strategic goals for naval forces: command of the sea, sea control, 
and sea denial. Naval War College professor and retired U.S. Navy Captain Robert Rubel 
identified command of the sea a strategic condition which gave the strongest navy 
“significant freedom of action,” while being capable of constraining the action of 
others.39 Furthermore, Alfred Thayer Mahan emphasized the importance command of the 
seas when describing it as “that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s 
flag from it, or allows it only to appear as a fugitive, and which, by controlling the great 
commons, closes the highways by which to and from the enemy’s shores.”40 Rubel 
further argues, “Whereas command of the sea denotes a specific kind of general 
superiority, ‘control’ is delimited in space and time…Command has been traditionally 
about the relative strength of fleets, whereas control was and is about the condition of the 
water space.”41  
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Three strategic missions will be analyzed and used to contextual China’s naval 
modernization: sea denial, power projection, and SLOC defense. Each selected strategic 
mission compliments one of the three main strategic goals of command of the sea, sea 
control, or sea denial. The strategic goal and mission of sea denial are one in the same. 
The strategic goal of sea control will be analyzed through the lens of the power projection 
and SLOC defense missions. Command of the sea is only plausible for a global navy, and 
is extremely difficult to obtain. The U.S. Navy is the only naval force that can claim a 
general superiority in naval power and no other navy currently comes close to the size 
and capability of the U.S. Navy. Consequently, the United States will not be used as an 
archetypal force demonstrating command of the sea to contextualize China’s naval 
modernization because the PLAN is not reasonably close to obtaining a naval force of 
comparable power to the U.S. Navy.  
It is difficult to characterize specific capabilities of a force built to obtain sea 
control because sea control is a general condition that is gained to carry out a more 
specific mission. David Gompart defines sea control as “the ability to use the sea in 
defiance of rivals,” and controlling the seas identifies a strategic condition which navies 
can operate within.42 Rather, it is more effective to analyze a navy’s capabilities to 
conduct power projection or SLOC defense missions because each of those mission sets 
come as a direct use of the strategic condition that sea control brings about. Moreover, 
sea control is a means to the end of employing specific capabilities to achieve narrower 
missions—like power projection or SLOC defense.  
Naval Postgraduate School professor and retired U.S. Navy Captain Wayne 
Hughes asserts, “Sea control aims at protecting the sea lines of communication, but it 
usually focuses on the destruction of enemy forces that threaten them. Power projection 
aims at employing sea control, predominantly by strikes ashore or amphibious 
landings.”43 Controlling the sea serves two main purposes: ensuring free movement and 
use of the sea for the controlling country and preventing free movement and use of the 
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sea for the adversary.44 Power projection is a capability gained by obtaining sea control, 
which is more broadly defined as exerting total control over a finite space for a finite 
period of time. Furthermore, a power project strategy is usually used as a means to 
project forces ashore away from the homeland. Hughes succinctly summarizes Corbett’s 
justification for a great seagoing fleet when he argues, “The seat of purpose is on land.”45 
Power projection enables a state to parlay sea control into land attack. 
Although it is not one of the three broad categories of naval strategy, SLOC 
defense is a hybrid of power projection and sea denial because there are elements of each 
that can be used to protect trade. Protecting commerce and ensuring the uninterrupted 
flow of goods on the sea is an increasingly critical part of the global economy and is 
predicated on SLOC protection vis-a-vis sea control. In some instances, important trade 
choke points are located thousands of miles from a state’s coastline, which requires a 
blue water navy to provide protection through convoys or sustained presence in areas of 
known piracy and commerce disruption. Furthermore, the Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, 
and Strait of Malacca all hold tremendous economic significance in North East Asia, and 
maintaining limited power projection capabilities may be acquired to protect assets 
abroad more so than to deliver forces ashore.  
Unlike sea control, it is not difficult to characterize specific capabilities used to 
employ a sea denial strategy. Sea denial is defined as “the ability or action at least 
temporarily to deny others access to waters considered important.”46 Additionally, sea 
denial involves denying the enemy access to a finite space for a finite period of time. 
Rubel further defines a denial strategy when he states, “It can send out units to try to do 
enough damage to the stronger force (which is presumably attempting to project power or 
blockade) to cause that force to abandon the operation or at least delay it, giving the 
weaker power some strategic breathing space.”47 Unlike sea control, the military 
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employing a denial strategy may not have complete freedom to act within the area it is 
denying; rather, it only prevents the adversary from freely acting within the given area. 
The three navies that will be used to contextualize China’s naval modernization 
exemplify their archetypal force structure within the sea denial, power projection, or 
SLOC defense strategies. The Royal Swedish Navy will be analyzed as an example of a 
force structure based on a sea denial strategy, the French Navy will be analyzed as a non-
hegemonic regional power projection force, and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense 
Force will be analyzed as a SLOC defense force. Each section in this chapter will assess 
strategy, goals, threats, force structure, C2 and ISR capabilities, and the nature of 
previous deployments and exercises of each navy as a means to identify the 
characteristics of navies built for the sea denial, power projection, and SLOC protection 
missions. Furthermore, the intent of this chapter is to identify specific naval capabilities 
of each archetypal force and the strategic limitations that result from their capabilities in 
order to better understand the nature of China’s naval modernization and determine the 
strategic missions the PLAN is capable of performing.  
1. Royal Swedish Navy: Sea Denial 
Between the 1520s and 1530, Sweden brought its first autonomously acquired 
naval forces to Stockholm, and it established its first naval base and modern coastal 
defense forces to defend Sweden from invasion.48 Nearly five-hundred years later, 
Sweden still organizes its military with the primary goal of preventing invasion. Jane’s 
World Navies asserts, “The Royal Swedish Navy (RSwN) has traditionally been highly 
regarded for its capabilities in shore defense and littoral warfare in the protected waters of 
the Bay of Botnia and the Baltic Sea.”49 The RSwN is a small and specialized 
organization that provides a clear example of a force designed specifically for sea denial. 
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a. Strategic Outlook of the Royal Swedish Navy 
Swedish defense goals and policy have remained relatively consistent for the last 
century, and the waxing and waning of power in Russia and the Soviet Union has driven 
the majority of Sweden’s defense decisions. Despite remaining neutral throughout the 
Cold War, Sweden clearly based its defense strategy on the Soviet threat and not 
NATO.50 The former Soviet Union and modern Russia state could both boast 
overwhelming military superiority over Sweden in both conventional and nuclear forces. 
At the end of the Cold War, the USSR had nearly four million more active duty military 
members than Sweden, and the Soviets had 312 more submarines, 227 more principle 
surface combatants, 350 more coastal combatants, 300 more mine warfare ships, and 77 
more amphibious assault ships than the RSwN—it was truly a David and Goliath 
situation that relegated Sweden to adapting the only strategy it could as a small neutral 
state.51 Niklas Granholm asserts, “The perceived existential threats to Sweden from the 
Soviet Union led over time to a defense force structure almost exclusively focused on an 
anti-invasion strategy.”52 A prolonged trend of only allotting one-sixth of military 
defense spending to the RSwN has limited its strategic goals and capabilities.53 The fall 
of the Soviet Union marked the beginning of a series of gradual policy shifts for the 
RSwN that would pendulum away from a purely self-defense force posture aimed at 
coastal and littoral missions, to a navy that could be used in limited blue water 
operations—but that pendulum would eventually return back to a nearly exclusive coastal 
defense posture. 
(1) Sweden’s Threat Picture and Defense Policy Goals Post WWII 
At the onset of the Cold War, Sweden described its defense policy as a “third 
way” between capitalism and communism by declaring a policy of “non-alignment in 
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peacetime with the aim to neutrality in wartime.”54 Sweden and Finland’s neutrality—
when combined with NATO membership for Denmark and Norway, and Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania being absorbed by the USSR—created “The Nordic Balance” that would 
remain in place until the end of the Cold War.55 Although Sweden was a “vocal critic of 
the superpowers,” it seemed clear that Sweden would not join the Soviet Union if war 
broke out in the Baltics.56 Sweden’s independent status forced it to make large 
preparations for the advent of a Soviet attack, and The Defense Bill of 1958 prioritized 
budgeting the Army and Air Force over the RSwN—which received only half of the 
funding that the Army or the Air Force was allotted.57 Furthermore, Sweden maintained a 
large number of conscript forces—specifically trained for anti-invasion efforts—through 
the end of the Cold War. 
In 1960, Naval Plan 60 was developed to provide long term strategic goals for the 
RSwN. The RSwN was to be structured by a “light navy concept” that emphasized “fast 
attack-craft with torpedoes and guided missiles, submarines and defensive mines,” while 
capital ships—like cruisers and destroyers—would be gradually phased out.58 The light 
navy would be complimented by fortified artillery batteries and mobile artillery batteries 
with light and heavy weaponry ashore.59 Although Sweden’s use of shore batteries in 
conjunction with naval assets may seem like an Anti-Access Area Denial (A2AD) 
strategy, the limited range and capabilities of both the naval and shore based forces only 
allowed Sweden to employ the “Area Denial” component of A2AD—as will be discussed 
in greater depth later in this section. The result of Naval Plan 60 was a navy that was 
capable of coastal defense, littoral sea denial, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and 
SLOC defense.  
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The Defense Bill of 1972 radically de-scoped the defense policy goals associated 
with the RSwN. The government disregarded the assets requested for ASW and SLOC 
defense and ordered the RSwN to focus nearly all of its resources toward “sea-denial in 
an anti-invasion scenario in the Baltic Sea.”60 The resulting goals and force posture of the 
Defense Bill of 1972 remained consistent until a nuclear armed Soviet Whiskey-class 
submarine ran aground near Karlskrona naval base in Southern Sweden. Consequently, 
ASW became a primary mission of the RSwN for the remainder of the Cold War—and it 
was recognized as a critical piece of the sea denial strategy.61 
The end of the Cold War, and collapse of communism, was hailed by Swedish 
representatives as a “triumph of true European values—human rights, democracy, market 
economy, rule of law, and right of ownership—over the authoritarian values of Eastern 
Europe.”62 The Defense Bill of 2009 drastically reduced the capability and size of the 
RSwN. The anti-invasion sea denial mission was relegated to a small Amphibious Corps, 
while the RSwN was assigned new strategic goals to be prepared to engage in “peace-
support and crisis-management operations” abroad with other EU members.63 
Furthermore, in 1991, Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Margaretha af Uggas stated 
that “the support of freedom, democracy, and market economy will affect all parts of our 
foreign policy”—a huge shift in defense goals from the 1970s and 1980s that supported 
state sovereignty and non-intervention.64 It appeared that Sweden was shifting from 
isolationist and neutral defense and foreign policy goals to an mildly interventionist 
strategy. This development is particularly relevant because Sweden downsized its force 
and reduced its emphasis on a sea denial force since it no longer had a perceived threat 
that required a sea denial strategy. The drawdown of troops in the 1990s and earlier 
2000s would later require the Swedish government to focus on the most critical 
components of its anti-invasion strategy while it rebuilt its sea denial force in response to 
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a resurgent belligerent Russia—highlighting and reaffirming elements of the sea denial 
strategy constructed with Naval Plan 60 and prioritizing the most important platforms, 
technology, and capabilities needed for sea denial. Sweden’s historical doctrine in Naval 
Plan 60 and its prioritized spending in the 2016–2020 Defense Bill provide clear 
indicators and priorities of a state that desires a sea denial strategy—and can be used to 
analyze China’s naval modernization. 
(2) Anti-Access/Area Denial or Just Area Denial? 
In assessing Sweden’s force structure—especially its Cold War force structure—it 
is pertinent to discuss whether or not the RSwN was capable of Anti-Access Area Denial 
(A2AD). A NATO Defense College Conference Report describes A2AD as containing 
two components. The “Anti-Access” strategy “refers to the strategy that limits entry and 
posturing, using whatever means are need to complicate and challenge access by the 
opponents forces.”65 The “Area Denial” strategy “works at the tactical and operational 
level, minimizing freedom of maneuver and in-theater movements.”66 More generally, 
A2AD prevents an adversary from acting in a limited space for a limited time. While 
A2AD and sea denial may seem to be interchangeable in a strategic sense, they are not. 
Sea denial is the naval component of “Area Denial,” and is usually used as a defensive 
posture. The U.S. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) further specifies “Area 
Denial” by stating that “Area Denial capabilities target forces in all domains, including 
land forces.”67 Moreover, the JOAC asserts, “Anti-access actions tend to target forces 
approaching by air and sea predominantly, but also can target the cyber, space, and other 
forces that support them.”68 The Anti-Access component includes preventing entry at the 
theater or regional level, and it requires longer range offensive and ISR capabilities, as 
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well as facilities at land and sea to employ those capabilities.69 Some weapons or 
platforms have strict limitations and capabilities that clearly fall into the Anti-Access or 
Area Denial categories, but it can also be difficult to differentiate between an Anti-
Access asset and Area Denial asset because “the same submarine that performs an area-
denial mission in coastal waters can be an Anti-Access capability when employed on 
distant patrol.”70 Moreover, some Anti-Access weapons can be used for Area Denial 
purposes, but it is less likely that Area Denial weapons can also be used for Anti-Access 
missions. 
 Sweden’s force structure was built around the “Area Denial” concept, but not the 
“Anti-Access” concept. The primary purpose of the RSwN during the Cold War was to 
prevent Soviet invasion through a sea denial, and its operational capabilities were limited 
to a defensive posture. Sweden’s longest range SSM employed by the navy—the RBS-
17—had the limited range of 8,000m (roughly 4nm), while the army’s longest range 
SSM—the RBS-97—only has a range of 40,000m (roughly 25nm).71 While the shore 
batteries and sea based SSMs could deter invasion, they certainly would experience 
unsurmountable challenges in denying access to the region—even at the narrow 
chokepoints near the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits. 
(3) Recent Shift in Strategic Goals and Threat Perception 
Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimea reignited fears of invasion within the 
Swedish government. Swedish Defense Minister Holtqvist identified Russia’s reckless 
resurgence and illegal annexation of the Crimea as the “greatest challenge to European 
security order since it was established twenty-five years ago.”72 Additionally, in 2014, 
Sweden claimed that a Russian submarine encroached upon Swedish waters near 
Stockholm, which solidified the Swedish government’s argument to return to a sea denial 
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and anti-invasion force posture.73 Sweden’s latest defense policy has called for two 
billion dollars in new defense spending to help fortify Gotland Island and expand the 
capability of the RSwN’s surface and subsurface forces. Sweden has positive diplomatic 
relations with the United States, the EU, and its Nordic neighbors, but it has not parleyed 
the diplomatic relations into any substantial military alliances—only “deepened 
cooperation.”74  
The large scale downsizing of the RSwN after the end of the Cold War was 
predicated on the belief that the collapse of the USSR and democratization of many of the 
former Soviet states—most importantly Russia—would remove the existential threat that 
previously existed for states on the Baltic Sea. However, in 2015 the Swedish Defense 
Ministry has pivoted back to its Cold War goals of national defense. In June of 2015, 
Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist stated,  
We are facing a more provocative, unpredictable and destabilizing Russia 
that has lowered the threshold to use military force. Russia’s illegal 
annexation of Crimea and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine is a 
violation of international law. It is the greatest challenge to the European 
security order since it was established 25 years ago. Russian activities in 
the Baltic Region and in the High North has also increased. They have 
increased their military exercises and intelligence activates. They are 
engaging in hybrid warfare, which effects all levels of society: military, 
police and civilian.75  
The shift in Russian Foreign Policy from willing integration into the Western 
democratic ranks, to a seemingly greater desire to regain some of the power and prestige 
it lost following the Cold War, has caused Sweden’s strategic goals to shift back to “Total 
Defense” of the homeland—and away from periphery missions in support of general 
European defense missions. The 2016–2020 Swedish Defense Policy asserts,  
In line with the Defense Commissions conclusions, Swedish defense 
policy requires a new focus. Thus, a renewed regional focus will be a 
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priority, with the emphasis on national defense and planning for wartime 
scenarios. This renewed regional and national focus will also require an 
updated Total Defense Concept able to cope with present day challenges 
and threats. Ultimately, the Swedish Defense should be able, with its 
available resources, to face an armed attack.76 
The Russian threat is driving Swedish defense policy, military modernization, and 
military force structure—just as the USSR did during the Cold War. Sweden is in a 
different geopolitical position than it was during the Cold War, and its military 
partnerships with the EU, NATO, and Nordic states make neutrality nearly impossible, 
but gives Sweden more resources to draw from in case of conflict with Russia. Although 
there were cultural ties to the Crimea and Ukraine shares an extensive portion of its 
border with Russia—which made annexation much easier than in the Swedish context—
the Swedish government is taking no chances and making it clear that Russia is, once 
again, seen as an existential threat. Consequently, Sweden is shaping its force structure to 
meet the challenge of conventional warfare, as it did during the Cold War, and is 
preparing for the possibility of hybrid warfare, as seen in Ukraine.77 Moreover, Sweden’s 
shift in defense goals is accompanied with a 11% increase in defense spending during the 
2016–2020 timeframe, and new RSwN acquisitions refocused on the sea denial and anti-
invasion strategy. 
b. Royal Swedish Navy Force Structure and Concept of Operations 
The size and capability of the RSwN has made considerable changes since the end 
of WWII. The RSwN was at its peak in overall manning, equipment, and capability 
toward the end of the Cold War, and it hit a trough in manning, equipment, and capability 
after the passing of the 2009 Defense Bill. The resurgence of the Russian threat has led to 
increased military spending and renewed focus on homeland defense through the “Total 
Defense Concept.”78 Sweden begun the process rebuilding and expanding its capacity 
and capability after the 2016 to 2020 Swedish Defense Policy was released. The “Total 
                                                 






Defense Concept” and modest naval expansion has broadened the capabilities of the 
RSwN, but it still remains limited in comparison to its Cold War posture.  
The RSwN is tasked with defending approximately 2000 nautical miles of 
coastline on the Baltic Sea, Bay of Bothnia, and the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits.79 The 
Skagerrak and Kattegat straits provided a choke point for exiting Soviet naval forces at 
Kaliningrad, and the straits remain strategic access points for Russia today. Gotland 
Island is only 214 miles from Kaliningrad, which acts as a major strategic consideration 
in the development of Sweden’s sea denial strategy. The compact confines of the Baltic 
Sea remove the need for Sweden to invest in long range defensive weapons. 
Consequently, Sweden’s sea denial naval force—and shore based artillery—have limited 
operation ranges. Additionally, Sweden’s close proximity of the Skagerrak and Kattegat 
straits further diminishes the need for Sweden to invest in a blue water navy because it 
can provide naval protection using smaller coastal craft. Sweden’s geography—in 
conjunction with its threat perception—has had a significant influence on the 
development of its sea denial force. 
(1) Cold War Force Structure  
In 1990, the RSwN was at the height of its size and capability to employ a sea 
denial strategy. The basic approach developed in the 1958 Defense Bill remained mostly 
intact through the end of the Cold War—with the resurgence of ASW capabilities in the 
early 1980s after the ASW mission was de-scoped for a decade. The RSwN was designed 
for a sea denial strategy based on the employment of “fast attack craft with torpedoes and 
guided missiles, submarines, and defensive sea mines.”80 There were two tactical 
components of Sweden’s sea denial force: the RSwN and the Coastal Defense Force. 
Both shared the goal of sea denial, but the Coast Defense Force owned weapon systems 
on sea and land, whereas the RSwN only had naval assets. In 1990, the RSwN consisted 
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of around 12,000 sailors; slightly over half of the sailors were conscripts.81 Additional, 
the 1990 force had twelve diesel boats in their submarine force, but only one—a 
modernized Nacken class submarine—was outfitted with Air Independent Propulsion 
(AIP) technology that allowed it to remain submerged for three to four times longer than 
a conventional diesel submarine.82 Each submarine was capable of carrying the TP-617 
heavyweight torpedo and the TP-42 lightweight torpedo, and all of the submarines were 
capable of deploying sea mines.83  
The RSwN surface forces consisted of forty-two patrol and coastal combatants, 
thirty-one mine warfare combatants, twelve small amphibious craft, and twelve support 
vessels. Of the forty-two patrol and coastal combatants, thirty-one retained Surface to 
Surface Missiles (SSM) and torpedoes.84 Half of the patrol boats could carry up to eight 
RBS-15 SSMs, ASW mortars, and two or four torpedoes—depending on if it was 
outfitted for heavy weight or light weight torpedoes. The other half of the patrol boats 
carried six RBS-12 SSMs and ASW mortars.85 The RBS-15 Mk2 SSM utilized by the 
Swedish fleet has a maximum range of 108 nautical miles and uses a guidance system 
that employs both an inertial navigation system (INS)—at launch—and a semi-active 
homing seeker in the terminal phase of its flight.86 The RBS-15 is the most capable 
medium range threat Sweden has in its inventory, and variations have been modified to 
be based on shore. The Type 43 lightweight torpedo is wire guided with limited range 
and can only cause serious damage to smaller naval combatants and submarines.87 The 
remaining Swedish patrol craft were lightly armed and only used in the immediate 
vicinity of the shoreline, whereas the patrol craft armed with SSMs and torpedoes could 
operate in extended portions of the Baltic Sea, Bay of Bothnia, and the Skagerrak and 
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Kattegat straits. The minesweeping component of the RSwN consisted of three 
minelayers and twenty-eight mine countermeasures ships—which are deployed to 
retrieve, deactivate, or safely detonate mines.88 
The RSwN surface and subsurface forces are complimented with a modest naval 
air presence. Sweden owned one C-212 combat aircraft that specialized in ASW, and 
three helicopter squadrons with a total of fourteen aircraft outfitted to conduct ASW 
missions.89 
The RSwN was reinforced by a sizable Coastal Defense force which consisted of 
2,650 personnel, five artillery brigades, coastal patrol boats, and a minelayer squadron. 
The artillery brigades were broken up into sixty units that had anti-aircraft and coastal 
defense guns of both mobile and static variety, as well as SSMs—to include the RBS-17 
Hellfire, RBS-08A, and the RB-52.90 Naval assets included eighteen patrol craft, 144 
small amphibious landing craft, nine coastal minelayers, and 16 inshore minelayers. 
The RSwN had limited Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities during the Cold War. The Swedish 
fleet lacked the principle surface combatants to act as a hub for C2; rather, engagements 
were coordinated from the shore and executed tactically close to shore and other patrol 
craft—negating the need for a complex C2 suite in its patrol craft. The RSwN’s ISR 
capabilities were constrained to its submarine force and naval air forces. Sweden’s close 
proximity to Kaliningrad removed the need for advanced long range detection equipment, 
and Sweden lacked satellites to gain ISR on troop movements. Rather, Sweden relied 
almost entirely on frequent submarine patrols within the Baltic Sea as its primary means 
of naval ISR. 
The assets of the RSwN and Coastal Defense force are designed with only a sea 
denial strategy in mind. The threat of submarines, SSMs, and mines spread across a large 
number of small platforms made the cost of invasion significantly high, and make it 
                                                 





difficult to quickly neutralize the sea denial force less likely because of its dispersed 
structure. The combination of mobile platforms at sea and permanent and mobile weapon 
systems on land gave the relatively small RSwN a significant amount of defensive power 
within the limited confines of their coastal waters and slightly into the Baltic Sea, Bay of 
Bothnia, and the Skagerrak and Kattegat straits. A lack of blue water surface combatants 
and a diesel submarine fleet limited the range and time that the RSwN could operate 
away from Swedish shores, and this operational restriction inherent within the RSwN’s 
Cold War force structure further solidified the sea denial strategy as the most pragmatic 
for Sweden. 
(2) Modernization and Downsizing Post-Cold War 
After the end of the Cold War, Sweden made drastic changes to its naval force 
structure. With the perception that Russia was no longer a threat, the massive sea denial 
force was abandoned for a smaller, technologically advanced, and versatile force that 
could make limited deployments outside the immediate vicinity of the Baltics—
something that was never done during the Cold War. The most dramatic change occurred 
as a result of the 2009 Defense Bill, which cut around 80% of the total naval force.91 The 
resulting force structure is comprised of seven corvettes, seven mine hunters, four 
submarines, and four support ships. The Coastal Defense Force has been renamed the 
“Amphibious Battalion,” which only consists of 150 small combat boats and amphibious 
landing craft, one mortar platoon, and eight RBS-17 Hellfire SSM launchers.92 
Furthermore, conscription has ended and the new force is entirely volunteer based. The 
drastic cuts effected every part of the naval force structure, but the shift from investment 
in large numbers of small attack craft with SSMs and torpedoes to the slightly larger—
and blue water capable—Visby-class corvettes signaled a deviation from sea denial to 
modest cooperative engagements overseas. Unlike the Goteborg or Stockholm-class 
corvettes, the Visby-class corvettes were built with hull-strengthening modifications that 
allow it operate outside of Sweden’s near seas. Multiple Visby-class corvettes have 
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deployed to the Gulf of Aiden to aid in counter-piracy operations as a part of the EU 
Force’s Operation Atlanta.93 Moreover, the Visby-class of ships was made of lightweight 
carbon-fiber that was “designed to have minimal radar, acoustic, magnetic, 
hydrodynamic, electronic, visual, and infrared signatures,” and allows it to operate even 
closer to shore than previous corvettes—while providing an additional ISR resource due 
to its difficulty to detect and extended range.94 Although it is more seaworthy and 
stealthy than its predecessors, the Visby-class is armed with the same RSM15 SSMs and 
Type 43 torpedoes. 
Without an existential threat, Sweden deprioritized its military spending, and the 
remaining force has been used to support EU and UN missions as a sign of solidarity. 
The RSwN contributed to counter piracy operations near the horn of Africa as a part of 
EU Naval Force in 2009, 2010, 2013, and 2015.95 Although it is more than a symbolic 
force, Sweden’s current naval force structure no longer has as credible a sea denial threat 
as it did at the end of the Cold War.  
(3) Returning to a Cold War Mindset? 
Russia’s annexation in the Crimea marked a turning point in Swedish Defense 
Policy. It was the event that enabled concerned military leaders to convince their political 
counterparts that a change in defense policy was necessary to account for increased 
Russian aggression in Europe and presence in the Baltics. Defense Minister Hultqvist 
listed concerns other than Crimea for Sweden to consider. The significant increase of 
strategic bomber patrols over the Baltics since 2011—the most since the Cold War—and 
a “steady increases in Russian military exercises and intelligence operations in the Baltic 
Sea region,” over the last two years, which have grown in complexity and include all 
                                                 




military services, have caused fears to arise over Sweden’s lack of preparedness for the 
possibility of invasion.96  
The 2016 to 2020 Defense Policy calls for an 11% increase in defense spending, 
including two billion dollars in new spending in the RSwN.97 The recently announced 
“Total Defense Concept” and approved procurements indicate that Sweden is returning to 
a sea denial strategy. The submarine fleet of four technologically advanced Gotland-class 
submarines will be expanded with two additional A26 submarines by 2022. The 2016–
2020 Defense Policy report additionally called for increased investment in SSMs, 
minesweeping vessels, patrol boat life expansion, air defense capabilities, active cyber 
warfare capabilities, motorized battalions, and re-manning the Gotland island bases.98 
While the spending authorized will not return Sweden to its Cold War size, the increased 
technological abilities of the Visby-class corvettes and Gotland-class submarines will 
account for some of the loss—although the Visby is using the same SSMs that were on 
patrol craft in 1990, upgrades in torpedoes have been made and fielded on the Visby and 
Gotland platforms.99  
Sweden is switching back to a sea denial strategy, but it is currently significantly 
less capable to perform the mission. The hallmarks of a sea denial force involve 
developing a strategy which makes attack considerably costly for the enemy through the 
use of a small and agile naval force that is dispersed and difficult to quickly defeat. Sea 
denial forces are difficult to defend due to an oversaturation of threats that come through 
waves of small attack crafts, shore based SSMs, submarines, and sea mines. Sweden’s 
recent reinvestment in each of the key components of a sea denial navy proves that the 
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pendulum has begun to swing back in the direction that the RSwN was built for during 
the Cold War. 
(4) Concept of Operations: Deployments and Exercises 
The RSwN routinely participates in regional military exercises in conjunction 
with NATO and EU Forces. The general theme behind many of these exercises is the 
same: repelling a foreign invasion into one of the states on the Baltic Sea through 
multilateral cooperation. This was the mission in the “Northern Coasts” exercise in 2013, 
“Open Spirit” in 2014, and the “Bold Alligator” exercise in 2014. Each of the exercises 
focuses on different elements of an anti-invasion scenario. “North Coasts” utilizes small 
coastal craft to defend shallow coastal waters, “Open Spirit” is a minesweeping exercise 
that routinely destroys leftover mines from WWII, and “Bold Alligator” focuses on 
amphibious operations that can be used to deter invasion.100 Sweden’s presence in each 
of these exercises is relatively limited because numerous countries participate—including 
fourteen states in the “Northern Coasts” exercise alone—which caused the RSwN played 
a reduced role in the multinational effort.101  
In addition to its multilateral exercises, the RSwN has deployed its Visby-class 
corvettes to help with counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. Four Visby-class ships 
have deployed as a part of “Operation Atlanta” over three deployments since 2009—each 
deployment last three to four months.102 Each of these deployments saw the RSwN 
integrate into a larger EU Forces force structure for the deployment. 
The regular multinational exercises that the RSwN participates in reinforces the 
argument that any conflict in the Baltic Sea will most likely draw multinational defense 
efforts, but the exercises—and recent deployments—do not have explanatory powers 
when constructing CONOPS for an anti-invasion defense of Sweden only using Swedish 
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forces. Rather, regular annual exercises called SWENEX, hone in on the training of each 
branch of the Swedish military for the unilateral defense of Sweden.  
A notional defense scenario for the RSwN would start by using its submarines 
and ASW aircraft to provide early warning and intelligence of enemy movements while 
hunting enemy submarines well outside of the territorial seas of Sweden and closer to the 
embarking location of the enemy forces. The next lair of defense is provided by the 
stealthy Visby-class corvettes distributed throughout the Baltic Sea or Bay of Botnia 
based on the movement of enemy forces. The Visby corvettes would use hit and run 
tactics utilizing its RBS15 SSMs and torpedoes to inflict damage, while using their speed 
and stealth to avoid detection. Within the littorals of Sweden, the RSwN’s lightly armed 
patrol craft would mass and perform swarm tactics with artillery support from mobile 
garrisons on the shore. Additionally, minelayers would mine key approaches to strategic 
bases or cities to prevent or slow enemy progress. Each portion of the defense in depth 
that the RSwN constructions uses platforms that are small, fast, inexpensive, and difficult 
to detect—which makes the cost of losses on the Swedish relatively low, while 
maintaining the capability to score major losses to the enemy. In the case of using swarm 
tactics against an enemy carrier, the small missile boats retain the capability to sink or 
disable the expensive center of gravity of an invading force—like a carrier or large 
amphibious assault ship—while the financial and strategic loss of the individual corvettes 
or patrol craft remain low. Mining the approaches to key invasion objects has a similar 
effect of making the potential cost and risk high for the enemy, but low for the defending 
Swedish force.  
c. Comparative Significance of the Royal Swedish Navy 
The RSwN’s Cold War force structure is a clear example of a navy built for sea 
denial. Sea denial—and “Area Denial”—capabilities do not necessarily mean that an 
A2AD strategy is being employed. In Sweden’s case, A2AD was never a part its strategy 
because it never possessed the long range weapons required to prevent access to the 
region. The RSwN sea denial force was built around submarines, fast attack craft with 
SSMs and torpedoes, and defensive sea mines with the primary mission of preventing 
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Soviet invasion. The recent return to an anti-invasion and sea denial based mindset—as 
exemplified in the 2010 to 2020 Swedish Defense Bill—has resulted in investments into 
cornerstone technology of a sea denial strategy, like submarines, minesweepers, and 
SSMs. Thus, the Swedish naval model used during the Cold War provides the ideal 
archetype for developing a force based on the narrow strategic goal of sea denial. It is 
important to recognize that Sweden’s geographic constraints played a role in reducing the 
need for blue water surface combatants that might be necessary in a sea denial scenario 
for a state that has longer coastlines, more open access opportunities, and is not limited to 
the defense of a smaller bay or enclosed sea. Moreover, the close proximity to the other 
states on the Baltic Sea played a role in limiting the range of the RSwN’s weaponry and 
reducing the need for long range ISR capabilities. Despite the unique elements of 
Sweden’s defense situation, it still provides the best archetypal example of a naval force 
built specifically for a sea denial strategy. 
2. French Navy (Marine Nationale): Power Projection 
By the middle of the 20th century, France’s economy, military, population, and 
territory were ravaged from the effects of two World Wars. Although France was on the 
winning side of both wars, the victories seemed to be Pyrrhic for the French. After years 
of being perceived as an undervalued power in Post-WWII Europe, France decided to 
pursue a defense force that could project power independent of NATO. Part of this 
decision was due to the growing Soviet conventional and nuclear threat—France believed 
it was not a big enough part of the decision making process in NATO. France’s colonial 
legacy provided additional reasons to build a power projection force. The 1950s and 
1960s brought colonial defeats in Algeria and Indochina, as well as national 
embarrassment when the Suez crisis with British was settled through coercive diplomacy 
wielded by the United States. Each major defeat for France made it clear that it no longer 
possessed the military power that it did a half century earlier. The Suez crisis acted as a 
catalyst for a new direction in French strategic thinking and had major implications for 
France’s military force structure. France still has territories in South America, the South 
Pacific, near Southeast Africa, near Australia, and near North America. A power 
projection force was viewed as a necessity to keep the remaining territories in check after 
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losing Vietnam—and more importantly, Algeria. Although the majority of French 
political, economic, and militaristic concerns are confined to Europe, France continues to 
view itself as a state with limited global ambitions and global assets, which requires a 
global military presence to protect. Jane’s World Navies states “The French Navy 
(Marine Nationale) is a well-equipped force and capable of projecting power around the 
globe.”103 The goals and threats articulated by French leadership starting in the 1972 
white paper, and continued through numerous strategic documents up the 2013 white 
paper, have resulted in a persistent call for the capability to project force globally—as 
will be discussed in greater length in the following section. 
a. Strategic Outlook of the French Navy 
Like Sweden, France has faced the ebb and flow of the Soviet—or Russian—
threat since the end of WWII. Unlike Sweden, France no longer considers Russia as the 
central threat in its defense planning. The shift from a bipolar international system to a 
unipolar system—which France argues has shifted increasingly to a multipolar system—
has led to major changes in France’s threat perception. Even with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, France’s strategic naval goals have remained relatively consistent since its 
first white paper on defense was released in 1972. The evolution of France’s defense 
policy is firmly rooted in the desire to maintain a strong autonomous force that is capable 
of defending France at home and intervening in global conflicts to protect French 
interests. Although France has maintained its status as part of the NATO alliance, it has 
had varying degrees of involvement with NATO. Furthermore, the more involvement 
France has with NATO, the smaller the naval force it is comfortable maintaining. France 
has built up power projection capabilities since the beginning of the Cold War, although 
power projection was not a defining role of French policy until the Cold War ended.  
(1) Strategic Outlook During the Cold War 
In the wake of WWII, France became one of the original members of NATO after 
signing the Treaty of Brussels in 1948. At the forming of the alliance, France sought to 
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form a tripartite council with the Great Britain and United States, but it was rejected by 
the United States.104 Additionally, France felt embarrassed by the American led 
international response to the Suez Canal Crisis. President Eisenhower banded together 
with the Soviet Union and United Nations in condemning the French, British, and Israelis 
for invading Egypt, and demanded that all troops withdraw—the British, Israelis, and 
French all complied. The Suez Crisis reinvigorated Frances desire to be a great power 
and not relegated to a second rate and unequal partner to the United States.105 France 
began to separate itself from the NATO military structure by banning American nuclear 
weapons from France in 1958—while continuing its own atomic program, which 
detonated its first homegrown atomic bomb in 1959.106 France’s military detachment to 
the NATO force structure culminated in 1966 when French President Charles de Gaulle 
announced his decision to completely pull out of NATO’s integrated military command 
structure.107 The departure from NATO is significant because it signaled France’s 
commitment to pursue an independent nuclear and conventional deterrents despite facing 
the looming Soviet Threat. Furthermore, rather than investing in a smaller force that 
would integrate nearly exclusively into the larger NATO force structure, France 
developed a more capable force that could project power independent of allied support; 
thus, laying the groundwork to become an archetypal independent power projection 
force. 
France’s primary threat during the Cold War were the conventional and nuclear 
forces of the Soviet Union—as was the case for the entire set of Western alliances. 
During the 1960s, the recent history of invading forces coming from East and capturing 
large swaths of French territory weighed heavy in the decision to maintain formidable 
conventional and nuclear forces that were autonomous to NATO.108 France’s security 
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goals at the time of its departure from NATO’s command structure were vaguely 
identified as remaining a great power with the ability to maintain an independent foreign 
policy—this stance was maintained until clear goals were articulated in the 1972 white 
paper. In 1972, France clarified the role and goals of its military when it stated the 
following priorities: “security of the French territory and its population, the participation 
in the security of Europe, security and defense of the Mediterranean front, and the 
compliance of the commitments with the countries in French-speaking Africa.”109 
Moreover, to achieve its goals, France required “a conventional force capable of delaying 
an atomic escalation, and a national nuclear force as last guarantor of the integrity of the 
country.”110  
The French Navy had to prepare to counter the significant Soviet naval threat that 
possessed aircraft carriers, submarines, and a sizable blue water fleet that dwarfed the 
French Navy. At the height of the Cold War in 1980, the USSR had a naval force that 
surpassed the French Navy by over two hundred more submarines, one aircraft carrier, 
two-hundred and fifty principle surface combatants and three-hundred and fifty 
minesweepers.111 The French responded to the Soviet threat by building a conventional 
force capable of delaying “atomic escalation” and an independent nuclear deterrent as a 
last resort to protect the French people.112 The French navy would provide submarines 
capable of launching nuclear missiles as part of France’s nuclear deterrence, and France’s 
conventional naval forces were configured to project power—with a strategic focus on 
regional power projection and response to invasion from the east.  
Adopting a regional power projection strategy meant that France was acquiring 
the capabilities to projection power globally, even if it was not the focus during the Cold 
War. The cornerstone platforms for power projection, aircraft carriers and large 
amphibious assault ships, can be used to project power anywhere—regionally or globally. 
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Although France intended to use its power projection assets in a regional context during 
the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union left France with a power projection force 
that was no longer constrained to be used primarily as a regional deterrent. Furthermore, 
France intended to keep a large conventional navy and would shift its strategy to use its 
navy to protect its interests globally. 
In sum, France’s Cold War strategic defense goals were to maintain strong 
autonomous nuclear and conventional forces. France maintained its alliance with NATO, 
but it reserved the right to choose what operations it would partake in while maintaining 
command of its troops. France’s aim to remain a great power has led to the development 
of independent nuclear and power projection capabilities. The main goals of the French 
navy were to protect French territory, protect the Mediterranean, and protect Europe. The 
French navy’s power projection capabilities were mostly intended to counter Soviet 
forces away from the French homeland in order to avoid the invasion scenarios the 
French faced in WWI and WWII. 
(2) Post-Cold War Shift in Strategy 
The end of the Cold War led to a significant shift in France’s naval strategy. Since 
the fall of the USSR, threats to France have become vaguer and more dispersed. France is 
no longer putting the vast majority of its resources toward one threat; rather, there are six 
situations that the 2013 French white paper identifies scenarios its military is built for, 
which include: A regional conflict that does not affect France but France is involved 
through a multinational organization and commits to use power projection forces, a 
regional conflict that does involve France where conventional forces and nuclear 
deterrence would be used, aggression against French overseas territories, limited military 
response to Sub-Saharan African conflicts, crisis management, and the resurgence of a 
threat to Western Europe.113 France identifies balance of power dynamics in East Asia 
and the Middle East, the spread of transnational crime and terrorism due to failed states, 
and ambiguous Russian military intentions as specific threats that France intends to 
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prepare for.114 The 2013 white paper also identifies cyber-attacks, climate change, and 
Western decline in the global economic system as threats to Western primacy.115  
The French made the use of selective intervention in conflicts that effect France’s 
broader interests a key new tenant of their foreign policy. Gomez and Piella assert, “The 
intervention would be carried out within a multinational framework, as a projection of 
power with advanced weaponry and special operational forces, or as a projection of 
forces, with ground units.”116 Consequently, the French navy’s primary goal would be to 
facilitate French power projection abroad. Moreover, France’s nuclear deterrence 
capabilities were viewed as critical components of maintaining strategic independence, 
and the French Navy’s role in providing deterrence assets through SSBNs would not 
change. Other key goals for the French Navy include protection of French territory 
overseas, crisis management and imposition of peace, and response to threats against 
Western Europe.117 Defending French territory overseas especially lends itself to 
maintaining a power projection force since France still has eleven overseas territories that 
span the globe including: French Guiana in South America, French Polynesia in the 
South Pacific, the Reúnion Island near Southeast Africa, and other various islands in the 
south Pacific Ocean and Caribbean. The attack on the British Falkland Islands off the 
coast of Argentina only further solidified France’s concern over the potential for a distant 
conflict on its island territories and reconfirmed the need to maintain power projection 
capabilities. 
(3) Modern Strategic Outlook 
The lack of a clear primary threat after the end of the Cold War has led to 
strategic ambiguity in setting strategic goals, force planning, and defense budgeting. 
France has seen a gradual decline in its defense budget since the end of the Cold War. 
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Increases in defense spending only occurred in reaction to terrorist attacks at home.118 
Europe is in a uniquely peaceful and stable position that has made justifying a substantial 
military component difficult. Consequently, since 1990, the French Navy has been 
surpassed by Japan and China—and remains behind the United States, Russia, and UK—
in total tonnage of naval forces.119 France remains in a position where budget cuts loom 
as major threat to the viability of maintaining a global power projection force. The 
French Navy has responded globally by sending its carrier and amphibious assault ships 
to assist NATO action in Syria and Afghanistan, but its shrinking force has dwindled to a 
size that makes sustaining global power projection naval force nearly impossible. 
France’s policy to maintain an independent conventional power projection force 
has been hindered by budgetary constraints. There is currently a forty-five billion dollar 
gap in past budgetary plans and current budgetary constraints.120 As a result, French can 
no longer afford to procure a second aircraft carrier or a fourth Mistral-class amphibious 
assault ship. The recent Charlie Hebdo and Paris terrorist attacks led to increased funding 
for the military budget of around three billion dollars a year. Despite former French Navy 
Chief of Staff Jean-Louis Battet’s clear declaration that “As for power or force 
projection, it has become, from now on, the main function of the traditional forces which 
have to be ready to act in co-operation with other Services, most of the time in a 
multinational context, and, if need be, a long way from the homeland,” lack of funding 
has driven the French Navy to a point where current Navy Chief of Staff Bernard Rogel 
assessed the fleet size as “sufficient but just barely.”121 The modern French Navy has 
reached a point where it is able to complete its power projection mission, but is at the 
threshold of losing that capability.  
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Despite growing budgetary constraints, France has not reduced the scope of its 
military goals. A 2013 white paper identified protection, deterrence, and intervention as 
France’s primary military goals.122 The French Navy is charged to maintain the nuclear 
deterrence ability while “They will also have the capacity to undertake high-intensity or 
major-crisis operations thanks to their high-level, multi-purpose combat capabilities with 
powerful and accurate firing systems, easily integrated in multi-national operations, and 
with the ability to assume command of such operations.”123 The key to conventional 
French naval strategy is based around their aircraft carrier and “force projection and 
command vessels”—three Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.124 All four vessels of 
these power projection platforms have been built since 2000 and represent the most state-
of-the-art technology France has designed to project power abroad. France’s reintegration 
into NATO’s command structure in 2009 was viewed by French leadership as a means to 
ensure that the French had a role in any international military involvement led by NATO. 
Moreover, the French Navy has increasingly been utilized as a power projection force in 
NATO operations globally, including Operation Chammal against ISIS in Syria and Iraq 
in 2015 and Operation Enduring Freedom against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan numerous 
times since 2001. Consequently, France’s increasing role as a NATO power projection 
asset is being used to justify future investment into power projection capabilities. 
b. French Navy Force Structure and Concept of Operations 
The French Navy’s force structure has two main components: the nuclear force 
and the conventional force. France views each component as a critical piece of their 
autonomous defense policy, which can be exercised through global intervention if 
needed. Although the French force structure has varied in size, its main pieces have 
remained the same. France is unique in its desire to maintain a strong military force with 
capabilities to act independently of the NATO command structure, although it has 
recently reintegrated in to NATO’s military structure. 
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(1) Cold War Structure  
During the Cold War, France’s main strategic goals for the navy were deterrence, 
atomic de-escalation, and defense of France and Western Europe. Many France’s naval 
assets during the Cold War imply a power projection strategy, but in a time where sea 
control was contested, France’s Naval Force structure was more about obtaining sea 
control than about power projection. NATO and the Soviets were in constant competition 
for control of the sea—which is required prior to being able to project power.  
At the end of Cold War, France’s Navy had grown to include two Clemenceau-
class aircraft carriers—each capable of embarking forty fighter aircraft.125 Additionally, 
France had five amphibious ships capable of delivering 350–500 troops and their 
equipment ashore, with another five amphibious ships capable of delivering 150 troops 
and their equipment ashore.126 The French blue water forces included two cruisers, five 
destroyers, and thirty-five frigates.127 France also maintained twenty-three minesweepers. 
The conventional naval force was complimented with six SSBNs and fourteen attack 
submarines.128  
The notional employment of naval force during the Cold War was meant to be 
used as far away from the French homeland as possible. Although previous invasions of 
France had been over land through Germany and Belgium, the French intended to use its 
navy to draw Soviet forces away from such an action by providing a credible amphibious 
power projection threat in the Mediterranean. The French submarines would be used to 
clear the area of attack prior to amphibious operations, the principle surface combatants 
would provide air defense for the aircraft carriers, the aircraft carriers and amphibious 
assault ships would strike soviet forces ashore, and the minelayers would be used as a last 
effort to deter or slow invasion from the sea by mining the approaches to strategic ports 
and beachheads. Even at its peak, the French Navy would not have been able to take the 
Soviet forces in conflict. Rather, the conventional French naval forces were meant to act 
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as an additional conventional deterrent independent from NATO and to slow the Soviet 
rate of advance until a decision could be made on the use of France’s nuclear forces. 
It is crucial to recognize that the force structure and policy goals are tightly 
linked. Although the platforms France possessed during the Cold War could be used for 
offensive purposes, they were intended for defensive purposes in the Cold War 
context.129 The French did not intend to go on a colonial offensive around the world, or 
start a war with the Soviets. France intended used its large power projection force to draw 
the Soviets away from the French homeland if it feared that an invasion was about to 
occur, and the employment of its navy acted as a escalatory step toward the use of 
France’s independent nuclear forces. Like today, France reserved the autonomous 
capability to use its navy in foreign intervention scenarios during the Cold War, but it 
was connected to its atomic de-escalation, containment, and colonial policy goals. 
Furthermore, the French Navy was a part of the larger NATO structure that aimed at 
obtaining sea control. It is difficult to discern whether a force is being built for offensive 
or defensive reasons since naval platforms can usually be used for both, but France’s 
Cold War policy goals show that the primary purpose of the French fleet was not power 
projection—although it was capable of projecting power if sea control was ever gained. 
(2) Post-Cold War Downsizing 
In order to be able to project power, a navy must have sea control first. France has 
enjoyed America’s unchallenged power since the end of the Cold War because it 
provides the maritime security apparatus which has allowed for the United States and its 
allies to freely project power since the end of the Cold War. The lack of a significant 
challenger to sea control has allowed U.S. allies to downsize their navies while 
maintaining the freedom to maneuver globally under the security apparatus provided by 
U.S. Navy. In France’s case, it has maintained the ability to project power globally with a 
force that would have only afforded limited regional power projection during the Cold 
War. Despite cutting the size of its naval manning and equipment in half, France has 
repeatedly used its navy to project power abroad in support of NATO operations. 
                                                 
129 Gomez, “The Waning Power,” 420. 
 50
The Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier is the center of France’s force projection 
capability and can complement up to forty Super Etendard or Rafale fighter aircraft.130 
Additionally, France has three Mistral-class amphibious assault ships (LHDs)—which it 
calls helicopter carriers—that can support 16 helicopters and a marine detachment of 450 
troops each.131 The Mistral-class LHDs can also deliver equipment ashore through a well 
deck that can be configured to hold 2 LCACs, 4 LCMs, 13 MBTs, or 50 AFVs.132 The 
Charles de Gaulle and the Mistral-class LHDs serve as the C2 hubs during strike group 
operations. Additionally, the Charles de Gaulle can embark E2-C Hawkeye aircraft that 
acts as an C4ISR asset because of its extended radar ranges, communication relaying 
abilities, airborne early warning for missiles up to 100nm away, and the capability to 
relay over the horizon contact tracks back to the fleet through Link-16.133 The Hawkeye 
significantly boosts the strike groups C4ISR capabilities, but the French Navy only has 
three of the planes in service—limiting their ability to deploy multiple strike groups. 
France’s blue water navy also comprises of eleven destroyers and eleven frigates 
which all possess the capability to launch Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) and SSMs, and 
they can embark helicopters. Many of the blue water ships are equipped with the outdated 
SM-1MR Block VI SAMs (ancient missiles that can even be found on the Iranian 
Kaman-class Fast Attack Craft) and are only capable of self-dense—limiting the scope of 
the French blue water fleet’s ability to defend a carrier. Only the new Aquitaine-class 
frigates possess the formidable Aster 15 and Aster 30 SAMs that are capable of point and 
area defense for the carrier.134 Additionally, the French Navy uses outdated Exocet 
MM40 Block 3 SSMs on all of its blue water ships. The MM40 has a 99 nautical mile 
range with an active radar seeker, but is nowhere near as formidable as newer SSMs—
like the DF-21 or the SSN-27.135 The French navy recognized its SSM shortcomings, but 
canceled its next generation SSM program in favor of the acquiring more MM40s 
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because of budget constraints. France has largely relied on its multi-national partners to 
help provide area defense and surface defense due to its aging inventory of SAMs and 
SSMs. 
The French Navy maintains a sizeable minesweeping force of eighteen vessels—
which is viewed as a critical component of power projection in case the fairways to the 
beach have been mined.136 The strategic submarine fleet has decreased slightly from six 
to four SSBNs since 1990, but the SSN fleet of attack submarines has shrunk from 
fourteen to six boats.137 After the collapse of the Soviet Union—and subsequent decline 
of the Russian fleet—France could maintain its power projection capabilities without 
investing in fast attack submarines because the enemy submarine threat had shrunk 
dramatically. The tradeoff is that the French submarine fleet accounted for a large portion 
of the navy’s ISR capabilities, which have not been replenished after the retiring of the 
most of the French submarine fleet. France is now more reliant on its NATO allies to 
provide ISR capabilities during operations. The French Navy also gains ISR from two 
shore based Atlantique 2 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA), but they 
have a 600nm range that restricts their use for regional operations. Additionally, the 
French Navy has eight Falcon 50 shore based MPRA that have an extended 2,700nm 
round trip range, which can provide ISR outside of the immediate region.138 
The purpose of a power projection naval force is to parley sea power to land 
attack. As Hughes argued, “the seat of power is on land.” France has constructed a force 
that is able to strike from the sea through the use of aircraft carriers; clear paths to the 
shore with destroyers, frigates, and minesweepers; and deliver troops and their equipment 
ashore with amphibious assault ships.  
(3) Concept of Operations 
During the 2015 “Operation Chammal,” the French Navy deployed the Charles de 
Gaulle aircraft carrier to aid in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The Charles de 
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Gaulle was complimented by a fighter wing and an E-2C Hawkeye. The Horizon-class 
destroyer Chevalier Paul and the Lafayette-class frigate Jean Bart accompanied the 
carrier and provided area air defense and surface defense. Additionally, two Atlantique 2 
MPRA were deployed to provide ISR and one submarine accompanied the strike group. 
The size of the French fleet was relatively small compared to an U.S. carrier strike group, 
but the French were acting in concert with the United States and other NATO allies 
during the deployment. Operation Chammal gives a good insight into the notional strike 
group force that the French Navy would deploy engaging in power projection missions. If 
it was acting alone it could be expected that more frigates or destroyers would 
accompany the strike group, and more land based ISR aircraft—like the Falcon 50s—
would also be utilized. Thus, a notional power projection strike group for the French 
would include an aircraft carrier or LHD, three to four destroyers or frigates, a 
submarine, at least two land based MPRA for ISR, and at least one E-2C Hawkeye for 
C4ISR. 
c. Comparative Significance of the French Navy 
The size of the power projection force varies based on the size of the threat. The 
lack of substantial state-to-state conflict in Europe since the fall of the USSR has resulted 
in a shrinking French naval force structure. France has a strong desire to maintain its 
legacy as a great power with global power projection capabilities, but it is slowly losing 
the funding to be able to maintain a naval force that can meet the goals of the 
government. The forty-five billion dollar gap between original procurements and what 
the government can currently afford has resulted in a significant challenge to the French 
Navy’s ability to sustain power projection missions year round. Current French Navy 
Chief of Staff Rogel’s assessment that France’s navy is just barely sufficient to sustain 
the power projection mission gives significant insight to what minimal force structure 
must be maintained to be considered capable of power projection. France has invested in 
maintaining a carrier, amphibious assault ships, sea based fighter craft, minesweepers, 
and a blue water navy. The assets that French Navy has prioritized serve as an example of 
what a state seeking to build a power projection force would invest in first to establish the 
minimum force required to project power abroad. Thus, in trying to determine if a 
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regional power has power projection aspirations, it can be compared to France since the 
French Naval force structure provides the minimum capabilities required to complete the 
task. 
3. Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force: Sea Lines of Communication 
Defense 
The Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) operates within an unusual 
set of limitations based on legal constraints embedded in Article 9 of Japan’s constitution. 
Multiple constitutional “reinterpretations” have led to the gradual normalization of the 
JMSDF in certain aspects, but the JMSDF is constantly adapting to the changing 
limitations and mission sets that it is assigned. Despite its pacifist constitution, the 
JMSDF is the fourth largest navy in the world based on gross tonnage—only behind the 
United States, Russia, and China.139 The growing size and capability of the JMSDF is 
directly linked to its dependence on sea going trade. Jane’s World Navies argues, “As a 
maritime island nation, Japan is dependent on its sea lines of communication (SLOC) for 
trade…The JMSDF is empowered with the country’s most fundamental mission-to 
defend Japan from maritime invasion and secure the safety of maritime traffic around 
Japan.”140 With 90% of its oil shipped from the Middle East and 60% of Japan’s food 
imported, SLOC defense is a central mission of the JMSDF.141  
a. Strategic Outlook of the JMSDF 
Japan’s strategic goals for the JMSDF have wildly varied on the international 
political environment and the status of Japan’s military relationship with the United 
States. The predictable nature of the Cold War was replaced by a less predictable regional 
environment starting in the early 1990s. Japanese defense goals have evolved to meet the 
growing regional threats, while making new partnerships to ensure the safe flow of trade 
to the island nation. Japan’s prioritization of SLOC defense began in the Cold War and is 
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still the main priority of the JMSDF. Retired U.S. Naval Captain Bernard Cole asserts, 
“seaborne shipping carries 99.7 percent of the nation’s overall trade, and as stated by one 
Japanese analyst, ‘the maritime highway along the Eurasian rim literally constitutes the 
lifeline of the Japanese economy.’”142 Japanese security policy has been limited to a 
defensive posture since the ratification of its constitution in 1947, but protection of trade 
was quickly clarified as a matter of national security as defense of Japanese livelihood 
and it was incorporated as the primary mission of the JMSDF. 
(1) Strategic Outlook During the Cold War 
In 1947, Japan enacted a new constitution written by staff members of the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Article 9 of the constitution “prohibits Japan 
from maintaining ‘war potential’ and renounces Japan’s ‘right of belligerency.’”143 Japan 
found itself in the unusual situation of being unable to raise and maintain an army, navy, 
or air force shortly after it had possessed the regions strongest military. Japan’s right to 
build a “Self Defense Force” was soon clarified as a means to compliment the broader 
security support Japan would receive from the United States until Japan could afford to 
increase its own contributions to supplying its defense.144 Prime Minister (PM) Shigeru 
Yoshida came up with the doctrine that would dominate Japanese security policy for 
nearly half a century and still resonates today. Yoshida favored an alliance with the 
United States where Japan would have a “nonaggressive, low-cost postwar Japan security 
policy,” which would make them an “attractive trading partner.”145 Yoshida’s plan faced 
criticism for being too pacifist by nationalists and not pacifist enough by the socialists, 
but it provided a pragmatic middle ground. Reliance on the United States for security 
became entrenched in 1960 when PM Kishi renegotiated the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security and guaranteed significant U.S. base presence indefinitely—
until the treaty was renegotiated or abandoned. The new consensus that Japan would be a 
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“non-nuclear, lightly armed, economic superpower” was widely accepted as a 
compromise among politicians.146  
In 1949, the U.S. National Security Council determined that a Soviet proxy war in 
Japan was a likely enough possibility to justify maintaining a sizeable U.S. troop 
presence in Japan.147 Furthermore, Japan would provide a strategic location and 
“unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the United States to use in response to regional security 
in Asia. The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security solidified the U.S.-Japan 
alliance and the Soviet bloc would remain the primary threat to Japan through the end of 
the Cold War. The biggest threat the Soviets posed for Japan was destruction of shipping 
and invasion. The U.S. military presence on bases around Japan made invasion highly 
unlikely, but attacks on shipping was a realistic and probable threat if a hot war broke out 
in the region. Yoshihara and Holmes assert, “Japan’s Cold War maritime strategy was 
very limited in scope, predicated as it was on a few core competencies. In particular, the 
Soviet submarine menace in the Pacific compelled Japanese planners to focus almost 
exclusively on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and to adhere rigidly to sea lane 
defense.”148 Japan’s limited security goals and threats led it to form small specializations 
in the ASW and SLOC defense. 
The 1973 oil crisis “conclusively demonstrated Japan’s dependence on the 
SLOCs.”149 Although the 1973 oil crisis was caused by restricting supply, future 
conflicts—like the Iran-Iraq tanker war—would lend credence to arguments for building 
a SLOC defense fleet. Moreover, Expanded Soviet activity in East Asia led the United 
States to push Japan to be a more active member of the alliance.150 Consequently, the 
JMSDF area of operation limits were extended based on a 1978 agreement with the U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, and in 1982 both national governments formalized the JMSDF’s 
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operational commitments to defend SLOCs up to 1,000 nautical miles from Japan.151 The 
new 1,000 nautical mile radius validated the need for a capable blue water fleet, and the 
JMSDF provided continued investment into building advanced destroyers. Toshi 
Yoshihara and James R. Holmes argue,  
Japan’s Cold War maritime strategy was very limited in scope, predicated 
as it was on a few core competencies. In particular, the Soviet submarine 
menace in the Pacific compelled Japanese planners to focus almost 
exclusively on antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and to adhere rigidly to 
sealane defense. By the 1980s the MSDF’s niche capability in ASW filled 
a serious gap in the U.S. Navy’s warfighting capacity while dovetailing 
fully with the American strategy of containing Soviet naval power.152 
Japan’s narrow security goals of SLOC defense and limited ASW contributions to 
the U.S. alliance efforts made the Cold War policy relatively simple. It was not until the 
conclusion of the Cold War that the East Asian region became a rapidly changing 
security environment with new players and sources of instability, which would lead Japan 
to formulate a new maritime strategy by 1995.153 
(2) Initial Post-Cold War Strategy Changes (Gulf War to 2000) 
The end of the Cold War was a “Big Bang” for the global security architecture, 
and it led to new security challenges in East Asia.154 North Korea made significant 
strides in its pursuit of nuclear weapons as an alternative security path, which became 
known to Japan after The United States discovered the extent of North Korea’s nuclear 
plans in 1993. The subsequent test of a North Korean missile through Japanese air space 
in 1998, presented North Korea as the central threat in Japanese defense policy—and 
“provided a ‘reasonable excuse’ for Japan to expand its military.”155 The near-singular 
focus on ASW during the Cold War has shifted to include BMD and expanded maritime 
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defense in national strategy.156 Japan further expanded its defense goals in the 1995 
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which allowed the SDF to protect “areas 
surrounding Japan…which have important influence on national peace and stability.”157 
The 1995 NDPO policy was included in the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation 
Guidelines, although neither document defined what “areas surrounding Japan” meant.158  
Consequently, changes in the Post-Cold War era broadened the role of the 
JMSDF to include a strong BMD role in addition to SLOC defense, which complicates 
the purity of using Japan as an archetypal SLOC defense case. However, to complete the 
BMD mission, Japan used the same destroyer platforms it was investing in for SLOC 
defense, but it added BMD capabilities to its destroyers—making them multi-mission 
capable and identifiable based on their technological load out. In China’s case, it can be 
observed that if China is building a fleet of destroyers similar to Japan’s, but without the 
BMD capabilities, then China’s force structure would resemble Japan’s SLOC defense 
fleet. 
After an embarrassing response to the first Gulf War, the Japanese Diet passed the 
International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992, which eased the restrictions on approving 
overseas deployments and involved the JMSDF in UN PKOs around the world. 
Furthermore, By the end of the 1990s, Japan entered into trade and security agreements 
with numerous states along the SLOCs that Japan depended on, including: Brunei, India, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.159 During the 1990s, Japan’s military 
goals and strategy continued to expand to take on a broader protection of Japan’s interests 
in the region. Maintaining free and secure SLOCs was at the center of the expansion as 
Japan faced an increasing number of regional threats—most notably North Korea. This 
gradual normalization accelerated after the attacks on the United States on 9/11. 
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(3) Modern Strategic Outlook (2001-2016) 
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Japanese PM Koizumi 
authorized deployment of the JMSDF to the Arabian sea to support refueling missions, 
and continued to do so until 2010.160 Japan continued to order the JMSDF to partake in 
international military missions, including the 2005 deployment to Indonesia in support of 
tsunami relief–its largest military deployment since WWII.  
Based on the 2004 Defense Program Guidelines, Cole asserts, “The essence of the 
new maritime strategy is twofold. The first aspect is defense of regional SLOCs, perhaps 
best defined by a triangle, the points of which are Tokyo, Guam, and Taiwan…Second, 
the JMSDF is tasked with fulfilling responsibilities under the mutual defense treaty with 
the United States.”161 Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) missions are 
viewed by the Japanese government as opportunities to strengthen alliances with key 
states along SLOCs, as well as a justification to expand the JMSDF’s amphibious fleet. 
Defense of the SLOCs remains Japan’s most difficult challenge because it depends on 
trade that enters through the distant Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca. Having to 
protect shipping thousands of miles away requires both a strong blue water fleet, 
submarines to provide security, and the support vessels to regularly replenish the blue 
water fleet. Competition over ownership of various Spratly Islands has the potential to 
effect the free flow of trade through the South China Sea, further complicating the SLOC 
defense mission for the JMSDF. Moreover, unlike HA/DR missions that serve mostly to 
strengthen alliances, the SLOC defense mission is critical to Japan’s livelihood.  
The 2011 Fukushima disaster further aided the expansion of amphibious forces—
which can be used as command and control during conflict or as a forward sea base 
during HA/DR missions—as well as the importance of SLOC defense, since Japan’s 
reliance on foreign oil is likely to increase after concerns of nuclear power were raised.162 
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Expanded HA/DR and SLOC defense capabilities are being used by Japan as justification 
to expand the size and capability of the JMSDF in a peaceful and defensive context.  
China’s growing military strength and ambiguous intentions is another rising 
security threat to Japan and a source of changes to Japan’s military policy. Cole argues, 
“Tokyo’s concerns about China as a military threat to Japanese security are clear. They 
are the most evident in the goal of increasing the ability to defend the Senkakus, but they 
are also notable in the complain about Beijing’s lack of transparency regarding the 
compositions and missions of its military.”163 Bhubhindar Singh states that China’s 
military has been growing in “lockstep” with its economy and asserts,  
Although China is still a distant second after the United States in the list of 
top spenders on defense, the Chinese defense budget dwarfs Japan’s. 
Based on figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, China’s defense budget for 2013 was almost $189 billion, 
whereas Japan’s budget was only $50 billion.12 The disparity is also 
evident from a comparison of the rates of increase in the two countries’ 
defense budgets for the period 2003–13: while Japan’s defense budget 
increased by 5%, China’s rose by a staggering 270%.164  
The 2014 NDPG identified China’s military expansion as a concern for regional 
and global security since China has been “rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities 
in waters and airspace, showing its attempts to change the status quo by coercion.”165 
Increased economic ties between Japan and China toward the end of the Cold War played 
an important role in normalizing relations between both countries and forming mutually 
beneficial economic interconnectedness. However, both countries have expressed 
concern over each other having expanded leadership roles in regional security and 
diplomacy.166  
China’s expanding A2AD capabilities provide a significant threat to denying 
access to SCLOS and includes “a large number of highly accurate ballistic missiles, high 
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quality anti-ship cruise missiles, submarines, sophisticated long-range air defense 
systems, and counter-C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance) capabilities, including counter-space, electronic 
warfare cyberwarfare, and anti-radiation systems.”167 A 2015 RAND analysis of 
potential conflict in 2017 within the Taiwan strait between the United States and China 
shows that China has parity or an advantage in maintaining air supremacy and anti-
surface warfare, which gives China medium confidence for success over the United 
States—a shift from the low confidence in victory expected in 2010.168 Although RAND 
assessed a long-range engagement scenario in the Spratly Islands between the United 
States and China as a low likelihood of victory for China, it has still made relative gains 
in past twenty years that are leading it toward parity in more aspects of battle.169 China’s 
growing blue water fleet and denial capabilities give it the capability of blocking access 
to key SLOCs that are vital to Japan’s economy, and not even the United States is 
capable preventing the Chinese from doing so in some scenarios. Moreover, SLOC 
defense is becoming even more critical for the JMSDF, as is countering China’s long 
range A2AD technology. 
Although the diversity of threats has grown since the end of the Cold War—to 
include shifting regional balance of power resulting from decreasing U.S. relative power 
in the region; cyber-attack; “gray zones” of territorial, economic, maritime, and 
sovereignty disputes; and piracy and illegal unilateral acts of coastal states that infringe 
on freedom of the high seas—Japan’s primary strategy for its JMSDF remains consistent. 
Japan’s 2014 NDPG exhibited the same dominant goal as the 1995, 2004, and 2009 
reports: “As a maritime state, enhancing “Open and Stable Seas” and securing the safety 
of maritime and air traffic constitutes the foundation of the peace and prosperity of 
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Japan.”170 Japan’s critical role in regional SLOC defense was also emphasized in the 
2012 “U.S.-Japan Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain Security,” which recognized 
the important role that supply chains played in the global economy and “outlined ways to 
cooperate more closely to strengthen the security and resiliency of the global supply 
chain and promote the timely, efficient flow of legitimate commerce.”171 The JMSDF’s 
modern goals are not limited to SLOC defense, but it is this the most critical to Japan’s 
security. Furthermore, in 2015 Japan passed legislation that allowed for collective self-
defense in situations that could eventually pose a threat to the Japanese people—a major 
step toward normalization.172 
b. JMSDF Force Structure and Concept of Operations 
The small and constrained JMSDF force structure that emerged at the beginning 
of the Cold War has grown tremendously into a formidable fighting force and one of the 
world’s largest naval powers. Although constitutional constraints prevent the JMSDF 
from performing certain missions and procuring specific weapons systems, the slow 
normalization of the JMSDF has allowed it to assume many of the capabilities of the 
world’s strongest navies. Jane’s World Navies asserts that Japan “retains strengths in 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), 
mine warfare, ballistic missile defense (BMD), electronic warfare, surveillance, transport/
escort, and search and rescue (SAR). The JMSDF also possesses an aviation component 
that comprises fixed-wing aircraft and various rotor craft.”173 In fifty years, Japan 
transformed from a gunboat defense force to a regional maritime power. The JMSDF has 
only expanded from 42,000 personnel in 1980 to 45,500 in 2016, but its technological 
capabilities have grown far more significantly and allow the JMSDF to perform nearly 
every major naval mission set.  
                                                 
170 “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2014 and Beyond (Summary),” Japanese Ministry 
of Defense, Published December 17, 2013. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/national.html. 2. 
171 “Trade Policy Review Report by Japan.” World Trade Organization. January 15, 2013:12. 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp376_e.htm 
172 “Asia,” The Military Balance, 116, no.1 (2016): doi: 10.1080/04597222.2016.1127567.230. 
173 “Japanese Navy Overview,” Jane’s World Navies. 
 62
(1) Cold War Force Structure 
After complete demilitarization at the end of WWII, Japan had limited 
remilitarization through the creation of the Self-Defense Forces. The SDF’s role in 
lessoning the U.S. burden in the region during the Cold War resulted in the JMSDF 
developing niche capabilities as an ASW capable force as a means to defend the SLOCs. 
By 1980, the JMSDF had a sizeable regional force with over 42,000 personnel built with 
the ASW and SLOC mission sets in mind. Japan had forty-eight principle surface 
combatants comprised of thirty-three destroyers and fifteen frigates. Twenty of the 
destroyers and ten of the frigates were outfitted with Anti-Submarine Rockets (ASROCs), 
and the twenty ASROC capable destroyers also had SAMs capable of point defense—but 
not area defense—with half capable of embarking ASW helicopters.174 The JMSDF had 
three large blue water minesweepers with thirty-three coastal minesweepers. 
Additionally, Japan had fourteen diesel submarines, one hundred and forty ASW 
maritime patrol planes, and sixty-three ASW helicopters. The JMSDF 20 lightly armed 
patrol boats, SAR and training aircraft, and small amphibious transport ships, but lacked 
any missile boats, corvettes or auxiliary support ships.175 
The Cold War force structure of the JMSDF was clearly built with the ASW 
mission at the forefront. Over two-thirds of the surface and air combatants of the JMSDF 
had specific anti-ASW weapon systems and detection equipment. The ASW threat was 
viewed as a threat to the maritime shipping which was vital for the rapidly growing and 
import dependent Japanese economy. The ASW missions were generally within a triangle 
formed between Tokyo, Guam, and Taiwan, but Japan’s blue water capable fleet of 
destroyers and frigates made limited distant SLOC defense possible. The lack of JMSDF 
replenishment support ships made longer deployments complicated and reliant on in-port 
replenishment. The first Japanese oiler—the Towada class—was not brought into service 
until 1985. Furthermore, he JMSDF’s lack of SSMs, large amphibious force, nuclear 
                                                 




power submarines, corvettes, auxiliary support ships, and aircraft carriers limited them 
from projecting power or conducting sustained operations outside of the near seas.  
(2) Post-Cold War Growth 
With the new post-Cold War regional security threats in North Korea and China, 
Japan has significantly upgraded the quality of its fleet. The number of personnel only 
modestly grew from 42,000 in 1980 to 45,500 in 2016, but the capabilities of the fleet 
have expanded significantly.176 Notably, Japan has built three “helicopter carriers,” 
which can embark ten to twelve helicopters built for ASW or sealift missions.177 
Additionally, Japan has added two guided missile cruisers to its fleet of capital ships, and 
each cruisers is outfitted with Aegis baseline seven, two SSM-1B quad launchers, 96 VLS 
cells capable of launching the SM2 SAM, SM3 BMD defense missile, and vertically 
launched ASROCs—each of which are the most advanced missiles actively deployed in 
the U.S. Navy.178 The JMSDF’s destroyer fleet has the same number of ships it did in 
1980—33—but they have all been outfitted with the Harpoon SSM in addition to the 
ASROC and SAM capabilities. Furthermore, six of the destroyers have Aegis BMD 
capabilities with two additional Aegis destroyers procured.179 Japan’s blue water fleet 
could be used in a power projection context to provide area defense for a carrier, but 
since Japan does not have an aircraft carrier—and its helicopter carrier cannot currently 
embark fighter aircraft—the blue water fleet is relegated to SLOC and BMD defense. 
The submarine force has modernized from conventional diesel submarines to AIP 
equipped diesel electric submarines with associated increases in operational range, and 
Japan now has eighteen of these modernized SSKs.180 The JMSDF submarine fleet only 
grew from 18 to 19 since 1980, but all the submarines in the modern fleet are the more 
advanced AIP equipped SSKs—the Cold War era submarines were less capable 
conventional diesel submarines. The minesweeping fleet and amphibious fleet have 
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remained relatively constant in size since the 1980s with limited technological advances. 
The JMSDF’s air wing component has five more ASW helicopters than in 1980, and 
fewer ASW Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Aircraft (MPRA), but the number of P-
3 Orion MPRA has increased from 18 to 73—the P-3 is a much more capable than the P-
2J and HSS-2 ASW and ISR aircraft the JMSDF had in 1980. The JMSDF were slow to 
acquire the P-3 during the Cold War, and still have not procured any of the P-8 MPRA 
which are in the process of replacing the P-3 in the United States. In both the Cold War 
and in the modern Japanese fleets, the JMSDF has operated capable—but not cutting 
edge—aerial ISR assets. However, the close alliance with the United States allows for 
Japan to obtain intelligence support from the United States. The JMSDF air component 
also has limited SAR, ISR, and minesweeping aircraft.181 
There have been several key broad shifts in the JMSDF force structure since the 
end of the Cold War. The addition of helicopter carrier gives Japan a very limited power 
projection ability and expanding HA/DR capabilities. JMSDF Captain Takuya 
Shimodaira asserts that helicopter carriers give Japan sea basing capabilities that can act 
as an effective command and control sea base, minimize friction with local populations 
when conducting HA/DR, rapidly respond to natural disaster, build partnerships with 
regional states, and quickly transform from a peace time sea base to a wartime limited 
power projection asset.182 Unlike France’s Mistral-class LHDs—which carry strike 
fighter aircraft—the Japanese helicopter carriers do not embark fighter aircraft. If it were 
to embark fighter aircraft, it would require a STOVL capable craft, which Japan does not 
currently have. Japan has procured F-35 aircraft from the United States, but its contract is 
for the shore based “A” variant, which is not capable of STOVL. If Japan were to procure 
the STOVL capable “B” variant of the F-35—or building F-35 C capable ramps on its 
helicopter carriers—it could signal the transformation of their helicopter carriers into 
power projection assets. Japan views HA/DR missions as critical to building partnerships 
along critical SLOCs, and is using its expanded carrier capabilities in both the non-
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traditional military operations like HA/DR and to bolster SLOC defense capabilities 
through partnership and limited power projection.183 Moreover, adding SSMs to all 
principle surface combatants has given Japan’s blue water capable ships an offensive 
weapon and deterrent which has advanced the destroyers, frigates, and cruisers from 
purely ASW hunters and near sea defenders to capable far seas combatants.  
Japan’s sustained deployments to the Malacca Strait area and the Gulf of Aiden 
for counter piracy have proven that Japan’s JMSDF is capable of SLOC defense outside 
of the East Asian region. The modernized AIP equipped SSKs have given Japan’s 
submarine fleet greater operational capabilities for operations farther from the home 
islands. Each upgrade to the JMSDF fleet has expanded Japan’s ability to complete a new 
variety of missions in conjunction with SLOC defense—”ASW, ASuW, mine warfare, 
ballistic missile defense (BMD), electronic warfare, surveillance, transport/escort, and 
search and rescue (SAR)”—but they are centered on the two main missions of homeland 
defense and SLOC defense, which increasingly require the new mission capabilities that 
the JMSDF has acquired. 
(3) Concept of Operations 
In the past, many of Japan’s extended SLOC defense deployments have involved 
two destroyers that deploy together to escort shipping near the Horn of Africa (HOA), 
Strait of Hormuz, or Strait of Malacca. In recent counter-piracy deployments near the 
HOA, Japan has also deployed two of its P-3 aircraft to provide ISR. The main aspects of 
SLOC defense involve protecting shipping in convoys, displaying a presence to deter 
piracy or illegal activity, and preventing states from inhibiting access to vital SLOCs. 
Japan has benefited from the largely unchallenged maritime security apparatus that the 
United States has enforced—diminishing the need for larger SAG deployments. 
However, if regional SLOCs are challenged near the Strait of Malacca and South China 
Sea, it is likely that Japan would have to deploy a larger force to aid in the protection of 
its commerce. Japan conducts annual bilateral exercises with the United States to practice 
integrated C2 and larger scale naval movements to prepare for a situation where more 
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active defense of SLOCs or the Japanese homeland is required. Although Japan maintains 
one of the largest navies in the world, it is still dependent on the United States for aspects 
of its security—including its nuclear deterrent. A notional SAG deployment for SLOC 
defense by the JMSDF in under current security conditions would include up to three 
destroyers, a submarine for advanced warning and SAG defense, an oiler for at sea 
replenishment, and P-3 detachment for ISR.  
c. Comparative Significance of the JMSDF 
Japan faces unique threats due to its status as a maritime island nation. Although 
most states in East Asia extensively use the sea for trade, Japan is the most reliant on 
seagoing trade in the region—with 99.7% of all imports and exports, 90% of its oil, and 
60% of its food utilizing the sea for transportation.184 Piracy, coastal states unlawfully 
interfering with trade, and regional territorial disputes have threatened freedom of 
navigation on the high seas near key maritime choke points that flow into East Asia. 
Japan has made defense of the homeland, defense of trade, and defense of interests vital 
to the U.S. alliance cornerstones of its security policy.  
Over the course of fifty years, the JMSDF has transformed itself from a modest, 
one dimensional force, to a formidable multi-mission navy. Constitutional constraints on 
the JMSDF have slowly lifted to allow for more missions and quicker response to crisis. 
Throughout the evolution of the JMSDF it has had two main strategic goals: defense of 
the Japanese homeland and defense of the SLOCs. Defending the SLOCs means being 
able to counter the adversary which is attempting to deny or limit their use. In the Cold 
War, Soviet submarines posed the largest threat to freedom of navigation through the 
SLOCs, so the JMSDF focused on ASW to ensure safety of maritime shipping. After the 
Cold War ended, the emergence of new Chinese and North Korean threats has called for 
the JMSDF to modernize to meet the growing threats. North Korea’s nuclear program has 
led to the JMSDF to make a growing number of its forces BMD capable. China’s 
growing blue water fleet and increased regional ambition has led the JMSDF to invest in 
SSMs, ISR, and electronic warfare to build up the deterrent capability of their 
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conventional forces to protect contested territory—like the Senkakus and Takeshima 
islands. The introduction of helicopter carriers allows Japan to complete HA/DR missions 
well away from home waters, build partnerships around key SLOCs, and give them a 
platform that can be quickly transformed to perform limited power projection 
capabilities—and potentially to house vertically launched fighter aircraft like the F-35. 
As regional threats evolve and gain the capability to challenge freedom of navigation, the 
JMSDF has been modernize to counter each new regional threat in partnership with the 
United States with homeland and SLOC defense in mind.  
The continued growth in size and capability of the JMSDF—despite its pacifist 
constitution and close alliance to the United States—begs the question, if Japan could use 
SLOC defense and preventing Soviet hegemony as the justification for building a far 
reaching fleet, is it possible that SLOC defense and preventing U.S. hegemony is just as 
acceptable of a motivation for the Chinese to expand its fleet based on a structure similar 
to the JMSDF? Although China is not an island nation, it faces many of the same energy 
and trade dependency issues that Japan uses to justify the structure of its navy. Moreover, 
China does not enjoy the same alliance with the United States that Japan does, which 
makes building a naval force capable of defending its interests arguably more important 
than it is for Japan. 
4. Concluding Thoughts on Building a Navy with a Narrow Purpose 
Each navy discussed in this chapter based its force structure off of the goals and 
threats delineated by the respective governments. Additionally, the force structures of 
each navy drastically changed as perceived threats were strengthened or eliminated. 
Thus, it is crucial to ask several key questions when determining the purpose of a state’s 
navy. First, what are the primary maritime threats of the state? In Sweden’s case there 
was only one threat: invasion from the Soviet or Russian military. In Japan’s case there 
was one primary threat in the Cold War, but regional destabilization after the Cold War 
led to a broader array of threats from more states.  
Second, how does the perceived threat influence the size of the force? In 
Sweden’s case the collapse of the USSR led to an 80% reduction in forces with the 
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remaining forces charged to carry out the same mission against a far less capable threat—
rendering Sweden incapable of adequately employing a sea denial strategy like it was 
able to do during the Cold War. For France, power projection is a national priority to 
maintain national prestige and strategic autonomy, but there is no single threat or group 
of threats that makes a power projection force an existential requirement for France since 
it is a part of NATO. Consequently, France has seen a gradual reduction in funding and 
power projection capabilities as the goals of the country require an expansive naval force 
that does not match the small regional threat profile. The end of the Cold War only 
brought a more diverse array of regional threats for Japan, which led it to expand and 
modernize its fleet. 
Third, does the type of force structure match the goals and threats of the state? In 
France’s case, the size of its modern force exceeds its threat profile, but barely meets the 
goal of the state to have a global power projection force. For Japan, the JMSDF arguably 
exceeds both the threats and goals. Japan is constitutionally limited to having a military 
force with the singular purpose of self-defense, but it has repeatedly reinterpreted the 
constitution to semantically redefine what constitutes defense. Furthermore, while the 
rhetoric of the Japanese government has focused on regional security, SLOC defense, and 
homeland defense, the JMSDF could quickly configure its helicopter carriers to support 
vertical take-off fighter aircraft, which gives Japan significantly more power projection 
capabilities. Japan is a good example of a navy that has experienced gradual mission 
creep and capability expansion until the force structure exceeded the requirements to 
fulfill the declared national goal of self-defense—although China’s military 
modernization has certainly justified the growth of the JMSDF to the revisionists in 
Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party.  
It can be difficult to accurately assess if a state is building a navy for sea denial, 
power projection, or SLOC defense for several reasons. First, the publicly stated goals of 
a state might not be the actual goals discussed at the classified level. Sweden, France, and 
Japan are all established liberal democracies that have been transparent about their 
military goals, budgets, and acquisitions—this is not necessarily going to be the case with 
the authoritarian government in China. Japan has been forthright in its desire to play an 
 69
active role in promoting international peace, but if had expanded and modernized its 
forces while sticking to strictly homeland defense rhetoric, it would be clear that the 
stated rhetoric probably does not match the classified goals. Additionally, naval 
equipment can be used for multiple missions and purposes. A blue water force of 
destroyers and frigates can be used to escort a carrier for power projection or conduct 
SLOC defense. With Japan’s helicopter carrier and blue water fleet, SLOC defense and 
power projection are both possible—if the carriers are retrofitted to accommodate strike 
fighters. Thus, it can be a difficult task to match rhetoric, threats, and capabilities to 
ensure that one is not significantly out of sync with the others. In cases like Sweden’s, 
there is a clear and limited goal for the RSwN which makes it easy to assess. For France, 
the government is outspoken about its desire to maintain an international influence 
through power projection—even if it slowly defunding its own ability to do so. For Japan, 
it is clear that SLOC defense is central to Japan’s survival as an island nation, but their 
forces are advanced enough to complete a hybrid of power projection and SLOC defense 
if the situation demanded. It will crucial to keep these questions in mind when 
determining the main purpose for the naval force that China is building, while 
understanding that most navies can quickly adapt to complete multiple missions. 
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III. THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY (NAVY): 
MODERNIZATION STRATEGY AND CAPABILITIES 
The transformation of contemporary Chinese society, in terms of its 
viewpoint on sea power, is the evolution from an internally oriented 
economic form of a traditional farming civilization to an externally 
oriented economic form of a modern industrial civilization relying on sea 
lines of communication…[This transformation] is the basis of a historic 
about face in China, from its traditional advocacy of land power to the 
modern advocacy of sea power. Beyond that, it opens up a distinct, 
historic path by which China can achieve a national resurgence from 
“continental civilization” to “maritime civilization” in the 21st century. 
—Lu Ning185 
A. INTRODUCTION: DISCERNING THE LONG-TERM PURPOSE OF 
CHINA’S NAVY 
Although it is seemingly impossible to perfectly and precisely impute the long-
term intentions the political elite of the CCP has for the PLAN, it is possible to evaluate 
its current capabilities and how China’s modernization compares to other naval powers. 
From that, some inference regarding Chinese intentions is reasonable. This chapter will 
attempt to evaluate China’s naval expansion in the context of the abstract and empirical 
cases of forces optimized for power projection, SLOC defense, or sea denial detailed in 
the previous chapter. Once a strategy is determined, it makes deciphering Chinese 
regional political intent more manageable because it will identify the operational 
restrictions placed on Chinese policy by determining the capability of the PLAN in 
comparison to the regional naval powers previously analyzed. To identify the 
predominant maritime mission that the PLAN is most likely being built to achieve, this 
chapter will assess two broad topic areas. First, China’s strategy, goals, and threats will 
be discussed starting with its historical attitude toward maritime security and ending with 
China’s current maritime strategy. Next, the PLAN’s force structure, C2 and ISR 
capabilities, and the nature of its previous deployments and exercises will be analyzed as 
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a means to identify the characteristics of the PLAN and its current ability to employ sea 
denial, power projection, or SLOC protection missions—or a combination of multiple 
missions. Lastly, although there will be a brief summary of findings on PLAN 
modernization in this chapter, the direct comparisons of the PLAN with the archetypal 
navies discussed in Chapter II and the final assessment on China’s current long-term 
maritime strategy will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
China’s regional and global status has drastically changed since the “Father of the 
Chinese Navy,” Liu Huaqing, developed the first modern strategy for the PLAN in the 
early 1980s. Liu called for developing a force capable of sea control in China’s littorals 
by 2000, sea denial outside of China’s near seas by 2020, and command of the seas 
globally by 2050.186 The PLAN is not on track to meet Liu’s strategic goals by his goal 
dates, but the PLAN has made significant progress in modernizing its forces into a 
formidable regional power with limited global capabilities. China’s rapid economic 
growth has been parlayed into political power—domestically for the CCP and 
internationally for the PRC—and has allowed for a steady budget increase for the PLAN 
as more emphasis is being placed on maritime security by a military traditionally focused 
on its army. Moreover, the international system has shifted from the bipolar structure of 
the Cold War to a unipolar system that is trending toward multipolarity, which presents 
the PRC with new security considerations—like how to restructure the regional hub and 
spoke bilateral alliances with the United States into a more diverse regional security 
apparatus. The United States and its allies have expressed concern over China’s military 
modernization and assertive behavior involving territorial disputes in the South China 
Sea and East China Sea, prompting the “rebalancing” of U.S. forces to the Asia Pacific 
region to “avoid weakening the U.S. posture in Asia”–but the PRC continues to insist it 
seeks to rise peacefully.187 
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Despite its growing capabilities and substantive qualitative leaps in technological 
ability since its military modernization began in the early 1990s, China has shown 
restraint in the speed of its military modernization in part to avoid being accused of 
starting a spiraling security dilemma. Consequently, a RAND study from that era argued, 
In its policies toward military modernization, the calculative strategy aims 
to reduce China’s existing vulnerabilities while increasing the ability of its 
military forces to secure diplomatic and political leverage. The 
modernization—in both nuclear and conventional forces—is going 
forward slowly and steadily because a rapid military buildup might alarm 
China’s neighbors and the major powers. Further, a sudden buildup would 
detract from China’s current emphasis on civilian economic 
development.188  
The political, geographic, and economic constraints that China faces are 
significantly different than what Sweden, France, and Japan face; thus, the archetypes 
laid out in the previous chapter will not perfectly mirror the PLAN—even if both navies 
are built for the same purpose. However, the goals, threats, capabilities, and CONOPS of 
each archetype should have significant overlap with the PLAN if it is built with the same 
purpose in mind. Furthermore, this chapter does not intend to predict what China will do 
with its navy; rather, it aims to determine what China is capable of doing with its navy, 
assess how naval strategic trends have changed in recent decades, discuss if China’s 
rhetoric can be reinforced by its capabilities, and discern the maritime strategy which 
China is able to enforce.  
B. STRATEGIC OUTLOOK OF THE PLAN 
The PLA’s initial military strategy at the founding of the PRC in 1949 was solely 
based on continental considerations and was not significantly modified until after the 
threat of great power war dissipated due to the prevalence of “peace and development” 
that accompanied the decline—and eventual collapse—of the Soviet Union in mid-to-late 
1980s.189 The combined efforts of Deng Xiaoping and General Liu Huaqing in the 1980s 
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helped to lay the foundation for China’s modern naval strategy and introduced a specific 
set of goals for PLAN modernization that—to an extent—China continues to work 
toward today. Furthermore, pursuing reunification with Taiwan as a top political goal, 
increasing reliance on SLOCs for trade and energy security, and unrelenting demands to 
safeguard territorial interests in the SCS and ECS has gradually pushed maritime security 
to the forefront of China’s security agenda. 
1. Establishing a Foundation for Modern PLAN Strategy  
The role of the PLAN in China’s national military strategy has drastically 
changed since the founding of the PRC in 1949. Initially, the PLAN was an afterthought 
to the PLA and strategic nuclear forces because Mao believed invasion and nuclear war 
were the biggest threats to China. As the Cold War came to a close and China began to 
focus on economic reform, the PLAN assumed a larger role in the national military 
strategy. By the 1990s, China’s growing dependence on SLOCs for trade and energy, and 
the expectation that future conflicts would have limited objectives and probably involve 
maritime territorial disputes, made maritime security a higher priority in developing the 
national security plan.  
a. PLAN Strategy at the Founding of the PRC 
When the People’s Republic was established in 1949, the PLAN was a dilapidated 
gunboat navy that held little strategic significance. The PRC’s initial maritime strategy 
was formed in the early 1950s by General Xiao Jingguang, an infantryman, who argued 
that the sole purpose of the PLAN was to aid the PLA in coastal defense as part of the 
“People’s War.”190 Moreover, Xiao asserted “a combination of coastal sea guerrilla 
warfare and coastal anti-landing warfare will be the major combat form for a future sea 
war.”191 Additionally, Mao believed that if China were to go to war it would likely either 
be because of a Soviet or American invasion or as a result of the spillover effects from a 
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nuclear war between the USSR and United States.192 To prepare for either scenario, Mao 
argued, “The PLA had to be large, dispersed, low tech, and politically integrated with the 
people” for a scenario where the invading forces would be drawn deep into China and a 
combination of the PLA and massive rural militias would overcome the invasion force.193  
Xiao and Mao’s decision to follow a “coastal defense” strategy remained intact 
for over thirty years. China pursued a duel strategy that emphasized continental and 
nuclear assets and largely neglected the PLAN. One exception is the development of the 
Xia class SSBN in 1980. Cole argues, “Although the single Fleet Ballistic Missile 
submarine China deployed about 1980 was national rather than a naval asset, the Xia 
gave the PLAN a nuclear deterrent mission for the first time.”194 The PLAN’s new 
mission set did not acknowledge the importance of maritime security or strategy, it only 
added an asset to help employ the PRC’s nuclear strategy. Furthermore, the nuclear 
deterrence mission only applied to one submarine. The Xia was the only SSBN in the 
PLAN fleet for thirty years and its development did not signal major shift in Chinese 
maritime strategy or strategic deterrence capabilities. It would be nearly three decades 
before the PLAN commissioned a capable replacement SSBN—the Jin-class in 2007—
which has yet to conduct a deterrent patrol. The five Han-class submarines commissioned 
between the mid-1970s and 1990—the only other nuclear powered submarines in the 
PLAN inventory—were capable of long distance missions, but there was no logistical 
support to enable such missions from occurring. Moreover, SSNs tend to operate in 
support of a blue water strike group or SAG when conducting distant deployments—the 
PLAN had no blue water strike groups or SAGs deploying at the time the Han SSNs 
entered the fleet, and they mostly served to provide long term support for operations in 
China’s littorals (while providing the foundation for more advanced indigenously built 
SSNs in the future). 
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b. Evolving Strategies Leading to PLAN Modernization 
In the early 1980s, Deng recognized that a war with either of the two great powers 
was becoming less likely, and if war did occur, it would probably have limited objectives 
and not devolve into total war.195 In 1985, Deng revised the PLA’s Military Strategic 
Guidelines (MSG) to prepare for “local war under modern conditions” that was more 
likely to take place “in a limited geographic area on China’s periphery, such as the 
Taiwan Strait, the South or East China Sea, Vietnam, or Korea.”196 Moreover, the short, 
high intensity conflicts that would dominate the new security environment were likely to 
be technology driven. Deng’s strategic assessment had major implications for the 
development of the PLAN, and marked the beginning a steady increase in significance 
placed on maritime strategy and technological modernization. 
Around the same time that Deng acknowledged a strategic shift in China’s 
security environment, General Liu Huaqing articulated a new maritime strategy for the 
PLAN, which continues to serve as a foundation that China’s modern maritime strategy 
builds upon. General Liu started his career as a ground forces officer that fought the 
against the KMT during the Chinese Civil War, and it was twenty years after he joined 
the PLA that he was transferred to the naval forces and quickly worked his way up the 
ranks.197 By 1982 he was appointed the PLAN commander and articulated his 
revolutionary plan to build the PLAN up from a weak force to a global power. The 
strategy has three phases based on sea denial, sea control, and command of the sea. Liu 
developed the “offshore defense” concept that China formally adopted in 1986—and 
continues to reference and use today—that is based on being able to dominate defense 
near of the coast, utilize mobile warfare at sea, and employ “surprise guerrilla-like-
attacks at sea.”198  
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The model Liu created had two main geographical areas of interests. The first area 
consists of the Yellow Sea, ECS, and SCS and is known as the “first island chain.” Under 
Liu’s strategy, the PLAN would have control of the first island chain by 2000, but that 
still has not come to fruition—although the PLAN’s robust sea denial capabilities and 
blue water fleet verge on meeting this goal.199 The second area, known as the “second 
island chain,” is based on a north-south line drawn from the Kuriles Islands northeast of 
Hokkaido down through the Marianas islands, Palau, the Caroline Islands of Micronesia, 
and the Indonesian archipelago.200 Broadly, Liu advocated modernizing the navy to first 
employ a sea denial strategy within the first island chain, and once that goal was 
accomplished, China would build a power projection force capable of exerting sea 
control in the first island chain by 2000 and sea denial through the second island chain by 
2020.201 Once sea denial could be extended well outside China’s littorals, a global 
strategy to command the seas could be pursued more securely and was aimed to be 
accomplished by 2050.  
Liu’s strategic goals were further refined in the late 1980s by General Zhang 
Lianzhong. Like General Liu, Zhang started his career as an infantry officer and spent 
thirteen years in the ground forces before transitioning to the fledgling PLAN submarine 
force. Zhang refined China’s maritime strategy to reflect the Soviet model of having a 
zone of sea control, a zone of sea denial, and a zone for ISR.202 The first two zones 
matched Liu’s first and second island chains, and the third zone accounted for the space 
beyond the second island chain.  
Liu’s strategic goals complimented Deng’s strategic outlook, and Liu assigned the 
PLAN four main capabilities to develop in order to fulfill the “offshore defense” strategy: 
“the ability to seize limited sea control in certain areas for a certain period of time, the 
ability to effectively defend China’s sea lanes, the ability to fight outside of China’s 
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claimed maritime areas, the ability to implement a credible nuclear deterrent.”203 The 
four capabilities that Liu identified seem somewhat reasonable when viewed with 
knowledge of China’s current naval capabilities, but during the 1980s, the PLAN was 
still an abysmally backward gunboat navy with technology that was drastically inferior to 
Western powers.  
When Deng changed MSGs in 1985, China had not yet experienced the economic 
explosion that would eventually help drive military modernization in the 1990s and 
2000s. Furthermore, in order to enable future investment in military modernization, Deng 
drastically cut military expenditures to facilitate economic development—which he 
believed was a precondition to military modernization.204 The PLA budget was cut by an 
average of 6% annually between 1979 and 1989, and starting in 1985, over a million 
troops were demobilized in the following decade.205 After a decade of Deng’s rule, China 
had achieved enough economic success to end the military drawdown and start funding 
acquisitions of the new technology needed to modernize the PLA for the “local modern 
wars” that Deng argued were the future of conflict in the region. A steady increase in 
investment into military modernization began by the late 1980s. China was starting its 
modernization significantly behind most of the relevant regional naval powers—like 
Japan, Korea, and the United States. Moreover, Deng continued to emphasize the 
importance of technology in short, high intensity conflicts—the likely nature of a conflict 
involving Taiwan—and PLA leaders were forced to recognize its high level of military 
inferiority after witnessing the swift and absolute victory the United States accomplished 
over Iraq in 1991.206 Technological advancement and defense in depth—starting with 
maritime defense—were identified as critically important after the first Gulf War, and 
military modernization became a top strategic priority as China refined its maritime 
strategy. 
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2. Modern PLAN Strategy  
From 1986 to 2015, the PLAN’s official strategy was “offshore defense,” but 
maritime defense rhetoric in China’s white papers gradually began to include references 
to expanding “blue water capabilities” as early as 2010.207 The 2010 and 2013 white 
papers asserted the PLAN was “solely following and ‘offshore defense,’ strategy,” but 
both white papers also called for the continued development of “open seas” capabilities—
the 2010 white paper specifically called for building capabilities to operate in distant 
waters, although what types of operations were not specified.208 Moreover, the 2013 
white paper tasked the PLAN in “protecting overseas interests” and developing “blue 
water capabilities for mobile operations,” but it was not until the 2015 white paper that 
China’s maritime strategy official expanded the role of the PLAN beyond “offshore 
defense” and to include “open seas protection.”209 The expanded blue water rhetoric in 
the 2013 white paper and the official addition of the “open seas protection” strategy in 
the 2015 white paper appear to be in response to a policy change that was articulated in 
the 18th Party Congress in 2012, during which President Hu Jintao called for China to 
become a “strong maritime power.”210 
Although the overarching official strategy remained relatively static until 2015, 
PLAN interpretation of the type of technology, naval platforms, and tactics that can be 
used for “offshore defense” evolved during the same time frame. At the onset of 
modernization, “offshore defense” seemed to be constrained to a sea denial strategy 
aimed specifically at a Taiwan scenario, but as PLAN has grown in capabilities “offshore 
defense” missions have been carried out further from the mainland until the 2015 Chinese 
Defense white paper formally added, “open seas protection” to its maritime strategy.211 
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Furthermore, China’s gradual expansion of the bounds of its “offshore defense” strategy 
has occurred in conjunction with expanding economic and security interests in the East 
Asian region and beyond.  
a. Territorial Interests and Maritime Strategy  
Protecting territorial sovereignty is a vital interest of every state, but China’s 
semi-colonial experience during the “Century of Humiliation” has caused CCP and PLA 
officials to develop an extreme sensitivity to territorial claims—China’s first National 
Defense white paper in 1998 explicitly mentions the Opium Wars and semi-colonialism 
as a driver of modern sovereignty concerns.212 This history continues to shape China’s 
sense of defining its security policy—which emphasizes respecting sovereignty and non-
intervention into the affairs of other states.213 Cole argues, “Beijing is party to six of East 
Asia’s more than two dozen maritime territorial disputes: the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
with Japan; Taiwan; the Paracel Islands with Vietnam; the Spratly Islands in the South 
China Sea with Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia; water areas of 
the South China Sea with the forgoing nations and Indonesia; and the maritime border 
with Vietnam.”214 The PRC has settled nearly all of its continental territorial disputes—
with the notable exception of its territorial dispute with India—so the remaining 
contested territories are at sea. PLAN modernization is aimed at enforcing the maritime 
territorial claims that China had been too weak to enforce since the onset of the “Century 
of Humiliation” 
Reunification with Taiwan is a core interest of the PRC. Consequently, the top 
maritime strategic priority of the PLAN is to aid in national unification through the 
integration of Taiwan and to counter foreign intervention—should unification come 
through armed conflict.215 The United States asserts that the people of the PRC and 
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Taiwan should make any decisions regarding unification and that any resolution should 
be made peacefully. However, the PRC has reserved the right to resolve the dispute by 
force under particular circumstances. China’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law legally 
acknowledged that armed conflict could be used for unification in certain scenarios and 
declares 
In the event that “Taiwan independence” secessionist forces should act 
under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession 
from China should occur or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification 
should be completely exhausted, the states shall employ nonpeaceful 
means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.216 
The impressive show of force by the U.S. Navy during the Taiwan Straits Crisis 
from 1995–1996 further justified the need to modernize China’s military forces, and 
illuminated the important role maritime security would assert in the post-Cold War 
security environment in Asia. Additionally, the Taiwan Strait crisis led China to catalyze 
the development Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) weaponry to accompany “a broader 
strategy of ‘countering intervention’ by the United States in a Taiwan conflict.”217 
Advancements in A2/AD—the specifics of which will be discussed later in this chapter—
through the 1990s and 2000s helped China to achieve sea denial capabilities in its littorals 
and edge closer to Liu’s first strategic goal of having the capability to exert sea control 
within the first island chain. Additionally, the shore based element of China’s A2/AD 
capabilities—including the PLAN’s shore-based SU-30 fighters and DF-21D ASBMs—
has freed up the PRC to use PLAN surface and subsurface assets to protect other 
territorial and economic interests further away from its near seas—a strategic game 
changer. 
Once PLAN modernization gave China sea denial capabilities for a Taiwan 
conflict scenario, China simultaneously had capabilities to address other nearby points of 
tension. Beijing began its strategy to protect its territorial claims in the SCS and ECS. In 
addition to reaching immediate sea denial milestones, the international situation evolved 
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in the late 2000s and pushed China to form a more assertive stance in its claims in the 
Spratly and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Upon ratifying UNCLOS in 1996, China made four 
formal declarations including “The People’s Republic of China reaffirms its sovereignty 
over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in article 2 of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, which was promulgated 
on 25 February 1992.”218 The archipelagos and islands referenced in the UNCLOS 
declaration included all of the SCS within the “Nine Dash Line” and the Daioyu/Senkaku 
Islands. China’s has remained ambiguous concerning the exact nature of its sovereignty 
claims within its 200nm EEZ.  
China’s Nine Dash Line claims became a higher strategic priority as the 2009 
UNCLOS deadline to solve SCS territorial disputes approached and passed without 
resolution. Starting in 2011, China steadily increased its Chinese Maritime Surveillance 
(CMS), Fishery Agency, Coast Guard, and PLAN presence in the Spratly Islands. 
Although the military activity in the SCS from all claimants has increased, China has 
pursued a considerably larger buildup in the SCS than any other state. PRC officials cite 
U.S. aerial and maritime reconnaissance in the region as the motivation for the buildup as 
a means to protect sovereignty,219 but the other claimants in the SCS are concerned China 
is expanding facilities in the SCS in an attempt to make a broader territorial grab that 
gives the PRC economic rights to the abundant fisheries and untapped natural resources 
in the area. 
By 2016 massive land reclamation projects on multiple reefs and shoals became 
capable of supporting various military missions—including long airstrips on Fiery Reef 
that support extended range bomber aircraft.220 China is not alone in its island 
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reclamations and militarization of the SCS. Vietnam has engaged in island building 
projects,221 the Philippines has manned a naval vessel aground on the Second Thomas 
Shoal,222 and Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia all have built airstrips in 
the SCS—but none of its airstrips are long enough to support bombers.223 Although most 
of the claimants have militarized their SCS claims to some extent, China’s land 
reclamation projects have been built up to provide logistical support for its warships, 
fighter aircraft, and bombers—making China’s SCS actions more serious and escalatory 
according to U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper.224 
China’s territorial dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands escalated 
in 2010 after a Chinese fishing boat and Japanese Coast Guard vessel collided within the 
territorial seas of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the Japanese arrested the crew under 
domestic law.225 Tensions continued to rise in 2012 after the nationalist mayor of Tokyo 
attempted to purchase the islands from a private owner. The Japanese Government 
stepped in to the buy the islands as a step to mitigate possible Chinese outrage, but the 
PRC saw the process as a land grab and a challenge to China’s sovereignty and the status 
quo.226  
Recent escalatory events in the SCS and ECS involving China’s territorial claims 
offer one reason as to why China is expanding its blue water naval capabilities—as the 
sea denial forces originally focused on in the 1990s did not have the capabilities to 
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project power to the distant portions of the SCS that are over one thousand miles from 
Hainan Island. Additionally, starting in 2004, China’s military strategy has acknowledged 
the need for moving its “strategic center of gravity” further outward to create a “favorable 
strategic posture” in the region.227 The facilities built on reefs in the SCS provide 
logistical support points for China’s blue water navy. Moreover, the notion of pushing 
out the defensive boundary outward toward the Pacific Ocean is in line with Liu’s 
strategy to expand China’s sea denial capabilities through the second island by 2020—a 
goal that forward sea-basing in the SCS and a larger blue water fleet would help them 
accomplish. 
b. Economic Interests and Maritime Strategy  
The growing power of the PLAN is catching up to meet the security demands 
resulting from China’s expanding economic power, which is heavily reliant on maritime 
commerce. The CCP believes that its continued political viability is inextricably linked to 
economic success, and the maritime arena is a critical component of China’s economic 
progress. Cole asserts, 
The importance of the maritime arena is increasingly crucial to that 
process…the PLAN’s value as an instrument of statecraft is linked directly 
to maintaining and defending China’s maritime stakes: the concentration 
of the nation’s economic enterprises in its coastal regions, its dependence 
on one of the world’s largest fleets of merchant ships and the world’s 
second-largest ship-building capacity, its massive seaport infrastructure, 
its dependence on riverine and coastal maritime commerce, and the 
increasing national dependence on offshore fisheries and other natural 
resources, especially oil and gas.  
China imports over half of its oil—with 80% of that arriving over the sea—and 
became a net importer of natural gas in 2007.228 The PLAN has multiple roles in 
protecting China’s oil and natural gas supply. First, the PLAN is tasked to provide 
security for the shipping that delivers oil and natural gas to China—as it must do with the 
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plethora of maritime traffic that China depends on to export its goods. As much as 50% 
of China’s economic growth is dependent on foreign trade, and over 90% of that foreign 
trade is transported by ship.229 Strategic maritime choke points at the Strait of Hormuz 
and Strait of Malacca are thousands of miles from China’s coastline and require blue 
water capabilities to the protect trade that transits through the straits. Currently, the 
PLAN would struggle to defend against a blockade against the Strait of Malacca, but the 
PLAN’s sustained deployments to the HOA have proven that the PLAN’s capabilities for 
distant SLOC defense are improving. Second, China’s maritime territorial disputes 
involve areas with offshore oil and gas reserves, and the PLAN plays a role in upholding 
China’s territorial claims. To date, China’s Coast Guard has played the leading role in 
asserting territorial claims, but if territorial disputes erupt into limited conflict in the SCS 
and ECS, the PLAN would be charged to protect China’s territorial claims and the 
important offshore energy resources that surround them. China’s estimates of oil reserves 
in the SCS and Spratlys is significantly higher than the U.S. estimates—China estimates 
213 billion oil barrels (bbl) in the SCS and 105 billion bbl in the Spratlys, vice the 28 
billion bbl in the SCS and 2.1 billion bbl estimated by the United States.230 Abundant 
natural gas fields—estimated to be 2,000 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)by the Chinese and 266 
by the United States—are already being exploited in the SCS.  
In addition to exports, oil, and gas reserves, China is heavily dependent on 
offshore fisheries. The SCS had abundant fishing resources, but by 2004, it was in danger 
of being “fished out.” Overfishing was a catalyst to China implementing EEZ claims in 
the SCS and increasing Fishing Agency patrols in 2009.231 The PLAN has not been 
involved in armed disputes over fisheries yet, but the close ties fisheries have to territorial 
claims, and the dwindling fish populations in contested areas, make future PLAN 
involvement more likely—especially as the Chinese government subsidizes fuel for 
                                                 
229 Ibid., 53–54. 
230 Ibid., 49. 
231 Cole, Great Wall at Sea, 53. 
 86
fishermen to fish in contested portions of the SCS far from China’s shores.232 As the 
PLAN continues to grow and modernize, China’s defense strategy has expanded to 
protect China’s economic interests further away from its near seas. 
c. Threat Perception and its Impact on Naval Modernization and Maritime 
Strategy  
China’s rising economic status enabled military modernization to occur, but the 
perceived threat the United States poses to various Chinese interests has shaped the 
nature of PLAN modernization in numerous ways. At a 2014 Conference on Interaction 
and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Xi Jinping made a thinly veiled 
criticism of the United States’ “outdated thinking of the Cold War,” by attacking the hub 
and spoke bilateral alliance system the United States has maintained in Asia.233 Xi 
asserted, “We cannot just have security for one or a few countries while leaving the rest 
insecure…A military alliance which is targeted at a third party is not conducive to 
common regional security.”234 Chinese Ambassador Cui Tiankai echoed Xi’s sentiments 
in 2015 at the International conference on China-US Cooperation in Global Security 
Affairs when he stated, “Do we work together to build broad-based partnerships that will 
enable us to effectively confront the global issues for common interest, or do we still 
keep a narrow focus on Cold War type of alliances that actually restrict the vision, reduce 
the choices and will render the world more divided and less secure?”235 Although Xi 
argued that alliances should not be targeted at a third party, in many ways PLAN 
modernization guided specifically to counter a third party: the United States (like the 
development of the DF-21D, YJ-62, and YJ-83 to counter the U.S. Navy threat in the 
immediate aftermath of the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996). 
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Deng gave military modernization higher priority after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 
1990 because it demonstrated China’s vast inferiority to the United States in conducting 
“local wars under modern conditions” that Deng viewed as the future of warfare. China’s 
pivot toward investing more heavily in A2/AD technologies came in response to the 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–1996.236 In 1996, the Chinese Aerospace Science and 
Technology Corporation (CASC) began to research the feasibility of an Anti-Ship 
Ballistic Missile (ASBM) program and provided concept demonstrations in potential 
guidance and control systems for an ASBM.237 Further investments into ASBM research 
eventually yielded the operational testing of the DF-21D “carrier killer” missile in 2010, 
which was developed specifically to counter U.S. power projection capabilities gained 
through aircraft carriers.238 Research and design of the YJ-62 ASCM and YJ-83 ASM—
which are outfitted on various PLAN warships and submarines—was sped up following 
the Taiwan Strait Crisis and both missiles made their way to the fleet by the mid-
2000s.239 Moreover, PLAN weapon-development in the aftermath of the Taiwan Strait 
was characterized by designing weapons to counter specific threats in the U.S. Navy.  
China’s maritime strategy has been largely reactionary to the CMC’s perception 
of the U.S. threat and has declared no clear long term goal outside of nebulous statements 
like “peaceful development” or “peaceful rise” that are difficult for U.S. military leaders 
to believe. In some aspects Liu Huaqing’s grand strategy is being followed as the PLAN 
modernizes, but the CCP has never confirmed the global aspirations that Liu laid out. The 
November 2012 18th Party Congress Report advocated making China into a “strong 
maritime power,” but did not give much detail on the roles it believed the navy of a 
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“strong maritime power” should play.240 The 2015 white paper formally added “open 
seas protection” as a new role of the PLAN after tasking the PLAN to protect overseas 
interests (2013 white paper) and developing capabilities for conducting blue water 
operations 2010 white paper), but failed to provide much clarity on the how far into the 
open seas China intends to regularly use the PLAN or what “protection” constitutes.  
Counter-piracy deployments to the Horn of Africa (HOA) provide one such 
interpretation of “open seas protection,” but China has been conducting continuous naval 
deployments to the HOA for seven years without formally changing its “offshore 
defense” strategy, so “open seas protection” may constitute something entirely different. 
Retired U.S. Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt asserts, “the combination of ‘offshore 
waters defense’ with ‘open seas protection’ build a combined, multi-functional and 
efficient maritime combat force structure. This passage suggests that protecting overseas 
interests and sea lanes is forecast to become as important to China’s leadership as 
defending China itself.”241 While it is not yet apparent if protecting overseas interests 
will become a “core interest” of the PLA, China is certainly expanding the boundaries it 
expects the PLAN to routinely operate in. U.S. Naval Postgraduate School Professor 
Christopher Twomey argues,  
The most notable priority for the CCP over the past 35 years has been 
economic development, and the reforms in this area are often described, as 
you know, in former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s phrase “crossing 
the river by feeling for stones.” This same process of Chinese decision 
makers gradually developing policy as the situation emerges is likely to 
characterize Chinese security policy making, precluding any “long-term” 
plan for global leadership (or anything else for that matter).242 
China has routinely released Military Defense white papers regularly since 1998, 
which PRC leadership started in order to calm concerns many states had in discerning the 
purpose of Chinese military modernization. It is certainly reasonable to expect China’s 
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military power to grow as its economic and political power grow, but the opaque long 
term intentions for PLAN modernization make it difficult to discern the primary strategy 
the PLAN is building toward. CCP has a well-known desire to decrease U.S. dominance 
in the regional maritime security apparatus—as Xi discussed at the 2014 CICA 
conference—but it is unclear how the PLAN would evolve to meet the needs of leading a 
“Asian security partnership program” led by the Chinese.243 Moreover, the expansion of 
PLAN strategy to include “open seas protection” may is related to increased investment 
abroad, such as the One Belt One Road initiative—which includes a new maritime silk 
road that includes numerous commercial ports. As China looks to protect its investments 
in the One Belt One Road initiative, it is reasonable that it wants to have more control 
over the security apparatus which protects the maritime approaches to its commercial 
ports. Consequently, McDevitt argues,  
The “open seas protection” mission also makes sense within the context of 
Xi’s much-ballyhooed 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which will run 
from China’s major ports through the Indonesian Straits, and then proceed 
along the Indian Ocean’s northern littoral, grazing East Africa, before 
transiting the Red Sea and Suez Canal into the Eastern Mediterranean. 
This “road” is already heavily traveled by China’s shipping, but if China 
does invest in infrastructure along the route, as it has promised to do, it 
will need to look after those investments as well as its shipping.244 
(1) Current Defense Strategy  
President Xi’s call for China to become a “strong maritime power” during the 
18th Party Congress was further discussed by Vice Admiral Jiang Weilie, who clearly 
identifies the SCS as the primary location that one of Deng’s “localized wars” could 
occur. Jiang stated, 
We need to do more with respect to implementing the strategy of strategic 
management of the South China Sea. The fleet is an important strategic 
force in the South China Sea. It ensures the security of important sea lines 
of communication and it effectively safeguards national sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests. We need to do more to strengthen our 
theoretical research on strategic management of the South China Sea; 
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proactively combine [actions that] safeguard rights and [actions that] 
safeguard stability; thoroughly augment the strength of our strategic 
control over the South China Sea; and thoroughly guard, build and 
strategically manage the South China Sea.245 
Additionally, China’s 2015 Defense white paper builds upon the same concepts 
that date back to Deng Xiaoping’s strategic concerns (and Jiang discusses above), but 
also provides an expanding set of national interests and missions for the PLAN. Like 
Deng asserted in the 1980s, the 2015 white paper states “ the world still faces both 
immediate and potential threats of local wars” and China’s primary defense goals are to 
“safeguard its national unification, territorial integrity, and development interests.”246 
Unlike Deng’s focus on bolstering defense in China’s immediate littorals aimed at A2/
AD—even if it was not explicitly labeled A2/AD by PLA leaders—the 2015 white paper 
formalized the recent trend of expanding the role of China’s military in safeguarding 
China’s global maritime interests first alluded to in the 2010 and 2013 white papers. The 
2015 white paper declares,  
China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world 
peace… With the growth of China’s national interests, its national security 
is more vulnerable to international and regional turmoil, terrorism, piracy, 
serious natural disasters and epidemics, and the security of overseas 
interests concerning energy and resources, strategic sea lines of 
communication (SLOCs), as well as institutions, personnel and assets 
abroad, has become an imminent issue… In line with the strategic 
requirement of offshore waters defense and open seas protection, the PLA 
Navy (PLAN) will gradually shift its focus from “offshore waters defense” 
to the combination of “offshore waters defense” with “open seas 
protection,” and build a combined, multifunctional and efficient marine 
combat force structure.247 
The 2015 Defense white paper is nuanced with statements that indicate China is 
shifting toward pursuing a global maritime force over the long term. The proclamation 
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that China’s military will remain “a staunch force in maintain world peace” seems to 
explicitly acknowledge a global military role (although one might argue that China’s 
military will focus on regional peace and stability as its contribution to protecting broader 
global economic stability). However, the “growth of national interests” is further 
specified by listing maritime focused missions—almost exclusively—that require a larger 
blue water navy component and can be used to justify expanding power projection and 
logistical capabilities. China’s power projection assets have traditionally been focused on 
short range operations in Taiwan, but growth in larger blue water amphibious shifts could 
indicate a strategic shift to a further reaching power projection force. Moreover, the 
addition of “open seas protection” to the traditional “offshore waters defense” indicates 
an expansion of the PLAN’s strategy to include SLOC defense outside the region at a 
minimum, and potentially expanding power projection capabilities away from its 
immediate littorals. 
d. Summary of PLAN Strategy  
Certain aspects of the PLAN strategy have remained constant since the start of 
modernization. Protection of territorial sovereignty through “offshore defense” is a core 
mission of the PLAN, but the PLAN strategy has quickly evolved to respond to specific 
threats that U.S. Navy poses. China invested in an A2/AD strategy after U.S. involvement 
in the Taiwan Straits conflict in 1995–1996, and the PLAN’s blue water force has 
steadily improved to expand China’s defense perimeter to include contested territories in 
the SCS and ECS. Although Liu Huaqing provided an ambitious modernization strategy 
aimed at producing a global navy with command of the seas, it is unclear if China is 
actually toward that goal. China’s articulated goals and strategies have no clear long term 
end state and are centered around more immediate security concerns. Strategy articulated 
in the 2015 China Defense white paper and Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2014 CICA 
conference support the notion that China desires to expand its regional influence and to 
become a leader in the regional security architecture. Moreover, the PRC claims to be 
modernizing the PLAN to provide greater maritime security to East Asian region and the 
strategic SLOCs that feed into it.  
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C. PLAN FORCE STRUCTURE AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS  
The PLAN is charged with the defense of China’s vast maritime territory 
including 11,000nm of coastline, 6,500 islands, and 1.86 million square miles of near 
seas made up of territorial seas, EEZs, and continental shelf waters.248 Moreover, the 
PLAN is broken up into three principle fleets organized by geography. The North Sea 
Fleet is headquartered in Qingdao and is responsible for the North Korean border to 
Lianyungang in Jiangsu Province. The North Sea Fleet served as the main base for 
SSBNs and SSNs prior to the gradual shift of submarine assets to Hainan Island, and the 
North Sea Fleet is home to the Liaoning aircraft carrier.249 The East Sea Fleet is 
headquartered in Ningbo and covers the coast from Lianyungang to Dongshan.250 The 
East Sea Fleet’s proximity to Taiwan and Japan make it a strategic location for launching 
operations into either location should hostilities occur. The South Sea Fleet is 
headquartered in Zhanjiang and stretches from Dongshan to the Vietnam border. The 
South Sea Fleet is the fastest growing of the three fleets and is home to both PLA Marine 
Corps Brigades and is expanding submarine facilities on Hainan Island—and is building 
facilities at Yulin that be used to support future aircraft carrier procurements.251 
Furthermore, the South Sea Fleet is constructed to play a major role in a Taiwan conflict 
or escalation of conflict in the SCS. 
To better understand the maritime strategy China is capable of enforcing, it is 
essential to analyze the PLAN’s force structure. This section will assess the PLAN’s 
coastal attack craft, mine warfare vessels, amphibious capabilities, blue water vessels, 
aircraft carrier, submarine fleet, land-based A2/AD assets, and C4ISR capabilities. PLAN 
force structure will be analyzed in conjunction with recent PLAN deployments and 
exercises to develop a notional concept of operations for multiple maritime strategies.  
                                                 
248 Ren Xiaofeng, “China’s Maritime Security Policy Making and Maritime Confidence-Building 
Measures,” Twenty-First Century Sea Power: Cooperation and Conflict at Sea, eds. Peter Dutton, Robert 
Ross, and Oystein Tunsjo. (New York:  NY. 2012); 197. 
249 “China Naval Overview.” Jane’s World Navies. Accessed June 7, 2016. https://janes.ihs.com/
Janes/Display/1322663#Organisation 
250 Ibid. 
251 “China Naval Overview.” Jane’s World Navies. Accessed June 7, 2016. https://janes.ihs.com/
Janes/Display/1322663#Organisation. 
 93
1. PLAN Force Structure  
At the onset of modernization in the 1980s, naval procurement focused on large 
numbers of cheap single-mission vessels. More recent PLAN modernization efforts have 
shifted to procuring new multi-mission naval platforms based on quality over quantity. A 
steady push has been made to make big “leaps” in the technological capacity of each 
platform until it has reached parity with the cutting edge vessels of other major powers. 
Moreover, China is working to develop “home grown” technology to support each 
component of its naval forces—China’s blue water and submarine fleets have largely met 
this goal, while its aircraft carrier program is still in the initial stages of producing an 
indigenous carrier.  
Defense spending in the PRC is dwarfed by the defense spending of the United 
States—China spent $215 billion in 2015 compared to the nearly $600 billion spent by 
the United States—but China’s military budget has grown 11% a year since 1995, which 
over three times the pace that the U.S. defense budget grew in the same time period.252 
While we do not know how the budgets are distributed across the services, the stead shift 
away from an Army centric force at least suggests that the Navy is not a lower percentage 
of that growing budget. Moreover, the difference between the defense budget reported by 
the CCP and the real defense budget (that International Institute of Strategic Studies 
estimates) has declined from a 72% gap (in RMB) in FY2005 to leveling out at around a 
40% gap by FY2012—making the actual defense budget easier to estimate and future 
defense budgets easier to predict.253 Even if the exact budget is unknown, the most 
important aspect of defense spending is how the money is being spent (and in support of 
what strategy). Adam Liff and Andrew Erickson assert, “Specific details remain unclear, 
but China’s defense spending overall is no mystery–it supports PLA modernization and 
personnel development as well as its announced objectives of securing China’s homeland 
and asserting control over contested territorial and maritime claims, with a focus on the 
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Near Seas (the Yellow, East, and South China seas).”254 Furthermore, steady increases in 
defense budgets have allowed the PLAN to domestically develop and produce some 
cutting edge naval technology that has parity with the United States and other major 
powers, which has forced the United States to react and build new capabilities to counter 
the increasingly advanced Chinese fleet. 
This section on PLAN forces structure will address significant advancements 
made since modernization began concerning patrol and coastal combatants, 
minesweepers, shore based A2/AD, submarines, blue water surface vessels, amphibious 
vessels, aircraft carriers, and C4ISR. First, the coastal assets used for sea denial will be 
reviewed (patrol and coastal combatants, minesweepers, and shore based A2/AD), then 
the platforms that allow the PLAN to conduct SLOC defense (submarines and blue water 
surface vessels), and it will conclude with the platforms that could potentially be used for 
power projection (amphibious vessels and aircraft carriers) and C4ISR.  
a. Patrol and Coastal Combatants 
The PLAN’s patrol and coastal combatants fall into three broad categories: 
corvettes, patrol craft (PC) intended for defensive purposes but with extended offensive 
capabilities, and PCs intended for strictly for near seas defense. There are seventy-eight 
PCs that are used for nears seas defense. The Haijiu, Hainan, and Haiqing class PCs are 
lightly armed with anti-ship mortars and a 57mm gun, and its size and capabilities limit 
its use to defense of the immediate near seas around China’s coastline.255 The slightly 
larger and better equipped Houjan and Houxin class offer between four and six YJ-8/
CSS-N-4 ASMs that have a 50nm range.256 The Houjan and Houxin are also intended for 
the immediate near seas by China’s coastline, but offer a modest range ASuW threat in a 
sea denial scenario. The Haijiu, Hainan, and Haiqing class PCs have shallow drafts 
which makes operating in the rougher waters outside of China’s immediate littorals 
difficult and renders the speed of the vessels ineffective. Moreover, the lack of long-term 
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habitability amenities prevents the Haijiu, Hainan, and Haiqing class PCs for being 
underway for more than a day or two. 
Since the onset of modernization, the PLAN has greatly improved its coastal 
combatant inventory through the mass production of the Houbei class PC and the 
Jiangdao I and II class corvettes. The capabilities of the Houbei class PC and the 
Jiangdao I and II corvettes provide a fierce ASuW threat in a sea denial or sea control 
scenario. The use of swarm tactics with the stealthy Houbei utilizing OTH capabilities 
make the PLAN’s coastal defense capabilities formidable. Although both classes were 
originally built with a Taiwan contingency in mind, the longer range and better armament 
of the Jiangdao corvettes aid in extending sea denial capabilities to the SCS and ECS.  
The Houbei PC has additional capabilities that allow it to be used for offensive 
purposes—or “offshore active defense” in PLAN doctrine. John Patch of the China 
Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College argues, “The Houbei 
missions fit within the recent PLAN emphasis on expanding near-seas missions beyond 
sea denial (which, of course, is inherently defensive) to sea control.”257 The Houbei 
contributes to the sea control mission because it can rapidly respond to crisis—with a top 
speed around 50kts—while maintaining the hull strength to operate in seas slightly 
beyond the EEZ. Furthermore, the Houbei class is equipped with two quad-launchers that 
fire the formidable YJ-83/C803 ASM that has a 135nm range and can be used for over 
the horizon (OTH) targeting by utilizing data-link capabilities that acquires targeting data 
inputs from aircraft, submarines, and other surface combatants.258 Additionally, the 
Houbei’s stealthy design and advanced data-link capabilities make it an ISR asset for 
OTH targeting and surveillance.  
The Houbei class is logistically limited to short duration conflicts in China’s near 
seas—and slightly beyond—but its OTH offensive capabilities, fast top speed, and large 
numbers (with over sixty in active use) make it ideal for both sea denial and sea control 
scenarios. Moreover, the Houbei’s ability to cover a significant operating space allows 
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for other blue water combatants to push out further from China’s littorals without 
sacrificing sea denial capabilities. The PRC stopped production of the Houbei class PCs 
in 2009 in order to produce corvettes that have extended time on station and blue water 
capabilities. The shift from mass production of Houbei’s to the larger Jiangdao corvette 
appears to be one signal of PLAN satisfaction with its surface fleet’s sea denial 
capabilities within its littorals and a shift toward coastal craft with longer range 
capabilities that can be used to protect the approaches to nearby SLOCs as well as 
disputed territories just beyond China’s immediate littorals.  
The PLAN has twenty-two corvettes and are broken into the Jiangdao I and 
Jiangdao II classes. In addition to having an extended range, the Jiangdao I and II are 
multi-mission capable. Like the Houbei, the corvettes have the YJ-83/C803 ASMs, but 
the corvettes are also equipped with HG-10 short-range SAMs, Anti-submarine torpedo 
tubes (ASTT), 76mm and 39mm guns, and a helicopter pad that can land—but not 
embark—ASW helicopters.259 The Jiangdao I and II are comparable to the Visby class 
corvettes employed by the RSwN and discussed in Chapter II. The Visby gives the 
Swedish the ability to patrol all of the Baltic Sea, but is limited to do much further from 
home. Similarly, the Jiangdao I and II can reach disputed territories in parts of the South 
and East China Sea, but more accurately provides a layer of defense between the 
immediate littorals that the Houbei operates in and the open ocean where Luyang 
destroyers and Jiangkai frigates operate. Jane’s assessed the Jiangdao corvettes as being 
primarily used for EEZ defense and were adopted as a cheaper and longer range 
alternatives to the Houbei.260 
b. Mine Warfare 
The PLAN has expanded its mine warfare capabilities as part of its initial push for 
sea denial capabilities at the onset of modernization. An ONI report assessed China’s 
naval mine’s program as increasingly sophisticated and stated, 
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The PLA(N) has moved from an obsolete mine inventory consisting 
primarily before-WWII mines to a robust and modern inventory including 
moored, bottom, drifting, rocket propelled and intelligent mines. The 
PLA(N)’s more advanced mines feature microprocessors for better 
targeting and integrated sensors to resist sweeping. The mines can be laid 
by submarines (primarily for covert mining of enemy ports), surface ships, 
aircraft, and fishing and merchant vessels.261 
The PLAN has forty-nine mine warfare ships, but the most capable vessels are the 
various models of the Wochi and Wozang minesweepers—which currently account for 
only sixteen ships but are in routine production—that employ the advanced Italian 
PLUTO mine hunting vehicle (MHV).262 The PLAN is in the process of reverse-
engineering the PLUTO MHV so it can be produced domestically. The PLAN’s advanced 
naval mines include the EM-52 and the EM-55. Jane’s assessed the EM-52 as potentially 
having the power to crack the hull of an aircraft carrier, and the EM-55 mines are small 
enough to be laid covertly by submarines.263 The PLAN’s naval mine program is part of 
its “Assassin’s Mace” concept aimed at countering U.S. interference in a Taiwan scenario 
and is a key part of China’s sea denial capabilities. As discussed in Chapter II, Sweden 
has similarly invested in an expansive mine program that allows for an inexpensive way 
to significantly slow down the progress of larger more advanced fleets (while having the 
potential to inflict heavy losses at a low cost). 
c. Shore-Based A2/AD 
The PLAN coordinates with the Second Artillery Force of the PLA in the 
execution of its A2/AD strategy. The U.S. Joint Operational Access Concept (JOAC) 
defines “Anti-Access” and “Area Denial” capabilities by asserting “Anti-access actions 
tend to target forces approaching by air and sea predominantly, but also can target the 
cyber, space, and other forces that support them,” and “Area Denial capabilities target 
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forces in all domains, including land forces.”264 More generally, A2/AD denies the 
adversary access to operate in a defined space for a defined time by the threat of heavy 
asymmetric losses. The PLAN’s patrol craft, corvettes, submarines, and part of the blue 
water fleet all contribute in employing the A2/AD mission in the near seas, but assets 
from the shore based Second Artillery Force and PLAN aircraft (like SU-30 fighters) 
significantly bolster the PRC’s ability to employ an A2/AD strategy at a longer range. 
The maritime connection between the Second Artillery Force and the PLAN 
comes from the newly developed DF-21D ASBM. The DF-21D is launched from road 
mobile platforms and has an assessed maximum range of 1,500nm.265 The maneuverable 
warhead of the DF-21D makes it difficult for missile defense interceptors that some U.S. 
ships employ to intercept it. Similar to the Houbei PC receiving targeting date via data-
link inputs from other ships and submarines to allow for its YJ-83 ASM to be employed 
for OTH targeting, the DF-21D will rely on targeting data inputs from several possible 
OTH sources. Jane’s asserts that data input for DF-21D guidance and targeting is 
expected to be received from UAVs, satellites, active and passive radar, submarines, and 
surface ships at sea.266 
The net effect of the DF-21D is that it provides a “low cost high yield” weapon 
that pushes the operating distance of U.S. carriers and its strike aircraft out of striking 
range during a near seas conflict. Unlike the Swedish artillery forces discussed in Chapter 
II, the A2/AD equipment China possesses can potentially attack forces 1,500nm—the 
Swedish use conventional artillery and short range missiles that only can reach 10–20nm 
away. The employment of DF-21D in conjunction with maritime A2/AD assets would 
come at huge costs for the U.S. Navy if it were to intervene in a Taiwan Strait scenario. 
Additionally, the extended range of the DF-21D could be potentially used in a sea denial 
strategy as far out as the distant parts of SCS and ECS. Moreover, when used in 
conjunction with the PLAN’s near seas maritime assets, the DF-21D guarantees China 
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the ability to employ a sea denial strategy—and potentially a sea control strategy—within 
its near seas. 
d. Submarine Fleet 
ONI argues that since the mid-1990s, China has focused on submarine 
modernization as one of its primary efforts due to the strategic and conventional 
deterrence capabilities that can be attained through employing a strong submarine 
force.267 Like the blue water surface fleet, the submarine fleet has moved into serialized 
production of a small number of platforms after a period of indigenous technological 
leaps and foreign military purchases.268 The PLAN submarine force consists of nine 
nuclear power submarines and fifty-nine diesel electric submarines of varying quality. 
The most advanced conventionally power submarine is the Yuan class SSP, which 
employs Air Independent Propulsion(AIP) technology that significantly extends the time 
it can submerge and remain on station. As discussed in Chapter II, both the Swedish and 
the Japanese have invested in AIP equipped submarines as well—producing AIP 
submarines is a way to extend asset time on station, but at a discounted price compared to 
expensive nuclear submarines. There are twelve Yuan class submarines already in service 
and ONI assesses that as many as eight more are already approved for production.269 In 
addition to torpedoes, the Yuan class has been upgraded to fire the YJ-18 ASCM that has 
a maximum range of around 290nm—a significant upgrade to the previous YJ-82 that 
had significantly less than half of the range of the YJ-18.270 The Song and Shang classes 
are similarly outfitted with the YJ-18 ASCMs. The PLAN has also acquired twelve 
stealthy Kilo class diesel submarines from Russia, eight of which carry the advanced SS-
N-27 Sizzler ASCM that has a 120nm range and was designed to defeat the Aegis weapon 
system.271 Moreover, between 2005 and 2014, PLAN submarines capable of employing 
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ASCMs has grown from 34% of the submarine force to 59% of the submarine force—and 
is projected to be 64% by 2020.272  
The PLAN has slowly advanced its nuclear-powered submarine force as well. 
After halting production of the Shang class SSN after two boats were completed between 
2002 and 2003, and improved Shang class has since gone into serial production and four 
have been commissioned since 2012. The improved Shang is quieter than both the first 
two Shangs and its predecessor—the Han class SSN—but still remains much noisier than 
Russian and U.S. nuclear submarines.273 Consequently, plans for a new Type 095 SSN 
are already being developed to create a quieter SSN with greater weapons capacity.274 In 
addition to nuclear attack submarines, the PLAN has added four Jin class SSBNs since 
2007 and a fifth boat is expected to be commissioned by 2017.275 The Jin gives China a 
credible nuclear deterrent and carries the JL-2 SLBM. Jane’s IHS Weekly reported that 
the first Jin patrol took place at the end of 2015,276 but such a patrol has not been widely 
reported nor confirmed in the latest report to Congress on Chinese naval modernization. 
If Jin’s first patrol has not occurred yet, reports to congress on Chinese naval 
modernization have predicted the first Jin deployment annually since 2014 and a the first 
patrol is considered to be imminent.277 The next generation of SSBNs—the Type 096—is 
expected to enter the initial phases of development after the fifth Jin enters the fleet.  
The PLAN’s submarine force has certainly made significant technological strides 
since the beginning of modernization, but what does it mean for developing China’s 
maritime strategy? ONI assesses the PLAN submarine fleet’s capabilities as limited and 
argues, 
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Most of China’s submarine force is conventionally powered, with 
ASCMs, but without towed arrays. These submarines are optimized for 
regional missions that concentrate on ASUW near major SLOCs. China’s 
small nuclear attack submarine force is more capable of operating further 
from the Chinese mainland, conducting intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and ASUW missions. China’s submarines are not 
currently optimized for two missions at the core of U.S. submarines—
ASW and land attack.278 
Like the blue water fleet, the PLAN submarine fleet is lacking in its capability to 
conduct ASW because of a lack of advanced towed arrays, and its primary torpedo (the 
YU-6) is based on the U.S. MK 48 torpedo from the 1980s (which has been significantly 
improved in the MK 48 ADCAP). Furthermore, the submarine force’s value as an ASuW 
threat and ISR asset have led it to increasingly conduct SLOC defense and 
reconnaissance missions. As the PLAN’s SSN numbers gradually increase, it will aid in 
making a sustained global submarine presence possible. However, the notable lack of 
power projection weapons (like the TLAM capabilities of U.S. SSGNs and SSNs) and 
poor ASW technology limit the future employment of the PLAN’s current SSN inventory 
to ASuW, SLOC defense, and reconnaissance missions.  
e. Blue Water Capabilities (Including Logistical Support) 
Perhaps the greatest technological leaps that the PLAN has made during 
modernization—along with submarine advancements—are in the advanced blue water 
fleet the PLAN has begun to field. At the onset of modernization, China’s blue water 
fleet was mostly dilapidated old Soviet vessels that offered little hope of actually 
sustaining blue water operations. Since 2000, the PLAN has developed four advanced 
indigenous classes of destroyers and two classes of advanced indigenous frigates.279 
Altogether the PLAN has seventy-four destroyers and frigates, but fewer than half would 
be considered to be technologically advanced compared to other regional power like 
Japan, France, or the United States. Although a large portion of the PLAN’s destroyers 
and frigates are older and less capable than its newer indigenous ships, it compensates for 
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their age with advanced weapon systems. For example, the Hangzhou class destroyers–
former Russian Sovremennyy class destroyers—are equipped with eight SS-N-22 
Sunburn ASMs that have a 130nm range and a seeker built specifically to defeat the 
Aegis weapon system on U.S. cruisers and destroyers.280 Moreover, even most of the 
oldest frigates in the PLAN inventory—like the Luda class—are outfitted with the YJ-83 
ASM that has a 135nm range, and others are outfitted with the YJ-8A with a 65nm range 
(providing considerable ASuW protection). 
The most significant progress in the PLAN’s blue water fleet is in development of 
its Luyang III class destroyers. The Luyang I-III classes represent several key milestones 
for the PLAN’s blue water fleet. First, they were assessed by ONI as “comparable in 
many respects to the most modern Western warships.”281 Consequently, the Military 
Balance assessed that the “leap frog” technique used in building previous destroyer 
classes—rapid technological jumps in each ship class, but only one or two ships per class 
(which made maintenance and logistical supply chain development a nightmare)—has 
ended with the Luyang III. Jane’s corroborates this assessment and states that twelve 
Luyang III class ships are expected to be built.282 Luyang II-III both include the Dragon 
Eye phased array radar, which gives each ship area air defense capabilities on par with 
U.S. Aegis destroyers and cruisers.283 Furthermore, the ASM and ASCM capabilities of 
the Luyang II-III have achieved parity with comparable U.S. cruisers and destroyers. The 
range of the only operational ASM in the U.S. Navy surface fleet (Harpoon) only has a 
range of 67nm (Block 1C and older variants) or 130nm (Block 1D and newer variants) 
and is not outfitted on over half of U.S. destroyers.284 This deficiency has been 
recognized by the U.S. Navy, and it has invested in the LRASM, SM-6 (surface mode), 
and Tomahawk (surface to surface mode) as a part of its “distributed lethality” concept 
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aimed at countering many of the A2/AD, ASM, ASCM, and ASBM advances the PLAN 
has made.285 The Luyang II is equipped with YJ-62 ASM with a 162nm range and has 
the long rang HHQ-9 SAM that provides protection out to at least 62nm.286 The Luyang 
III is similarly equipped with the HHQ-9 SAM, but adds the YJ-18 ASCM to its arsenal, 
which has an impressive 290nm range.287 The Luyang III’s capabilities rival—and in 
ASuW surpasses—the most technologically advanced U.S. ships.  
The growth of advanced capabilities within the PLAN’s blue water fleet is 
significant because of the new missions the PLAN can support as a result. The PLAN has 
advanced from point air defense to area air defense, which can enable future global SAG 
and carrier deployments and power projection. Additionally, the PLAN is developing the 
Type-055 cruiser class which is expected to have twice the number of VLS cells as the 
Luyang III (128 versus 64), while carrying many of the same weapons systems—and 
potentially the longer rang YJ-100 ASCM that is still being developed.288Furthermore, 
advanced ASuW weapons allow the blue water fleet to contribute to A2/AD efforts, and 
give China increasingly greater capabilities to employ a sea control strategy within 
China’s near seas.  
Several critical deficiencies stand in the way of making the PLAN a viable global 
fleet. First, the most advanced ships—the Luyang I-III destroyers—account for less than 
15% of the current blue water fleet, number 12 hulls (with eight more under 
construction). The most capable frigates—the Jiangkai I-II classes—account for another 
30% of the fleet, but they have less capable in providing ASuW weaponry and can 
provide area air defense, but at shorter ranges than the Luyang II-IIIs.289 Jiangkai FFGs 
enjoy parity to the ASuW capabilities of a U.S. LCS, but coming advancements in U.S. 
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ASuW weaponry and the LCS ASW package in development should soon give the LCS 
the technological edge . Moreover, the PLAN possesses only limited quantities of 
platforms that extend its capabilities outside of the region, but as Jane’s and Military 
Balance asserted, the serial production of Luyang IIIs and Jiangkai IIs will gradually give 
the PLAN more global capabilities—Luyang III has eight additional hulls in various 
stages of production and Jiangkai II has three in production with another five proposed290 
Another deficiency comes in the surface fleets ability to conduct ASW. Most ASW 
efforts have been made in submarine and naval aircraft development, not in surface 
combatant development. The advanced Luyang III is only equipped with the over the side 
launched Yu-7 light weight torpedoes, which act more as defensive countermeasures than 
offensive firepower.291 New SONAR suites and towed array technology is slowly 
reaching the fleet, but its capabilities are still relatively unsophisticated—clearly the blue 
water fleet is being constructed with ASuW in mind and with ASW as an afterthought. 
The PLAN’s ASW weaknesses could be easily exploited by capable ASW forces—like 
that of the U.S. Navy and JMSDF—and could prove to be a decisive flaw in battle. 
Moreover, China’s newest destroyers and frigates share a similar level of sophistication 
as the frigates and destroyers that Japan and France employ—and were discussed in 
Chapter II. Even with its weaknesses, the PLAN blue water fleet has made significant 
strides in catching up with the rest of the world in terms of quality—only time stands in 
the way in catching up in quantity. 
One often over looked blue water capability that the PLAN has also invested in is 
its blue water auxiliaries fleet. Even if the PLAN makes advancements in its destroyers, 
frigates, or even aircraft carriers, there must be logistical support ships if the advanced 
new fleet is to deploy outside of the region. One example is the advanced Fuchi class 
oiler. Since 2000, the PLAN has commissioned five Fuchi class oilers to add to its 
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auxiliaries fleet.292 Prior to the Fuchi class, three of the five oilers the PLAN used were 
over twenty-five years old, and only one was capable of refueling more than one ship at a 
time.293 Fuchi class oilers are substantially smaller than U.S. oilers, they only displace 
22,000 tons of water, and provided 10,400 tons of fuel—around half of what a U.S. oiler 
displaces and holds.294 However, the Fuchi class is comparable to the Japanese Mashuu 
class oiler which displaces 25,000 tons and 11,000 tons of fuel oil and gasoline.295 
Japan’s oilers have been used primarily in regional operations with occasional 
deployments outside of the East Asia—like the deployment of the oiler Tokiwa in support 
of U.S. operations in the Arabian Gulf at various points between 2001 and 2007. China’s 
Fuchi-class has similarly deployed in support of out of area deployments to the HOA. 
Moreover, the small nature of both Japan’s and China’s oiler fleet point to use primarily 
in the Asian region with short deployments beyond—they cannot sustain long blue water 
deployments. The stark difference between a U.S. oiler and the Japanese and Chinese 
oilers exemplify the difference between an oiler built for sustained blue water 
deployments out of region compared to one that can only support brief blue water 
deployments out of region—the difference between a regional global power projection 
force and a regional SLOC defense force. 
In sum, the PLAN’s blue water capabilities are not as large as other regional 
powers like Japan or the United States, but it is closing the gap—and closing quickly 
relative to Japan’s destroyer fleet (China has 26 destroyers relative to Japan’s 39).296 
PLAN modernization has allowed for its newer destroyers to be assessed as equals to 
comparable U.S. and Western ships, and allows for deployments outside of East Asian 
region. Expansion of the logistical fleet is complimenting the blue water combatants to 
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make sustained global deployments possible for a limited portion of the PLAN’s blue 
water fleet—as has been evident in Fuchi-class oilers being deployed as part of the 
ongoing PLAN counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. 
f. Amphibious Capabilities 
Although the PLAN’s amphibious lift capabilities have not significantly expanded 
since modernization began, all troop and equipment carrying platforms have been 
improved and modernized. Cole asserts that the PLAN’s troop-carrying capability is 
limited to approximately one mechanized division.297 China would certainly need the 
capability to carry more than one mechanized division to enforce any power projection 
aspirations, and civilian sealift cooperation would likely be required even in amphibious 
operations against Taiwan. However, the PLAN is steadily increasing the seaworthiness 
of its amphibious forces and laying the groundwork for future power projection 
capabilities.  
In addition to producing forty-seven modern smaller landing ships to replace 
obsolete versions, three state-of-the-art LPDs have been commissioned in the last five 
years.298 Cole argues that the Cole argues that these three Yuzhao LPDs are 
“straightforward copies” of the U.S. San Antonio class LPDs.299 The Yuzhao LPDs are 
the first PLAN vessels to incorporate a well deck—giving them amphibious assault 
capabilities—a significant a necessary component of a power projection strategy. 
Moreover, the Yuzhao can embark 500–800 marines along with its equipment—to 
include 4 LCACs and 2 helicopters.,300 the new LPDs have blue water capabilities and 
can be deployed globally—albeit they would have to deploy with area AAW and ASuW 
capable platforms since all of its armaments are short-range last resort defensive weapons 
(like the AK630 CIWS) as is the case for most modern amphibious assault ships. 
Although the Yuzhao LPDs could provide a critical component of a power projection 
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strategy, there are not enough of them in the PLAN fleet to employ power projection 
except in an extremely limited scenario—like hypothetical portions of a complex Taiwan 
situation. China would like need to seize a port and use commercial shipping to provide 
the needed logistical lift to support an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Moreover, the 
serious power projection capabilities from amphibious assault vessels come from strike 
capable LHAs/LHDs, which China has yet to invest in. 
In addition to blue water LPDs, Jane’s assessed that China is currently in the 
early stages of domestically building a big deck LHA capable of embarking eight 
helicopters, four LCACs, and over 1,000 marines—the U.S. DOD calculates that 
construction on the LHA will begin within five years.301 Notably, the LHA that China is 
currently is not capable of embarking strike capable fighter craft, which limits its power 
projection capabilities to situations where air supremacy has already been achieved 
(presumably in a A2/AD scenario involving Taiwan). 
Although the PLAN currently has a modest lift capability of a single mechanized 
division, the addition of three LPDs provides a blue water platform to build on for a 
future power projection and can currently be used to conduct HA/DR missions globally. 
Adding an LHA to the amphibious force will continue to lay the groundwork for power 
projection outside of China’s near seas. However, pursuing helicopter carriers and LPDs 
does not necessarily mean that China is pursuing a global power projection strategy. The 
specifications of China’s LHA match Japan’s Hyuga class helicopter carrier more closely 
than France’s Mistral class LHA. Like the Hyuga class, the PLAN LHA is predicted to 
lack the strike or attack capabilities that the power projection capable Mistral class LHA 
employs. As mentioned in Chapter II, the Mistral class LHA can embark up to 16 attack 
helicopters—double what the under-construction PLAN LHA could embark. However, 
unlike Japan’s Hyuga class helicopter carrier, the new PLAN LHA will likely have the 
ability to embark LCACs and other amphibious lift capabilities that can be used for 
power projection—only modifications to support VSTOL fighter air craft would be 
needed to transform China’s future LHA into a more offensive weapon. 
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In sum, China’s amphibious capabilities remain modest, but it is increasingly able 
to support far seas operations. The primary mission of the amphibious forces is 
undoubtedly a Taiwan strait scenario, but the PLAN amphibious forces would more than 
likely need civilian sea lift assistance to replenish the single marine division that the 
status quo PLAN is capable of landing. China’s blue water LPDs could play a major role 
in future HA/DR missions and are intended to be used for Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW) in addition to a Taiwan Strait scenario—Defense white papers 
from 2008 to 2015 highlight the importance of MOOTW and HA/DR specifically. 
Although the Yuzhou class has yet to be used in a real world HA/DR yet, its 2010 
deployment to the HOA in support of counter-piracy operations prove that it has the 
capability to operate far from China for prolonged periods of time. The PLAN is not 
close to being able to conduct distant power projection missions in the near term, but it is 
slowly building the capabilities that could gradually support power projection missions 
over time. 
g. Aircraft Carriers 
The PLAN commissioned its only aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September of 
2012. Liaoning was originally an unfinished Ukrainian Varyag class carrier and began 
initial flight integration training after finishing an extensive maintenance period in 
2014.302 Liaoning is capable of embarking up to twenty-four fighter air craft and twelve 
helicopters—to date it is using J-15 fighter aircraft and Z-18J, Z-18F, and Z-9C 
helicopters. Although the commissioning of an aircraft carrier is a significant milestone 
in the PLAN’s modernization program, the carrier air wing it can embark is only half the 
size of a U.S. Carrier Air Wing. Liaoning is more comparable in size and aircraft 
compliment to the French Charles de Gaulle class or British Queen Elizabeth class 
carriers, although the French and British carriers are considered to be more 
technologically advanced and capable of longer range missions. Moreover, the Liaoning 
does not give the PLAN immediate power projection capabilities. The 2015 Annual 
Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC states,  
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The LIAONING’s smaller size limits the number of aircraft it can embark, 
while the ski-jump configuration limits restricts fuel and ordnance load. 
The LIAONING is therefore best suited to fleet air defense missions, 
extending air cover over a fleet operating far from land-based coverage. 
Although it possesses a full suite of weapons and combat systems, 
LIAONING will likely continue to play a significant role in training 
China’s carrier pilots, deck crews, and developing tactics that will be used 
with later, more capable carriers.303 
As identified by the 2015 Congressional Report, the Liaoning’s greatest value 
comes in initiating the training regimen that can be used on larger future aircraft carriers. 
Moreover, training and operating on the Liaoning gives its pilots the operational 
experience needed to influence future doctrine and tactics. Additionally, the facilities the 
PRC has built to support the construction, maintenance, and upkeep of the Liaoning can 
be used to support future carrier procurement. As discussed in Chapter II, France’s 
Charles de Gaulle class carrier is a strike capable carrier that has twice the number of 
strike fighters as the Liaoning can also employ a C2 aircraft to broaden the aircraft early 
warning capabilities needed for achieving air superiority in a power projection scenario. 
Liaoning is incapable of providing both the strike and C2 capabilities needed for power 
projection. 
The 2015 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments 
Involving the PRC assess that China is pursuing an indigenous aircraft carrier program 
and it is building the industrial and logistical capacity to build multiple aircraft carriers in 
the next 15 years.304 Jane’s further asserts that China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier is 
expected to be launched by 2017 (and enter service several years later) with a second 
aircraft carrier completed within the next six years.305 In December of 2015, Chinese 
Ministry of Defense officials confirmed that the first indigenous aircraft carrier was being 
built and would use the same short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) 
configuration used on the Liaoning—during the same conference it was confirmed that 
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more advanced catapult systems were being developed for future models to move away 
from the STOBAR configuration.306  
China’s aircraft carrier program marks a substantial shift in seeking future power 
projection capabilities. Although the current carriers in production or commissioned are 
relegated to a fleet air defense role, the PLAN is building the foundation for more 
advanced platforms. The current carrier program could be viewed as a status symbol 
more so than a shift to a power projection strategy, but if future carrier models rival the 
size and capabilities of the U.S. carriers, it would seem to confirm that China is seeking 
to employ a limited power projection strategy outside of the East Asian region. 
Conversely, if future carriers stay small, it would point to a regional strategy with power 
projection only possible in very limited situations—as is the case currently. 
h. C4ISR 
The PLAN has developed a sophisticated C4ISR network that allows for 
advanced early warning of surface, air, and subsurface combatants operating near China 
and facilitates the use of its OTH ASCMs and ASBMs. A 2015 report to Congress on 
China’s modernization states, “These systems reportedly include land-based over-the-
horizon backscatter (OTH-B) radars, land-based over-the-horizon surface wave (OTH-
SW) radars, electro-optical satellites, radar satellites, and seabed sonar networks.”307 ONI 
assesses that the most reliable intelligence China gains are from ships at sea—to include 
fishing boats outfitted with the commercial Automatic Identification System that provides 
precise GPS locations that can be used when reporting a warship sighting—and from its 
aircraft—like the KJ-200s (airborne early warning similar to the U.S. AWACS) and Y-
8JB ELINT aircraft.308  
Land based Skywave OTH radars used in conjunction with satellite imagery 
significantly bolster the PLAN’s intelligence picture past its near seas—more importantly 
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they can potentially provide targeting data for the DF-21D ASBM or at a minimum 
vector vessels with the data link capabilities to areas suspected to have adversarial 
forces.309 Additionally, China has made significant strides in its space program. Roger 
Cliff argues that if China maintains its current trajectory of satellite deployment, “in 2020 
China would have: seven optical reconnaissance satellites, four radar reconnaissance 
satellites, eight electronic intelligence satellites, four groups of ocean reconnaissance 
satellites, seven missile launch early warning satellites, and thirty-five navigation 
satellites.”310 The PLAN has expanded its reconnaissance capabilities by investing in 
surveillance ships. Four Dongdiao class intelligence collection ships have been 
commissioned since 2000. The PLAN also receives ISR from its improved submarine 
force outside its near seas and stealthy Houbei patrol craft within its near seas. The space 
program in conjunction with PLAN modernization has allowed for a major increase in 
regional situational awareness, and serves as the basis for OTH targeting data used in the 
ASCM and ASBM systems that give China a high probability of success in a sea denial 
or sea control scenario in its near seas. Each element of China’s C4ISR supports the 
broader situational awareness needed to implement a sea denial strategy in its near seas. 
Having long range, shore-based weaponry without long range intelligence gathering and 
targeting data degrades the capability. Intelligence gather ships (like the Dongdiao) 
extend China’s ISR capabilities outward, but the bulk of China’s most sophisticated 
C4ISR technology is in support of operations in China’s near seas. 
2. Exercises, Recent Deployments, and Concept of Operations  
Since beginning its naval modernization program, the PLAN has gradually 
become more involved with international exercises and far seas deployments. Part of the 
gradual increase is due to introduction of more advanced blue water capable ships to the 
fleet while retiring the older ships left over from before the modernization push. 
Additionally, China’s economic growth—and its dependency on maritime shipping for 
both trade and energy—has highlighted the importance of the SLOC defense mission and 
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the subsequent need for “far seas exercises” and training has been emphasized to gain 
proficiency in operating outside of China’s littorals. The PLAN’s internal fleet exercises, 
multilateral exercises, and sustained deployments have helped the PLAN to gain greater 
proficiency in new mission areas outside of the traditionally emphasized littoral defense 
missions. 
This section will discuss the PLAN’s internal training exercises, multilateral 
exercises, recent deployments, and the concept of operations for a notional deployed 
force in a sea denial or SLOC defense scenario. 
a. Training Exercises 
Up until 2009, the PLAN enlisted forces were limited to sixteen years of service 
and was comprised mostly of conscripts with four-year service contracts. Consequently, 
there was frequent turnover of enlisted forces that resulted in an unsatisfactorily small 
Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) corps within the PLAN.311 The “conscript cycle” 
heavily influenced the PLAN fleet level training cycle. When new conscripts entered the 
fleet in the fall, a training stand down would occur between November and the beginning 
of the new year. Over the coming months, the three geographically fleets would work 
their way up from single ship training to larger flotilla-level training toward the end of 
the year when the cycle started over again. 
Starting in 2009, the PLAN extended the maximum enlisted service length to 
thirty years and shortened enlisted contracts to two years in order to encourage career 
enlisted sailors and expand the NCO component of the PLAN—significantly changing 
the training cycle.312 The effect of the new training cycle is that fleet assets are not 
required to return to lower level training immediately after achieving their peak level of 
readiness in flotilla-exercises. Rather, PLAN forces can continue to build from flotilla-
exercises and take on more advanced missions and exercises. One example is that prior to 
2009—and the development of requisite technology—planned fleet exercises were 
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almost exclusively focused on littoral defense ASuW operations. Since 2009, exercises 
have become increasingly oriented to conduct multiple missions, to include ASW, AAD, 
and C4ISR employment.313 Additionally, larger exercises that included forces from all 
three fleets have occurred regularly since 2013 and have continually increased in tactical 
difficulty. 
Although PLAN exercises have more complex, they have lacked much joint 
interaction between services. Moreover, some exercises that the PLA labels as “joint” 
would certainly not meet that standard in the United States. For example, annual “joint” 
exercises between the PLAN and the PLAAF occur, but the two services act as opposing 
forces rather than as a joint force pursuing a shared operational goal.314 The critical 
weakness in joint training was addressed in the PLA’s 12th Five Year Plan in 2011, and 
improving multi-branch training was on the top of its list of needed training reforms.315 
Until joint training improves, it limits the PLAN’s ability to employ a strategy that 
requires far seas coordination between multiple services—like a power projection 
strategy. A power projection strategy would require seamless integration of the PLA, 
PLAN, and the PLAAF to train to a series of complicated missions—for example: 
defensive counter air, tactical air support, close-in fire support, strategic air lift in support 
of amphibious operations, and strike operations. The respective armed forces would not 
act completely independently of each other in any major combat operation, so better joint 
training exercises are required to establish the doctrine and organizational cohesion 
needed for a joint campaign to be successful—whether the campaign were to involve A2/
AD, power projection, or SLOC defense. 
b. Multilateral Exercises 
The PLAN has regularly participated in multilateral exercises in recent years and 
ONI assesses “the PLA(N) has actively promoted naval diplomacy through goodwill 
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cruises and low-level joint exercises.”316 In response to the U.S. policy of “rebalancing to 
the Pacific,” the PLAN has increased it’s the frequency and size of its bilateral operations 
with Russia. Major bilateral naval exercises between China and Russia occurred in 
August 2012, July of 2013, July of 2014, and April of 2015.317 Each exercise with Russia 
included around 23 ships and submarines, 20 aircraft, and Marine Corps elements to 
conduct exercises that included “hijack rescue, escorting commercial ships, defending a 
convoy from air and sea attack, ASW, live-firing, and SAR.”318 
China participated in the largest multi-lateral naval exercise in the world for first 
time in 2014 by sending four ships to the U.S.-led RIMPAC exercise. The various events 
of RIMPAC shined a positive light on the tactical advances the PLAN have made and 
ONI assessed “China’s successful participation in RIMPAC highlighted its emergence as 
a capable navy in the Pacific and its increasing confidence in showcasing its own 
abilities.”319 The PLAN also hosted a 2014 SAR and HA/DR multi-national naval 
exercise led by ASEAN, which included seven other states and took place off of 
Qingdao—the PLAN participated in a similar ASEAN naval exercise off Brunei in 
2013.320 The gradual increase in participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises—
including some well away from its near seas—has allowed the PLAN to gain valuable 
operational experience while making symbolic gestures of cooperation with other key 
security players in the region.  
c. Deployments  
Routine PLAN deployments to the Gulf of Aden in support of UN counter-piracy 
operations has demonstrated the PLAN’s ability to conduct sustained—albeit limited—
blue water operations well outside the East Asian region. Cole asserts, “The PLAN has 
been making out-of-area deployments since the mid-1970s, for political as well as 
operational reasons, but the counterpiracy deployments—the thirteenth task group 
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departed China in December 2012—mark a new expanded scope for Chinese 
operations.”321 At the end of 2015, the PLAN had conducted over nineteen deployments 
to the Gulf of Aden, and notably sent a Song class submarine to aid in counter-piracy 
operations in 2014.322 The Gulf of Aden deployments are significant for several reasons. 
First, the PLAN has managed to sustain continuous out of area deployments for seven 
years. Second, it highlights the importance of the SLOC defense strategy for the PLAN 
and justifies the expansion of blue water assets to meet accomplish distant SLOC 
defense. China has begun construction on “support facilities” (read “naval base”) in 
Djibouti in February of 2016.323 The Chinese base in Dijibouti signals both a 
commitment to SLOC defense in the region and a big step toward sustaining a constant 
blue water presence outside of the East Asian region. Moreover, there are no other 
facilities currently being built similar to that in Djibouti—even with the extensive One 
Belt One Road policy. While the Djibouti base marks a significant event in PLAN 
overseas operations, the PLAN still needs similar facilities near other key SLOCs (like 
the western portion of the Strait of Malacca and Strait of Hormuz) if it seeks to provide a 
sustained SLOC defense force at all of the most critical SLOCs that China depends on. 
Third, it acts as an example of cooperation and integration into global maritime security 
efforts that can be viewed as a confidence building measure. Finally, it serves to 
contextualize recent changes to the PLAN maritime strategy in the 2015 Defense white 
paper that expand PLAN missions to “open seas protection.”324  
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PLAN Surface Action Groups (SAGs) have made other far seas deployments in 
recent year—including a three ship SAG that transited the Strait of Magellan in South 
America in December of 2013 and a five ship SAG that conducted an innocent passage 
through Alaska’s Aleutian Islands in September of 2015.325 More importantly, the PLAN 
escorted ships carrying Chinese citizens to safety in the Libya conflict of 2011 and out of 
Yemen in 2015, and the PLAN also provided security escorts during the removal of 
Syrian WMDs in 2014. Both instances were significant because of the PRC’s cooperation 
with the global community in situations that intervened in another states’ sovereignty for 
the sake of the domestic citizens—typically a situation the Chinese avoid or speak out 
against. Despite China’s symbolic maritime involvement in the evacuation of its citizens 
from Libya and Yemen, or the escorting of WMDs out of Syria, this has little 
resemblance to the strike-heavy power projection deployments France has conducted 
against Syria or Afghanistan discussed in Chapter II. The sustained out of area 
deployments demonstrates that China has naval aspirations that are certainly beyond its 
near seas, but still indicate that—for now—the aspirations seem to be limited to 
providing SLOC defense assets to key strategic maritime chokepoints. 
d. Concept of Operations  
In both concept of operation described below, information from previous 
deployments and exercises as well as the capabilities of each naval platform are taken 
into consideration for a notional sea denial or SLOC protection scenario—neither of the 
concept of operations are doctrinal, rather they are inferred from past behavior and 
capabilities. For a sea denial scenario, the PLAN would use defense in depth to deny the 
enemy from accessing its near seas by maintaining maritime and air superiority. The first 
layer of defense in China’s littorals would be a combination of Houbei PCs and Jiangdao 
Corvettes that have OTH ASuW capabilities and large numbers which could be used to 
swarm enemy surface combatants and overwhelm its anti-missile defenses. Additionally, 
mines could be used to block access to strategic entrance points and would force an 
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enemy strike group to divert its approaches for attack or to slow to a crawl while 
minesweeping vessels cleared the way—making them easy targets for OTH ASuW 
weapons or submarine attack.  
The next layer of defense would be provided by blue water vessels, like the 
Luyang I-III destroyers or Jiangkai frigates, which can provide area air defense for 
amphibious assault ships making landings—in a Taiwan scenario—or the Liaoning 
aircraft carrier. Additionally, many destroyers and frigates are outfitted with long rang 
ASCMs—including the YJ-18 on the Luyang III that has a 290nm range. Even the less 
capable YJ-83s that are found on older frigates and destroyers provide a credible OTH 
threat that could be used to engage an enemy strike group well outside of China’s 
littorals. Beyond the destroyers and frigates, attack submarines would be deployed both 
for ISR—to detect and localize enemy forces—and to act as an ASuW threat with the SS-
N-27 Sizzler or YJ-18 ASCM capabilities the majority of the submarine fleet possesses. 
The furthest layer of defense comes from the shore based mobile DF-21D ASBMs. 
Targeting data for engaging the enemy fleet with DF-21Ds would be gained from 
satellites, submarines, surface combatants, and UAVs. The combination of naval and 
shore based maritime assets allow for a formidable defense within 1,500nm of the 
Chinese mainland. The PLAN is increasingly attempting to integrate its three fleets in 
exercises that provide similar training in a red versus blue environment. In 2013, the 
PLAN conducted a 15-day exercise in the Philippine Sea with its naval air, surface, and 
subsurface forces that were focused on 24-hour “combat realistic” operations—a similar 
exercise took place in the Western Pacific in December of 2014.326 Both of these 
exercises focused more on coordination among fleets rather than coordination between 
maritime assets and shore based assets.  
In a SLOC defense scenario, the scale of operation would be much smaller. A 
submarine would be deployed ahead of the SAG to provide ISR and act as a credible 
ASuW threat if access to SLOCs were blocked. Additionally, two destroyers and two 
frigates would be deployed and accompanied by an oiler. The surface combatants would 
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be assigned an escort role for merchant shipping or provide AAD and ASuW defense for 
the SAG centered on the oiler—since it would be considered the high value unit in its 
role as a logistical necessity and defenseless unit. The PLAN has enough sophisticated 
blue water submarines, surface ships, and oilers to sustain operations to at least one 
strategic chokepoint—as demonstrated in the Gulf of Aden deployments—but probably 
could have a sustained SAG presence near two strategic chokepoints. 
D. CONCLUSION/SUMMARY 
While the PRC’s long term naval strategy is opaque and will largely adapt to meet 
China’s domestic economic and political demands, there are several inferences that can 
be made regarding the long term trajectory of the PLAN based on current information. 
First, the PLAN is already capable of employing a sea denial strategy in its near seas, 
which was the main priority of modernization after the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis. 
Territorial disputes in the SCS and ECS are important to the PRC, but only the 
sovereignty statuses of Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjian were identified as “core interests” by 
the CCP—signaling that even as the PLAN continues to build up its blue water 
capabilities, near seas sea denial will remain a core competency for the foreseeable 
future.327 Cole asserts, “There is little in China’s decades-old program of naval 
modernization that would support an offensive maritime strategy…Extensive operations 
in ‘blue waters’ or the ‘far seas’ no doubt remains a PLAN ambition, but it is an ambition 
for the future.”328 
The PLAN’s modern submarines, destroyers, and frigates enable China to employ 
a SLOC defense strategy, but the number of “modern” destroyers and frigates in the 
PLAN’s current inventory does not allow it to provide sustained SLOC defense to more 
than one or two strategic choke points at once. Although the absolute number of vessels 
in China’s fleet has remained relatively constant since the beginning of modernization, 
the technological capabilities of the fleet is growing dramatically as advanced indigenous 
vessels are built and replace older obsolete craft from the Cold War—slowly extending 
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the size of its blue water fleet. New investment in LPD, air defense DDGs, and aircraft 
carriers will allow for modest power project capabilities that—to date—are limited to 
regional security scenarios that focus on Taiwan. The PLAN’s amphibious capabilities 
are greater than the they were at the begging of modernization, but are far too limited to 
conduct offensive power projection outside of a Taiwan scenario where a sea denial 
strategy had already been accomplished. The current procurement of more LPDs, aircraft 
carriers, and a LHA—with the ability to deploy marines but without fighter aircraft—
continue to build up a very modest power projection capability whose greatest long term 
value comes from the operational experience, doctrine, and tactics that can be developed 
before investment in a substantial power projection force is pursued (if the PRC choses to 
adopt that strategy).  
Rhetoric from PRC leaders and official policy laid in Defense white papers point 
to an extended global presence for the PLAN, but do not specify to what end—only that 
it will be for peaceful purposes and defense. While Liu Huaqing’s “offshore defense” 
strategy has certainly been adopted and built upon by CCP and PLA leaders, it is unclear 
if Liu’s long term naval strategy aimed at global command of the seas is actively being 
pursued—if it is being pursued the PLAN has made significant progress, but is far behind 
the necessary progress needed achieve global command of the seas by 2050. The PLAN 
modernization, thus far, has been specifically for a sea denial strategy, but has 
increasingly evolved to support a SLOC defense strategy in conjunction with—but 
subordinate to—the sea denial strategy. China’s success or failure in achieving its 
expressed desires to take a leadership role in redesigning the regional maritime security 
structure may have a strong influence over the decision to continue to use its blue water 
force primarily for SLOC defense or to build up power projection capabilities for 
coercive diplomacy.329 In the meantime, the PLAN is capable of a sea denial—and 
potential sea control—strategy in its littorals and limited sustained SLOC defense outside 
of the region. The continued modernization of the PLAN fleet appears to aimed toward 
an expanded global presence capable of wider sustained SLOC defense as a mission of 
secondary importance to sea denial in a scenario involving Taiwan. 
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In the following chapter, direct comparisons will be made between China and 
each archetypal navy reviewed in Chapter II to identify the type of force the PLAN most 
closely resembles. China’s force structure and strategy appear to favor a SLOC protection 
maritime strategy when viewed independently, but the next chapter will identify if the 
PLAN is comparable to the archetypal sea denial, power projection, or SLOC defense 
forces when viewed through the archetypal lens established in Chapter II. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
A. ANALYZING THE COMPARATIVE CASES 
After compiling the relevant data on the archetypal navies and the PLAN, it is 
pertinent to analyze how the archetypes compare to the modernized PLAN. It is difficult 
to draw direct comparisons between states with differing geography, policy, threats, and 
budgets; however, there is still generalizable information on the sea denial, power 
projection, and SLOC protection archetypes that provide insight to the nature of China’s 
modernization. This chapter will provide direct comparisons between China and each 
archetypal navy, provide a final assessment concerning the strategic capabilities of the 
PLAN, and briefly discuss the implications of China’s naval strategy.  
1. Comparing the PLAN and the Royal Swedish Navy 
The PLAN possesses some characteristics of an archetypal sea denial force, but it 
is clearly not being built exclusively for a sea denial strategy—as was the case with the 
Royal Swedish Navy. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996, it became abundantly 
clear just how weak the PLAN was at the time—the U.S. Navy was capable of sending a 
substantial naval force thousands of miles away from its homeland to easily deter a 
Chinese military force in a scenario just over one hundred miles from its homeland. 
Consequently, initial PLAN modernization efforts were made to develop technology that 
emphasized a sea denial strategy to prevent U.S. naval intervention in a Taiwan scenario.  
The A2/AD weapons that China invested in starting in 1996 have direct parallels 
to investments the RSwN made at the onset of the Cold War. RSwN Naval Plan 60 called 
for the navy to be structured by a “light navy concept” that emphasized “fast attack-craft 
with torpedoes and guided missiles, submarines and defensive mines,” while phasing out 
capital ships and complimenting the afloat assets with fortified and mobile artillery 
batteries ashore.330 The PLAN has similarly invested in fast attack craft with ASM and 
ASCMs (Houbei PC and Jiangdao corvettes), submarines with ASCM and minelaying 
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capabilities (Shang SSNs and Yuan SSPs), and a sizeable fleet of minelayers and 
minesweepers which lay sophisticated domestically produced mines (EM-52s and EM-
55s). Additionally, China invested in mobile shore-based batteries to be used in a A2/AD 
scenario, but unlike Sweden, China invested in long range missiles rather than artillery—
including the DF-21D ASBM, which as a 1,500nm range, and mobile YJ-62 ASCM 
batteries with a 150nm range.  
The plethora of sea denial assets the PLAN possesses certainly gives it a sea 
denial capability, but sea denial is an intermediate objective in a larger strategy for the 
PLAN. The use of A2/AD weaponry to employ a sea denial strategy in a Taiwan scenario 
is the top maritime strategic priority of the PLAN—should unification come through 
armed conflict.331 However, once the PLAN developed its sea denial forces, it did not 
stop there. Unlike the RSwN, China has expanded its amphibious forces (to include three 
new LPDs), blue water fleet (Luyang III DDG, Jiangkai II FFG, and logistical support 
vessels like the Fuchi class oiler), and aircraft carrier program. Moreover, China has 
made significant investments in its blue water fleet. In the last ten years, China has 
commissioned nearly the same number of Jiangdao corvettes (26) as it has Jiangkai II 
frigates (22).332 The Jiangdao represents the largest green water ship the PLAN produces 
and costs approximately $50 million per ship.333 The Jiankai II represents the smallest 
new construction blue water ships that the PLAN is building and costs roughly $350 
million per ship—seven times as much per ship, which accounts for an additional $6.4 
billion in spending during the last ten years. China’s destroyers are significantly more 
expensive than its frigates, and the fledgling blue water amphibious force is extremely 
costly as well—if the Yuzhao LPD (that is a near copy of the U.S. San Antonio class 
LPD) shares a similar construction cost as the San Antonio, the Yuzhao LPDs would cost 
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around each $1.8 billion each.334 China has spent tens of billions of dollars to build a 
large and sophisticated blue water fleet that proves its ambitions are not limited to sea 
denial. Additionally, official Chinese Defense Whitepapers have recently expanded the 
role of the PLAN from “offshore waters defense” to include an “open seas protection” 
role for the navy.335  
It is no surprise that the PLAN does not fit the archetypal model of a sea denial 
navy because China has a significantly different strategic outlook than Sweden. Sea 
denial forces tend to be built by states that cannot afford larger navies, so they invest in 
large numbers of inexpensive—but well equipped—vessels that can inflict a high cost on 
any potential invading force. In Sweden’s case, it had a small defense budget—the RSwN 
only receives one-sixth of the meager security budget—that made a sea denial force the 
only feasible solution without greater defense investment. China’s military budget shrank 
during the 1980s, but once economic progress accelerated so did military modernization. 
China now possesses the second largest economy in the world with stable and steady 
growth—allowing China to continue to increase military investment since the 1990s. 
Moreover, China’s maritime geography is significantly different. Unlike Sweden, which 
defends 2,000nm of coastline in the closed off Bay of Bothnia that must be entered 
through a single chokepoint, China has an expansive 11,000nm coastline with a myriad 
of islands and open access. Furthermore, China’s Nine Dash Line claims demand a blue 
water fleet for enforcing the claims. 
China and Sweden’s threats are significantly different as well. Sweden’s greatest 
threat is Russia, which has potential invasion routes over land through Finland and across 
the Baltic Sea. Sweden has assessed the land route as the preeminent threat and has 
invested more in its army and air forces than in its navy—limiting its strategic 
possibilities to sea denial. China’s primary threat is U.S. Navy intervention in the 
region—whether it be by blockade of key SLOCs, power projection in a Taiwan scenario, 
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or protecting disputed territorial claims. Since the U.S. Navy poses a variety of threats to 
Chinese interests in the region, China is modernizing the PLAN to respond to each of 
those threats. Sea denial forces were built up first since preventing U.S. intervention in 
Taiwan is considered most important, but the PLAN is expanding to protect its territorial 
claims and economic interests further away from its littorals.  
In sum, the PLAN has built a sophisticated sea denial force, but sea denial is not 
the long term maritime strategy of the PLAN—only a critical skillset required to ensure a 
successful military campaign in Taiwan should hostilities ensue. China’s threat profile, 
geography, and regional leadership aspirations require a larger and more capable navy 
than an archetypal sea denial force, and it has continued to modernize its forces to carry 
out missions well outside of its near seas. 
2. Comparing the PLAN and the French Navy 
PLAN modernization does not fit into the power projection archetype as 
exemplified by the French Navy. Although China has invested in some of the same types 
of platforms that are the basis of France’s power projection force, the capabilities of the 
PLAN vessels are not currently suited for power projection. One example can be drawn 
from a comparison of China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and France’s aircraft carrier 
Charles de Gaulle and Mistral-class LHDs. Charles de Gaulle can embark nearly twice 
as many fighter craft as the Liaoning and Charles de Gaulle’s air wing includes the 
C4ISR equipped E2-C Hawkeye—allowing for an expansive radar ranges, airborne early 
warning, and relaying track data to other naval platforms through Link-16. Moreover, 
Charles de Gaulle’s C2 suite allows for fleet air defense in addition to power projection. 
Consequently, Charles de Gaulle is capable of sustained strike operations far outside of 
its home waters—as demonstrated in its multiple deployments in support Operation 
Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Operation Chammal against 
ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Mistral LHDs have a similarly advanced C2 system and can 
support sixteen helicopters, two LCACs (or fifty AAVs), and a marine detachment of 450 
personnel. The combination of the Charles de Gaulle and Mistral LHDs give the French 
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the capability to gain air superiority and establish a protected ground presence on foreign 
shores.  
The Liaoning has been assessed by 2015 Annual Report to Congress on Military 
and Security Developments Involving the PRC as being suited for regional conflict and 
fleet air defense, but is not capable of power projection.336 The greatest value provided 
by the Liaoning is in establishing carrier doctrine and training programs for its pilots to 
be used on future carriers. Additionally, Chinese amphibious forces—specifically its 
three newest LPDs—have lift capabilities for its marine forces, but all three Yuzhao class 
LPDs combined do not even embark half of the number of helicopters of one Mistral 
LHD—severely limiting the PLAN’s ability to quickly insert marine forces and their 
equipment deep into enemy territory. Moreover, the greatest symbol of power projection 
that the Chinese possess—an aircraft carrier—is not capable of conducting power 
projection missions. Future Chinese carriers may very well be similarly capable to the 
French carriers and LHDs, but the current Chinese aircraft carrier and amphibious forces 
to not have power projection capabilities—except for in a limited scenario involving 
Taiwan well inside China’s A2/AD umbrella. 
France and China have major differences in their maritime threat picture as well. 
France has land based trade options with the rest of Europe that China does not have. 
France’s nuclear power program also provides relief to its industry by making it less 
dependent on foreign oil than China. Maritime trade is certainly important to France, but 
it is not dependent on it for its economic survival like China. Additionally, France’s 
membership in NATO provides a coalition of defense forces that provide maritime 
protection in the waters around Europe. The NATO partnership allows France to focus 
less on defense and more on offensive power projection without jeopardizing its 
territorial defense that is guaranteed through the NATO alliance. Even if France insists on 
maintaining independent nuclear and conventional power projection forces, it still can fall 
back on NATO if a serious threat arose in Europe. China does not have the luxury of a 
massive regional mutual defense pact or land based trade network. Furthermore, ensuring 
                                                 
336 “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic 
of China 2015,” 10–11. 
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China’s economic viability by protecting key SLOCs and preventing outside interference 
in “domestic” issues like Taiwan unification dominate Chinese defense policy, rather 
than power projection.  
The stated defense goals of the French and Chinese governments are also 
significantly different. Since the 1960s, French leadership has been vocal about its 
intentions to maintain independent nuclear and conventional forces capable of power 
projection in order to ensure France has its opinions more seriously considered in 
international decision making. Moreover, France’s overseas territories require a power 
projection force to protect—four of the six military scenarios the 2013 French white 
paper identifies for its armed forces to prepare for involve power projection.337 Chinese 
Defense Whitepapers maintained “offshore waters defense” as the naval strategy for 
twenty years and only recently added “open waters protection” to the naval strategy—
neither of which insinuate power projection in any way. 
In sum, China neither has the capabilities nor the stated intent to currently carry 
out power projection missions. Some of its recent investments—like in an aircraft carrier 
and amphibious force—may provide a foundation to build a power projection force upon, 
but for now that foundation is small, weak, and incapable of conducting power projection 
outside of a Taiwan scenario (which would be heavily dependent on sea denial forces to 
provide for security, unlike a true power projection scenario outside of China’s littorals or 
the East Asian region). Moreover, China’s primary maritime security concerns involve 
SLOC protection and sea denial in protection of national sovereignty, but France’s 
security concerns involve protecting overseas territories and stated overseas political and 
economic interests. Additionally, China’s new naval platforms—like its aircraft carrier, 
LPDs, and blue water frigates and destroyers—have not changed the regional balance of 
power in important regional security issues. China’s land reclamation projects and 
expansive Nine Dash Line claims are not affected by many of their new capabilities 
because China already had relative superiority over the rest of the Spratly Island 
claimants well before it had a substantial blue water fleet. China’s naval strength relative 
                                                 
337 Gómez, “The Waning Power,” 422. 
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to other regional powers—like Japan and the United States—is growing, but it is still 
unclear just how much China will build up the PLAN and how it will impact China’s 
political relationship with other key regional actors. One argument is that China’s 
continuous deployments to the HOA in support of counter piracy operations is an 
example of power projection, but I disagree. Continuous deployments to the HOA to 
protect commercial shipping from ill-equipped and marginally trained pirates does not 
require the same sophisticated forces as achieving air and sea superiority as a means to 
project power inland in a state that outside of the near seas of the power projecting force. 
China’s HOA deployments point toward a SLOC defense strategy more than a power 
projection strategy.  
3. Comparing the PLAN and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force 
Significant portions of China’s naval modernization have parallels to the JMSDF 
and the SLOC defense archetype. China and Japan both face a similar dependence on 
energy imports and trade exports, which makes SLOC protection a critical component of 
both states’ maritime strategies. SLOC defense has been acknowledged as a key 
component of JMSDF strategy since the 1960s, and in the 1980s it extended the 
perimeter of acceptable SLOC defense operations out to 1,000nm. My interpretation of 
the “open seas operations” stated in the 2015 China’s Military Strategy document is that 
it is primarily referring to SLOC defense. Moreover, recent deployments by both Japan 
and China support a SLOC defense strategy. Japan regularly deploys its DDGs to the 
Strait of Malacca to provide SLOC protection, and China’s sustained counter-piracy 
deployments to the HOA are also focused on protecting the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait as a 
key SLOC for trading with Europe. China and Japan’s similar dependence on maritime 
trade and SLOC protection deployments enforce the notion that China the PLAN to act as 
a substantial SLOC protection force. 
There some are difficulties in making a direct comparison between PLAN 
modernization and the JMSDF. First, the JMSDF does not resemble the size or force 
structure of the PLAN. This is for multiple reasons. The JMSDF does not currently 
require A2/AD technology because it is a unified state with no threat of invasion or 
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external actors intervening in its internal affairs. Whereas China has built up a sizable sea 
denial force, Japan does not need one. Additionally, the JMSDF is integrated into the 
U.S. Navy’s regional security apparatus. With a powerful ally that is forwardly deployed 
within Japan’s homeland, it does not need as large of a force as China to complete the 
same missions. France’s membership in NATO and Japan’s bilateral alliance with the 
United States allows both states to maintain smaller navies for more specific strategies 
while relying on their allies to bolster their shortcomings in relevant missions that are 
unaffordable—China does not have the same luxury. The most notable example is 
Japan’s dependence on the United States for nuclear deterrence, but also extends to the 
BMD defense the U.S. Navy provides Japan—both through technology transfers and 
forward deployed naval vessels. Moreover, since Japan fits into the U.S. led regional 
maritime security apparatus, it does not need to build a huge fleet. Conversely, if China 
wants to lead a new regional maritime security system, it would require China to build up 
a regional maritime security force competitive with what the U.S. Navy currently 
provides the region already. Since China is looking to become a regional security leader, 
it has to focus on the most prominent regional security problems. SLOC protection is the 
preeminent maritime security concern—and maritime security is the preeminent regional 
security concern because of its central role in regional economic growth—which makes 
SLOC protection a critical capability that the PLAN must provide if China hopes to 
become a regional maritime security leader. 
Article Nine of the Japanese constitution places restrictions on the JMSDF 
preventing it from maintaining an offensive force, but Japan has slowly expanded its 
definition of self-defense to include vital SLOCs. Additionally, homeland defense is the 
primary purpose of the JMSDF. There are some similar parallels to China’s stated 
defense policy and Japan’s defense restrictions that result from Article Nine. Although 
China has no constitutional restraints, its political rhetoric has repeatedly asserted it 
wishes to rise peacefully, rejects intervention in the foreign affairs of other sovereign 
states, and states the crucial importance of SLOC protection for China’s economy. 
Furthermore, Chinese policy has indicated that protection of its territory—most 
importantly Taiwan—would be the only foreseeable scenario where it permits the wide 
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scale use of its armed forces in conflict. Of course China’s peaceful rise rhetoric may be a 
deceptive ruse to bide time until it is more powerful, but it could also be a genuine 
strategy to gain credibility and good favor with neighboring states that could see China’s 
expansive force being used for the greater good of the region by providing SLOC 
security—perhaps the best means to an end where China becomes the regional security 
leader. However, China’s “peaceful rise” rhetoric is far less binding and more open to 
interpretation than Japan’s Article Nine—which has seen the definition of “self-defense” 
broaden significantly. In both cases, Japan and China have used SLOC defense to expand 
their naval forces without losing political credibility. Japan does so under the guise of 
“self-defense” by defending its economic lifeblood, and China has expanded its blue 
water forces for the same reason. Having a powerful SLOC defense force that actively 
deploys in defense of regional trade gives China more credibility and leverage to assert 
itself a credible alternative to the United States for leading the regional security 
apparatus. Additionally, if China seeks to limit the dominant role the U.S. Navy has in 
the region, it would push to assume a larger leadership role in reshaping the regional 
security apparatus. If China were to become the regional security leader, it would require 
a force that can provide security to the broader Asian region. Providing regional maritime 
security includes ensuring key SLOCs remain open, ensuring regional states adhere to 
maritime law and established norms, and providing a more general security against 
negative external actors. It is debatable whether or not the United States consistently lives 
up to the previously discussed requirements, but the U.S. Navy is clearly the most 
powerful maritime security actor in the region—which allows the United States to dictate 
many of the norms in the maritime realm. Maritime security is a key component to 
regional economic growth and the PLAN must be a powerful force capable of providing 
security throughout the mammoth East Asian maritime environment, which requires a 
force substantially larger and more capable than one that is built primarily for sea 
denial—a SLOC defense strategy would give them a solid foundation to begin providing 
more expansive maritime security to region. 
One advantage to building a fleet primarily for SLOC defense is that it provides a 
solid foundation to build from if future needs for power projection arise. A blue water 
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force capable of conducting fleet air defense and sea control is required to protect high 
value targets—like aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious ships—in a power projection 
force in order to gain air and sea superiority. Japan and China have both invested in 
submarines with AIP technology that can be used to escort a SAG or prevent the 
blockade of a strategic SLOC. While nuclear submarines are a better SLOC defense asset 
because of their substantially longer window of submerged operations, AIP equipped 
diesel submarines can remain submerged for two weeks (and up to a month under the 
right operating conditions) but are much cheaper to build and maintain. Consequently, 
AIP submarines provide a cost effective option for routine SLOC protection missions that 
are not expected to last indefinitely. In Japan’s case, they can rely on U.S. Navy 
submarines in a scenario where SLOC protection would be required for an extended 
amount of time. Moreover, China could use their growing fleet of Shang class 
submarines in an extended SLOC defense scenario.  
The blue water forces built up by Japan and China have sophisticated AAW and 
ASuW weapons that can be used to protect valuable shipping assets, other ships in the 
SAG, or high value units—in the SLOC context the SAG oiler is the high value unit since 
it provides the logistical support required for sustained operations. Japan and China have 
both invested in large and sophisticated destroyer fleets—Japan with 39 and China with 
26, but only half of Japan’s and China’s destroyers are the most technologically 
advanced. Although China lacks destroyers in comparison to Japan, its fleet of 55 frigates 
dwarfs the JMSDF’s six frigates. When combined, Japan and China have similar sized 
blue water fleets with advanced ASuW capabilities. China’s focus on making formidable 
ASuW surface and subsurface platforms—at the expense of other mission areas like 
BMD—further hints at a SLOC strategy for the immediate future since the biggest 
current threats to the SLOCs are piracy and blockade. Furthermore, the LHA the PLAN is 
currently building is predicted to be similar to Japan’s helicopter carrier—which is has 
primarily been used for HA/DR efforts and as a C2 hub. Japan and China both are 
heavily dependent on maritime trade, and they have both built up the blue water forces 
necessary to protect maritime interests far from their home seas. Moreover, the strong 
blue water forces both states possess are large enough to conduct escort operations and 
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support a power projection force. Neither Japan nor China possess a power projection 
fleet, but they both have the blue water assets necessary to support the future 
development of a power projection force—should either state decide to pursue it.  
With advanced blue water and submarine technology, all Japan and China are 
missing are aircraft carriers or big deck amphibious ships capable of power projection. 
Japan’s Hyuga-class helicopter carrier platform could be quickly redesigned to 
incorporate strike aircraft, and China’s Liaoning aircraft carrier will be used to establish 
doctrine for future carrier development that could include larger carriers capable of power 
projection—if the PLAN desires the power projection capability. Building a regional 
SLOC defense navy for an expansive and complex maritime environment like East Asia 
gives both Japan and China the framework to build a larger power projection force 
relatively quickly since the support framework for the centerpieces of a power projection 
force are already in place.  
In sum, PLAN modernization for SLOC defense makes the most sense currently 
based on China’s force structure and stated political aims. While China’s long term 
maritime strategy has been much more opaque than Japan’s—and is not constrained 
constitutionally like Japan—its military investments and regional political discourse 
support the notion that its current strategy is SLOC defense.  
4. Final Assessment 
The CCP has not formally adopted Liu Huaqing’s maritime strategy—which 
called to achieve sea control in the first island chain by 2000, sea denial within the 
second island chain by 2020, and a dominant global naval force by 2050—but it has 
made significant progress toward achieving the first two goals. Adopting a SLOC 
protection strategy for the long term would still lend the PLAN toward massing a naval 
force that could exert sea control within the first island chain and sea denial in the second 
island chain, but not a dominant global force—which would require significant power 
projection assets. Chinese political rhetoric has expressed desires for China to become the 
regional leader for security cooperation, but it has not expressed similar desires for global 
leadership. Like the United States and the Monroe Doctrine, China could be attempting to 
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exert regional control before it moves onto a broader global leadership role, but at this 
point China has expressed neither the political desire nor built the requisite equipment to 
become a global power projection force. Moreover, why would China need a global 
power projection force in the current global environment? Sea denial and SLOC 
protection strategies have clear links to Chinese defense policy and its economic 
viability—especially should the U.S. Navy try to intervene in a Taiwan scenario or block 
access to key SLOCs in response to Chinese actions. Conversely, power projection 
capabilities are tied to missions that the Chinese has historically spoken out against—like 
intervention in the sovereignty of other states. 
China’s quick development of a sea denial force does not indicate an overarching 
long term sea denial strategy. Employing a sea denial—and potentially sea control—
strategy in a Taiwan scenario is certainly a key component of China’s maritime policy, 
but China’s maritime interests are not limited to preventing intervention in a Taiwan 
scenario. China’s economic growth is dependent on maintaining unimpeded accesses to 
the global maritime commons—especially through key SLOC chokepoints. Before PLAN 
modernization, China depended on the U.S. Navy to provide maritime security in East 
Asia, but China used its increasing military budget to build a sizable navy and desires a 
leading voice in establishing new regional security norms. As China’s power grows, it 
expects its representation in the regional security apparatus to grow as well. This is not to 
say that China desires to get rid of the United States from the East Asian region all 
together, rather it is seeking to ensure that Asia is led by Asians—especially in the 
security realm. The United States has credibility in East Asia after providing regional 
maritime security for decades, and if China desires to take over the reigns as the regional 
security leader it must be able to provide a similar amount of maritime security.  
The U.S. Navy encountered a similar situation in the 1800s when it declared the 
Monroe Doctrine—declaring that all future European colonization of the Western 
Hemisphere would not be tolerated—but the United States did not have the navy to 
enforce such a bold proclamation. Over the course the 1800s, the United States relied 
upon the British to enforce the Monroe Doctrine until the U.S. Navy was formidable 
enough to enforce the Monroe Doctrine itself—an achievement that was not achieved 
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until after Admiral Dewey’s overwhelming defeat of the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay in 
1898 or perhaps the global deployment of Teddy Roosevelt’s “Great White Fleet” from 
1907–1909. The United States maintained its status as an isolationist regional naval 
power until it was propelled into its status as a global naval leader after the end of World 
War II. Similarly, China must prove its ability to enforce its desires for regional security 
before having the credibility to move on to any greater global ambitions—assuming these 
ambitions develop in the first place.  
This thesis finds that China’s current long term maritime goals aim to build a 
large SLOC defense navy that is capable of providing regional maritime security and 
security for SLOCs that are outside of the region but are essential for East Asian 
economic stability. China’s sea denial force was built for a singular purpose—protection 
of territorial claims, most notably Taiwan. Moreover, by building a large naval force 
strategically focused on regional SLOC defense, China also has the foundation to build 
upon should it choose to pursue a global power projection power force. In other words, a 
SLOC defense force—combined with the sea denial force already assembled—gives 
China the option to stay regionally focused for now, but the ability to move toward a 
power projection force if it changes its security policy in the future. If the PLAN is 
capable of taking the lead in providing maritime security in one of the largest and most 
complex maritime environments in the world, it gives it a leg up in trying to expand its 
naval ambitions to global command of the sea if the political will and economic growth 
expand to accommodate global ambitions.  
5. Future Prospects and Implications 
Although the current PLAN strategy is grounded in SLOC defense, it is difficult 
to ascertain what the long term evolution of the PLAN will entail. Several factors that are 
difficult to predict will weigh heavily on the future direction of the PLAN. First, PLAN 
modernization has occurred simultaneously with economic modernization and staggering 
sustained economic growth rates. If China’s economic growth sputters as a host of 
domestic considerations converge—aging population, middle income trap, losing the 
momentum gained during the initial mobilization of capital without the requisite “Total 
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Factor Productivity” growth occurring concurrently338—the CCP’s maritime ambitions 
may be forced to shrink to ensure that domestic indicators of legitimacy are funded first. 
Moreover, an economic slowdown could lead to the development of a more pragmatic, 
sustainable, and predictable long term defense policy because it will reveal how much the 
CCP is willing to invest in the PLAN when the economy is not growing as quickly. If the 
CCP uses military spending in a similar way that it has used infrastructure investment, 
the PLAN could continue to grow despite broader economic slowdown—to use military 
modernization as a way to stimulate the economy. Conversely, economic slowdown 
could also cause military investment to level out or decrease. It is unclear when China’s 
economic growth will slow down, to what extent it will slow down, or how quickly it will 
slow down.  
Another major factor that will influence future Chinese military strategy is the 
American reaction to China’s pursuit for a larger regional leadership role. The rebalance 
to the Pacific policy the United States enacted emphasizes the critical importance of the 
East Asian region to U.S. security policy. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the United 
States would endorse Chinese leadership in the regional maritime security realm. 
However, if the United States seeks a policy to support broader maritime security 
partnerships that include Chinese and U.S. leadership—rather than the hub-and-spoke 
bilateral alliances—China could become satisfied with its role in regional security and 
not pursue more ambitious maritime goals that would necessitate a power projection 
force. China has shown some restraint in its naval modernization as to prevent fears that 
it is seeking to challenge the United States. If China seeks to fit into the U.S.-led global 
maritime security system as a regional leader and partner with the United States, it may 
allow for China’s military to grow peacefully.  
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If the United States and China do not find ways to cooperate and build confidence 
in their relationship, regional conflict could ignite over a number of territorial disputes 
that lead to a broader assertion by China that it should be the regional leader. China has 
remained ambiguous concerning red lines in disputed territorial claims like the Spratly 
Islands and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but the United States acknowledged that its 
defense treaty with Japan encompasses territories that Japan has administrative control 
over—which includes the Senkakus. If China makes clearer and more assertive 
declarations of territorial sovereignty and acts on its claims, it could threaten the U.S. 
spoke and hub alliance system as the United States must decide whether it is worth 
risking open war with China over the Spratly Islands or the Senkakus—a decision that 
could undermine the credibility of the United States to its allies if it fails to act, or lead to 
war over a seemingly insignificant piece of land to protect the status of the United States 
in the region. Conflict between the United States and China is not inevitable, as both 
China must choose to assert itself as the outright regional leader—and act on those 
assertions vis-a-vi enforcing territorial disputes like the Spratlys, Senkaku/Diaoyus, or 
Taiwan—and the United States must reject a preeminent Chinese role in regional 
leadership for conflict to become more likely. 
At the moment, China’s regional ambitions and SLOC defense strategy are 
compatible. Future economic and geostrategic factors will strongly influence whether 
China limits its ambitions to becoming the regional security leader in East Asia or if it is 
interested in slowly accumulating a dominant global navy similarly to the United States. I 
believe there is little chance that China decides to build a global navy akin to the United 
States because of the political and economic cost of doing so. For the foreseeable future 
the PLAN will remain a sophisticated and formidable navy capable of sea denial in its 
littorals and sustained SLOC protection in the East Asian region and beyond. 
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